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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Supply Chain Collaboration
In the course of the last decades, companies started to realize the benefits of setting
up a supply chain collaboration (SCC). Various challenges such as scarce resources,
increased competition among the organizations and higher customer expectations
forced companies to look outside their organizational boundaries to search for par-
ties with whom they can collaborate (Cao and Zhang, 2011; Lambert et al., 1996).
The need for launching an SCC is stressed by Whipple and Frankel (2000), who
postulate that competition no longer takes place between firms but between sup-
ply chains. According to Horvath (2001), SCC is the driving force behind effective
supply chain management (SCM). Cooper et al. (1997) defines SCM as the ”in-
tegration of business processes from the end user through the original suppliers
that provides products, services and information that add value for customers”.
In contrast, SCC can be defined as ”two or more independent companies working
jointly to plan and execute [...] operations with greater success than when acting
in isolation” (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002).
SCCs can be differentiated based on their structure and their level of integra-
tion. According to Simatupang and Sridharan (2002), three different SCC struc-
tures can be distinguished: vertical, horizontal and lateral. In a vertical SCC,
two or more parties from different supply chain levels, such as the manufacturer,
the logistics service provider (LSP) and the retailer, collaborate in order to im-
prove the supply chain performance. Well-known examples of vertical SCCs are
1
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vendor managed inventory (VMI), efficient customer response (ECR) and collab-
orative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) (Simatupang and Srid-
haran, 2002). In contrast, horizontal SCCs occur when two or more unrelated or
competing parties from the same supply chain level collaborate (Cruijssen et al.,
2007b; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). According to Cruijssen et al. (2007b),
examples of horizontal SCCs are manufacturers consolidation centers (MCCs) as
well as joint route planning. Lateral SCCs aim at gaining more flexibility through
combining and sharing capabilities of vertical and horizontal dimensions (Simatu-
pang and Sridharan, 2002). An example of a lateral SCC is the synchronization of
several manufacturers and LSPs in an effective transport network (Mason et al.,
2007).
Beside a structural distinction, SCCs can be differentiated based on their level
of integration. As shown in Figure 1.1, relationships between two or more parties
range from arm’s length relationships to full integration. In this thesis, relation-
ships that can be identified as SCCs are situated in between arm’s length rela-
tionships and full integration. This is in line with Cruijssen et al. (2007b) and
Lambert et al. (1996).
Figure 1.1: Relationship types (modified from Lambert et al. (1996))
An arm’s length relationship is purely transactional and has no degree of col-
laboration since there is no incentive of joint commitment or operations (Kampstra
et al., 2006; Lambert et al., 1996). An example of this kind of relationship is sub-
contracting. In the context of the transport and logistics industry, Cruijssen et al.
(2007b) describe an arm’s length relationship between two LSPs who subcontract
capacity to each other. In contrast, full integration requires some sort of merging
activity (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Lambert et al., 1996). One example is PepsiCo,
Incorporation (Inc.) which purchased restaurants from the brands Taco Bell, Cor-
poration (Corp.), Pizza Hut, Inc. and Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) to ensure
the distribution of its products in these restaurants (Lambert et al., 1996). In
between these two extremes, three SCC types are situated differing in their level
2
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of integration (Lambert et al., 1996). In Table 1.1, key characteristics of these
SCC types are outlined. SCC Type I refers to a short-term relationship between
collaborative parties which perceive each other as coalition partners. Neverthe-
less, the collaboration is on a limited basis and only refers to the coordination of
activities and planning. Furthermore, it involves just one division/function. In
an SCC Type II, the activities and planning are not just coordinated but inte-
grated. The collaboration is planned on a long-term horizon and involves multiple
divisions/functions. In case a significant integration of the collaboration, it can
be referred to as an SCC Type III. In this type of collaboration, the parties per-
ceive each other as an extension of their own company. The collaboration has
no fixed termination date and the collaborative parties share a significant level of
operational integration.
Table 1.1: SCC types (based on the definitions outlined in Cruijssen et al. (2007b)
and Lambert et al. (1996))
Level of Integration Time Horizon Division/Function
Involvement
Type
I
Solely coordination of
activities and planning
Short term Single
division/function
Type
II
Integration of activities
and planning
Long-term, but
finite length
Multiple
divisions/functions
Type
III
Integration on a
significant level
No fixed
termination
date
All organizational
divisions/functions
Within this thesis, strategic alliances are considered as another possible way to
collaborate. An affiliation of a strategic alliance to one of the relationship types in
Figure 1.1 is often discussed in literature. According to e.g. Nanda and Williamson
(1995), strategic alliances relate to merged relationships and, hence, are assigned
to the relationship level full integration. However, referring to Hagedoorn and
Sadowski (1999), only 2.6% of all strategic alliances are merged relationships. Ac-
cording to this statement, a strategic alliance will be assigned to an SCC type;
typically to Type III (Cruijssen et al., 2007b).
In this thesis, vertical, horizontal and lateral SCCs are considered. Chapter 2
deals with all three structural types. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on vertical SCCs,
3
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whereas Chapter 5 relates to horizontal SCCs. Regarding the level of integration,
the focus is on the three SCC types, including strategic alliances, outlined in
Table 1.1. The two extremes, arm’s length relationships and full integration, are
not considered to be SCCs and are therefore out of scope.
1.2 Supply Chain Collaborations: Successes and
Failures
Several researchers (e.g. Boddy et al., 2000; Cao and Zhang, 2011; Lambert et al.,
1996) outline sustainable competitive advantages that can be achieved through
SCC. According to Lambert et al. (1996), SCC might leverage unique expertise
and skills from all collaborative parties. Furthermore, a successful SCC can lead
to lower costs in e.g. manufacturing, inventory and distribution (Horvath, 2001;
Stank et al., 2001). Besides the reduction of costs, Stank et al. (2001) also men-
tion an improved service performance as an SCC outcome. Other competitive
advantages might be an increased customer satisfaction as well as a cycle time
reduction (Daugherty et al., 2006). One example of a successful SCC in practice is
the collaboration of Walmart Inc. and The Procter & Gamble Company (P&G),
who experienced significant success through a joint forecast of sales for P&G prod-
ucts at Walmart Inc. stores and a joint planning of corresponding replenishment
strategies (Attaran and Attaran, 2007).
Despite the fact that SCC may have significant benefits, multiple collaborative
incentives fail (Bititci et al., 2007). According to Sabath and Fontanella (2002),
the “supply chain collaboration is at the same time the most used, the most fre-
quently misunderstood, the most popular - and the most disappointing - strategy
that has come along to date”. In the context of horizontal SCCs, Schmoltzi and
Wallenburg (2011) outline that 50 to 70% of all collaborations break down. Re-
garding SCCs in general, 50 to even 77% of all collaborations fail (Zineldin et al.,
2015). In the literature, several reasons for unsuccessful SCCs are discussed. Ac-
cording to Fawcett et al. (2012), one main challenge for SCCs is a lack of trust.
Sherman (1992) points out that one-third of all alliances fail due to a lack of trust
among the collaborative parties. Another challenge mentioned in the scientific
literature might be the power imbalance between SCC partners. In Bretherton
and Carswell (2002), the issue of asymmetrical relationships is described. In the
4
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case of an asymmetrical relationship, the parties have different levels of power.
As a result of this power imbalance, Bretherton and Carswell (2002) claim that
these collaborations are less stable compared to symmetrical relationships. Fur-
thermore, Autry (2011) highlights another SCC challenge: the identification and
understanding of all relevant drivers and resistors before launching the SCC. In
order to eliminate obstacles before they lead to a breakdown of the SCC, it is
necessary to be aware of these impediments. In addition, according to Cruijssen
et al. (2007a) and Leng and Parlar (2009), another main difficulty for the im-
plementation and success of SCCs is a fair allocation of the coalition gain. If
one party is not satisfied with or does not accept the assigned gain share, future
collaborations are less likely to occur (Jap, 2001). Identifying the right party to
collaborate with represents another major challenge for the implementation of a
successful SCC (Cruijssen et al., 2007a). According to Barratt (2004) and Lam-
bert et al. (1996), parties are not able to collaborate with too many potential
parties due to the resource intensive nature of SCCs. Moreover, Brouthers et al.
(1995) state that collaborating with an unsuitable partner might lead to more or-
ganizational damage than not collaborating. In order to select a suitable partner,
parties need specific information about their potential coalition partners, such as
organizational capabilities. Since this kind of information is often kept private,
the partner selection process might be an expensive and difficult task (Cruijssen
et al., 2007b, Verdonck, 2017). One practical example of an SCC which ended
unsuccessfully is the collaboration between KLM Royal Dutch Airlines N.V. and
Northwest Airlines (Bititci et al., 2007). Their dyadic relationship was not con-
tinued due to ineffective communication. General Motors Company and Daewoo
also terminated their collaboration prematurely. A lack of trust in the relationship
as well as a lack of understanding for each other could be identified as the main
reasons for the terminated cooperation (Bititci et al., 2007).
1.3 Research Objectives and Thesis Outline
SCC has a huge potential. However, realizing its potential requires further inves-
tigation (Goffin et al., 2006). Moreover, the costs of SCC failures assert the need
for an investigation on why successful SCCs are rare (Fawcett et al., 2015). In
this context, it is essential to examine challenges for successful collaborations and
to identify ways to deal with these challenges. As Baumeister et al. (2001) point
out: adequate management of these SCC challenges has a greater impact on their
5
1 Introduction
success than focusing only on the development of successful SCCs. Understand-
ing the various facets of challenges is crucial to maintain long-term SCC success
(Samaha et al., 2011). In this thesis, three collaboration challenges are critically
investigated and approaches to tackle these challenges are outlined: identification
and understanding of drivers and resistors for launching an SCC, gain sharing and
partner selection. The thesis contributes to existing literature in the following
way. The focus of current SCC studies is on the positive aspects of collabora-
tions rather than on SCC challenges (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Lambert et al., 1999;
Zineldin and Bredenlo¨w, 2003). Zineldin and Bredenlo¨w (2003) further mention
a need to deeper investigate the problems and risks of coalitions to understand
why so many SCCs break down. The literature on collaboration challenges often
discusses the reasons for unsuccessful SCCs or evaluates the impact of challenges
on the coalition performance (e.g. Fang et al., 2011; Richey Jr et al., 2010), but
does not identify approaches to tackle the SCC challenges. Nevertheless, referring
to Richey Jr et al. (2010), apart from understanding the challenges associated with
the implementation and success of collaborations, it is important to understand
how to overcome them.
As indicated in Section 1.2, one challenge for a successful SCC is the iden-
tification and understanding of all relevant drivers and resistors for
launching a coalition. In order to eliminate a barrier before it leads to the
breakdown of the collaboration, it is necessary to be aware of this obstacle before
launching the SCC. Until now, a significant amount of literature discusses drivers
and resistors for launching an SCC, in some cases, also for specific SCC structures,
perspectives and/or industries. However, a comprehensive and structured study
including all drivers and resistors for any potential SCC structure, perspective and
industry is missing. Moreover, existing research is often ambiguous. For instance,
it is ambiguous that the same term is used for various driver or resistor categories
rather than having an unique term for each driver or resistor category. Secondly,
some drivers are allocated to more than one driver category. Another shortcoming
of the existing literature is incompleteness; drivers or resistors mentioned in one
paper for a specific driver or resistor category are not mentioned in other studies
for the same category. In response to these research gaps, Chapter 2 develops a
comprehensive, structured and consistent framework of all potential drivers and
resistors for launching an SCC for a broad range of SCC structures, industries
and perspectives. The framework provides companies with the opportunity to
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more holistically evaluate the considered SCC and to identify collaborations with
a high failure potential. In addition, the completeness of the framework is vali-
dated in the Dutch fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry. The literature
on drivers and resistors for the FMCG industry is limited and up to now not
all potential drivers and resistors have been investigated. The existing literature
mainly focuses on barriers (Jharkharia and Shankar, 2005) and forces (de Leeuw
and Fransoo, 2009). As for the investigation of the framework, all potential drivers
and resistors for the Dutch FMCG industry are identified and examined, which in
turn adds to the completeness of the developed framework.
Another major challenge for the implementation and success of SCCs is the
fair allocation of coalition gains (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Leng and Parlar,
2009). For a sustainable SCC, it is necessary that all collaborative parties are
satisfied with their allocated shares and for them to feel that they receive a fair
share of the coalition gain. Based on its importance, in this thesis the challenge
of allocating the gain in a fair manner is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Several researchers already developed gain sharing methods in order to allocate
the gain in such a way that everybody is satisfied with and accepts the assigned
gain share. However, the existing literature does not investigate the actual accep-
tance levels of these gain sharing methods in practice. In response to this research
gap, in Chapter 3 the acceptance levels of selected gain sharing methods in vertical
three-echelon SCCs in the Dutch FMCG industry are investigated. Furthermore,
the influence of behavioral decision-making aspects on the acceptance levels of
these gain sharing methods is observed in order to explain the cause for the accep-
tance or rejection of the gain sharing method. For a long time, the predominant
assumption in economics was that human beings think rational, which implies that
decisions are made in a rational and consistent way (Sterman, 1989). However,
due to limitations of available information, cognitive capabilities and time, human
beings are endowed with a bounded rationality (Simon, 1979). Human beings
tend to rely on heuristics or cognitive biases to handle complex problems (Schenk,
2011). The incorporation of behavioral research literature into SCM literature in
Chapter 3 is an important research contribution. Until now, limited research deal-
ing with the influence of human behavior, judgment and decision-making has been
published in the fields of logistics and SCM (Tokar, 2010). However, to ensure
practical validity, the integration of behavioral decision-making in SCM studies is
necessary (Sterman, 1989; Tokar, 2010).
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Chapter 4 builds upon the research findings of Chapter 3. The survey in
Chapter 3 reveals that no gain sharing method is accepted by and satisfies all
collaborative parties. Furthermore, additional interviews with parties from the
Dutch FMCG industry show that simple methods are preferred in practice. These
findings are confirmed by the existing research, which outlines that game-theoretic
gain sharing methods are perceived as too hard to understand and too complex
to implement (Leng and Parlar, 2005). Although the need for simple gain sharing
methods and the importance of the parties’ satisfaction with the assigned gain
share has been acknowledged both in theory (e.g. Verdonck et al., 2016) and prac-
tice, to the best of the author’s knowledge existing gain sharing methods do not
entirely resolve these two aspects. Therefore, in Chapter 4, a comprehensive, yet
simple gain sharing system which focuses on the maximization of the parties’ sat-
isfaction using a minimax regret approach is developed.
The third SCC challenge which is investigated in this thesis is finding a suit-
able coalition partner (Cruijssen et al., 2007b). According to Brouthers et al.
(1995), collaborating with an unsuitable party leads to more organizational dam-
age than not collaborating. Furthermore, for companies active in the transport
industry a broad geographical coverage is very important, but cannot always be
achieved on an individual basis (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). Bleeke and
Ernst (1995) and Cruijssen et al. (2007a) indicate that the geographical coverage
can be expanded through horizontal SCC. As such, one important aspect that
should be taken into account in the partner selection process is the geographical
dimension of potential cooperation partners. In this context, Bleeke and Ernst
(1995) point out that a collaboration between companies that do not geographi-
cally share a customer market is more beneficial due to less competitive pressure.
In line with this geographical perspective on partner selection, in Chapter 5 an
approach for facility location problems is proposed which can be applied in the
context of horizontal SCCs. This approach is briefly explained in the following.
In geometry, tessellations are used to cover a plane without gaps and overlaps
using different shapes. Whenever a tessellation is made up of congruent regular
polygons, researchers talk about regular tessellation (Grunbaum and Shephard,
1977). In the context of regular tessellation, whenever the demand for a commod-
ity is evenly distributed, the preferred polygons are hexagons since they have the
property to cover the plane without gaps and overlaps with the smallest number
of polygons (Mallozzi et al., 2017; Schultz, 1970). However, in the course of the
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last decades, the population shifted from rural to urban areas, a trend know as
urbanization (Cohen, 2006). As the regularity of the population has changed, the
assumption of a uniformly distributed demand/population is not valid anymore.
Therefore, in Chapter 5 the performance of regular tessellations as well as semi-
and demi-regular tessellations in the context of facility location problems is inves-
tigated under well-known non-uniform demand distributions, which are common
in practice. In addition, based on the results of the performance analysis of the
regular tessellations, two new expanding hexagonal tessellations are proposed for
one common demand distribution. It is identified that these expanding hexagonal
tessellations lead to a fair and cost-efficient way to locate facilities for a specific
customer spread assuming a non-uniformly distributed demand.
The investigated tessellation as well as the new proposed expanding hexagonal
tessellation approach support supply chain parties in the partner selection process
by suggesting where the partner’s existing or planned facilities should be prefer-
ably located in order to achieve a significant geographical coverage. Furthermore,
since the introduced tessellations cover a plane without overlaps, it is ensured that
the collaborative parties do not have overlaps in their customer bases, which will
reduce the competitive pressure within the SCC (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). The
approach additionally reduces transport costs for each collaborative party, which
in turn improves the SCC efficiency (Cruijssen, 2006).
Finally, Chapter 6 outlines general conclusions and further research directions.
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Chapter 2
A Comprehensive
Framework for Holistic
Evaluations of Potential
Supply Chain
Collaborations1
2.1 Introduction
Referring to Autry (2011), an important SCC challenge is the identification and
understanding of all potential drivers and resistors for launching a collaboration.
In order to eliminate a certain barrier before it leads to the breakdown of the
coalition, it is necessary to be aware of this obstacle. A significant amount of lit-
erature already investigated potential drivers and resistors for launching an SCC,
in some cases for a specific industry, SCC structure and/or perspective. Ahmad
and Ullah (2013) provide a literature review on potential SCC benefits and factors
which enable a company to launch a collaboration. Next to that, Cruijssen et al.
(2007a) discuss potential opportunities and impediments of horizontal coalitions
from the LSP perspective, whereas de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009) describe external
1This chapter is based on the papers Jung et al. (2017) and Jung et al. (2018b)
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factors which force a supply chain party to launch a collaboration for selected in-
dustries and perspectives. Although prior research has widely discussed potential
drivers and resistors to launch SCCs, a comprehensive study including all drivers
and resistors for any potential SCC structure, industry and perspective is missing.
Furthermore, most current work is prone to ambiguity and incompleteness, as out-
lined in detail in Section 2.2. In response to these research gaps, a comprehensive,
structured and consistent framework listing all potential drivers and resistors for
launching a collaboration is developed in this chapter using an extensive literature
review. The framework provides companies with the opportunity to more holis-
tically evaluate the considered collaboration and to identify collaborations with a
high failure potential. In addition, the completeness of the framework is validated
through case studies in the Dutch FMCG industry. In these case studies, compa-
nies within the Dutch FMCG industry are asked to identify all relevant drivers and
resistors for SCCs they participated in. Literature examining potential factors for
launching SCCs in the FMCG industry is scarce and until now not all drivers and
resistors have been investigated. The existing literature mainly focuses on barriers
(Jharkharia and Shankar, 2005) and forces (de Leeuw and Fransoo, 2009). For the
validation of the framework, all relevant drivers and resistors for launching collab-
orations in the Dutch FMCG industry are identified. Providing this overview of
drivers and resistors for the FMCG industry further adds to the completeness of
the framework.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, an ex-
tensive literature review is presented. The existing literature is critically discussed
and a comprehensive, structured and consistent framework of drivers and resistors
for launching SCCs is created. Moreover, to test the completeness of the frame-
work, relevant drivers and resistors for the FMCG industry are investigated using
a qualitative case study approach. The research methodology is explained in Sec-
tion 2.3, followed by the analysis and discussion of the case study in Section 2.4.
The chapter concludes with an outline of theoretical and practical contributions
and directions for further research in Section 2.5.
2.2 Theoretical Development
Until now, a significant amount of literature identified relevant drivers and resistors
for launching SCCs (e.g. Akintoye et al., 2000; Fawcett et al., 2008a). Neverthe-
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less, in none of these articles a comprehensive overview of all potential drivers and
resistors for launching collaborations is presented. Furthermore, the existing lit-
erature is prone to ambiguity and incompleteness. In the literature, there are two
kinds of ambiguity for the drivers. Firstly, the same terms are used for different
driver categories and there are no unique terms for the identified driver categories.
Examples are the terms drivers and driving forces. Ahmad and Ullah (2013) use
the term drivers to define two driver categories. First, they use the term to define
factors which enable someone to collaborate, like trust or commitment. Second,
they use the term for expected benefits of successful collaborations such as im-
proved customer service or increase in market share. Next to the term drivers, the
authors also use the term driving forces for the expected benefits. However, the
term driving forces is used by Fawcett et al. (2008b) to define factors which force
a party to collaborate, like more demanding customers or economic globalization.
Secondly, drivers are assigned to more than one driver category. An example is
the factor trust, which is identified by Akintoye et al. (2000) as a factor which
enables someone to collaborate, and by Beach et al. (2005) as an SCC outcome.
For the resistors, a unique term and definition is also missing. Even though un-
like the drivers, most studies only name one resistor category. However, even for
this single category multiple terms such as barriers (e.g. Akintoye et al., 2000) or
impediments (e.g. Cruijssen et al., 2007a) are used. Moreover, an incompleteness
can be observed: in earlier research identified driver or resistor is not present in
more recent literature. An example is the factor openness. It is identified as a
factor which enables someone to collaborate by Barratt (2004), but it is not men-
tioned by Ahmad and Ullah (2013) in their literature review for the same category.
Due to the ambiguity, incompleteness as well as the fact that no paper dis-
cusses all potential drivers and resistors, the understanding and identification of
all relevant drivers and resistors for a specific SCC represents a challenge for the
collaborative parties. Therefore, a complete overview of all potential drivers and
resistors for launching a collaboration is needed to holistically evaluate potential
coalitions.
Drawing on prior research, a conceptual framework consisting of two umbrella
terms is developed in this section. The first umbrella term is called drivers and the
second one resistors. The term drivers represents the various driver categories
identified in the literature. It is split into three categories. The first category,
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benefits, represents the expected benefits of a successful SCC, such as the benefit
cost reduction (e.g. Akintoye et al., 2000). The second category, forces, contains
external factors which force a party to collaborate, such as the force economic
globalization (e.g. Fawcett et al., 2008b). The last category, enablers, includes
factors which enable someone to collaborate and in addition have an effect on the
SCC success, such as the factor trust (e.g. Akintoye et al., 2000). The distinction
between the three driver categories is made to highlight the differences between
the drivers. Benefits and forces are both motivating factors to collaborate. Never-
theless, there is a big difference. Benefits represent an intrinsic motivation, which
means that the company decides to collaborate out of their own motivation (Lam-
bert et al., 1996). Consequently, the benefits usually have a positive influence
on coalitions. In contrast, the forces represent an extrinsic motivation. Here, a
party is forced to collaborate and therefore a change in management practice to-
wards more collaboration is dictated but not necessarily wanted by the party itself.
This might have a negative influence on collaborations (Fawcett et al., 2008b). A
strong motivation to build an SCC is not enough. Hence, in addition to the mo-
tivating factors enablers are required. Enablers increase the probability of success
and therefore have a positive influence on collaborations (Lambert et al., 1996;
Richey Jr et al., 2010). The umbrella term resistors is used to represent all re-
tarding factors for SCC. The resistors are divided into two categories, which both
have a negative influence on collaborations. The first category, barriers, consists
of impediments that can obstruct the SCC and are known before the collabora-
tion launches. An example is the factor lack of commitment (e.g. Akintoye et al.,
2000). Based on the extensive literature review, a connection between the driver
category enablers and the resistor category barriers is observed. For each enabler,
a corresponding barrier can be identified (Walker et al., 2008). An example is
the enabler information sharing and the barrier lack of information sharing (e.g.
Fawcett et al., 2008a). To show this connection, the factors of these two cate-
gories are combined. When evaluating coalitions, factors will be identified either
as an enabler, presence of..., or as a barrier, lack of.... The second category is
called risks. Risks are future-oriented and include events that might occur in the
future, but are unknown yet, like the risk recession (e.g. Landeros et al., 1995).
The distinction between barriers and risks is also mentioned by Evans (2012) in
the context of strategic planning. Given that barriers are already known at the
moment in time when parties decide whether to collaborate or not, each party can
already take actions against the barriers prior to the collaboration. In contrast,
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the risks are uncertain at this point in time. As a result, the decision to collaborate
or not is dependent on the decision makers and their risk preferences (risk averse,
risk neutral or risk loving).
Based on a review of 36 studies from 1990 to 2015, see Appendix 2A, 65
benefits, 25 forces, 100 enablers, 81 barriers and 64 risks were identified. After
an extensive literature review based on key words such as barriers or drivers, the
papers were selected based on the impact factor. Papers published in journals
with an impact factor of 2 or higher were taken into consideration. To create a
clear overview of all potential drivers and resistors, the factors were assigned to
so-called general factors. Reported benefits like increased customer satisfaction,
enhanced delivery performance and increased customer responsiveness (Fawcett
et al., 2008a) all refer to improvements with regard to the customers and were
assigned to the general factor customer improvements. The 335 identified drivers
and resistors were assigned to 73 general factors; 10 general factors for the benefits,
11 for the forces, 35 for the enablers/barriers and 17 for the risks. Figure 2.1 shows
the resulting conceptual framework including definitions and explanations of the
influences of the categories on the SCC as well as all identified general factors
for each category. Following the structure of the framework, in Appendix 2C
each factor identified in the literature review as well as in the qualitative case
study, which is introduced in Section 2.3, is assigned to the general factors of each
category. Moreover, a clear definition for each general factor is provided.
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Figure 2.1: Complete framework
The drivers and resistors may differ for each party in a collaboration as well
as in each industry and for each SCC type (Lambert et al., 1999). Appendix
2A provides an overview of the investigated perspectives, industries as well as
SCC types of the selected papers. In addition, if differences between perspectives,
industries and/or SCC types were made for the drivers and resistors factors within
the paper, the considered perspective, industry and/or SCC type is specified in
the last column of the tables in Appendix 2C.
2.3 Research Design of the Case Studies
The completeness of the conceptual framework is validated by investigating drivers
and resistors to launch collaborations in the Dutch FMCG industry. Coalitions
are very important for this industry. Referring to de Kok et al. (2015): “[t]he
FMCG sector is core to the wealth and well-being of the developed countries”.
Nearly 20% of the total ton kilometers transported in the European Union (EU)
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are goods from the FMCG industry. Without collaborating with supply chain
partners, companies in the FMCG industry are not able to be competitive on
the dynamic market. As a result, successful collaborations are essential for this
industry (de Kok et al., 2015). Since the literature about relevant drivers and
resistors for the FMCG industry is scarce and in addition not all driver and resis-
tor categories have been investigated, this research is exploratory and necessitates
a qualitative method (Eisenhardt, 1989); more precisely, a qualitative case study
research approach is used. Qualitative case study research provides researchers
with a tool to investigate a complex phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin,
2013). For the data collection, individual semi-structured in-depth interviews are
used, which is a common way to explore practice and to collect data (Qu and
Dumay, 2011; Yin, 2013).
Interviews were held with representatives of companies from the Dutch FMCG
industry that participated in a logistics competition for manufacturers, LSPs and
retailers in the Netherlands. The goal of the competition was to reduce the truck
cycle time at the retailer’s distribution center through SCCs. Out of the 26 par-
ticipating parties, 20 accepted the interview request. Among the participants are
seven manufacturers, six LSPs and seven retailers. This allows the researchers to
investigate different perspectives. The majority of the interviews were conducted
with the supply chain or logistics managers of the companies. The interviews
started with general questions about the company and SCCs in general and were
followed by questions about drivers and resistors for launching a specific SCC. The
participants were free to mention several SCCs in which they participated. Fur-
thermore, drivers and resistors for failed SCCs could also be specified. In total, 71
SCCs were mentioned by the participants. Among them were seven unsuccessful
collaborations. The focus of several studies is on investigating dyadic relation-
ships, but the attention has shifted to networks as well (Steinfield et al., 2011).
In this study, different collaborations are investigated, as well. Among them are
networks, such as triangular relationships, where three independent but connected
parties are collaborating with each other. The interviews were mainly conducted
face-to-face by visiting the companies’ headquarters, production locations or dis-
tribution centers in the Netherlands. Due to time constraints, three interviews
were conducted via telephone.
In order to ensure cross-case comparability, an interview guide was developed
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to provide directions during the interviews. However, the interviewer was also free
to adapt or add certain questions during the interviews and the interviewee had a
great deal of flexibility in how to reply. An extract of the interview guide is pro-
vided in Appendix 2D. The interview guide was made available to the participants
one week before the interview to give the managers sufficient time for preparation.
In order to reduce the possibility of biases and to increase the credibility of the
research findings, strategies introduced by Johnson (1997) as well as by Noble and
Smith (2015) were applied. Firstly, the strategy multiple investigators was used
for the data collection. At least two researchers were present at every interview.
Secondly, a strategy called participants feedback was applied. All interviews were
recorded by audio-recording or video and in addition notes were taken during the
interviews. Based on the gathered information, a report of each interview was
prepared and sent back to the interviewees for verification and to confirm that the
researchers’ interpretations were consistent with the respondents’ interpretations.
After a detailed case study write-up for each case, the data were analyzed using
cross-case analysis. The key to a good cross-case comparison is looking at the data
in many divergent ways. Eisenhardt (1989) discusses three cross-case tactics. One
tactic is to select categories and then look for within-group similarities coupled
with intergroup differences. Dimensions can be suggested by the literature or
can simply be chosen by the researcher. A second tactic is to group the cases
and then list the similarities and differences between them. Finally, data can
be divided by data source. The first two cross-case tactics were used, as this
enabled an analysis of the elements as identified in the literature in addition to
identifying the new elements from practice. This way, the probability of capturing
the findings, which may exist in the data, is enhanced. After categorizing the
factors mentioned in the interviews and comparing them with the general factors of
the conceptual framework, the factors were analyzed by category (benefits, forces,
enablers/barriers and risks) and party (manufacturers, LSPs and retailers).
2.4 Discussion of Results
In this section, the cross-case analysis is presented. The factors reported in the
interviews are included in the framework and assigned to the right general factor.
If the appropriate general factor was not defined before, this general factor is added
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to the framework. Results are discussed by category.
2.4.1 Benefits
Table 2.1 shows all benefits stated by the interviewees. The mentioned benefits
are classified per party - LSP, manufacturer (MA) and retailer (RE) – and whether
the factor was mentioned by a party who actually launched the SCC (C) or not
(NC). The intrinsic motivation for launching collaborations in the FMCG indus-
try does not significantly differ from the intrinsic motivation in other industries.
All mentioned benefits are identified as, sometimes new, examples of the general
factors in the conceptual framework (see Appendix 2C.1).
In the Dutch FMCG industry, the main motivation to launch a collaboration
is cost reduction. This benefit has been mentioned as an important factor for
parties to launch a collaboration in the literature as well. Cruijssen et al. (2007a)
identify cost reduction as an important motivation factor for parties to launch
an SCC in the logistics industry. The same holds for the construction (Akintoye
et al., 2000) and the chemical industry (Reniers et al., 2010). Cost reduction,
which is assigned to the general factor efficiency improvements, was mentioned
as an intrinsic motivation factor for 18 SCCs. Half of it was stated by LSPs.
Cruijssen (2006) points out that LSPs are concerned about their high transport
costs. Therefore, it is reasonable that LSPs collaborate in order to reduce their
costs. Moreover, by looking at the remaining benefits mentioned by the LSPs,
it is obvious that this party is mainly driven by efficiency improvement factors;
sustainability improvement seems to be less relevant for the LSPs. This is in line
with the literature review by Cruijssen et al. (2007b), where the LSP perspective
is observed in the transport and logistics sector. The majority of the outlined
benefits are factors belonging to the general factor efficiency improvements.
The second most frequently mentioned general factor in the case studies is sus-
tainability improvements. For some parties, sustainability is even more important
than cost reduction (interview with one manufacturer on 28.05.2015). Due to an
increased consciousness of the climate change, parties are imposing pressure on
their suppliers to manage their greenhouse gas emissions as one of the conditions
for doing business with them (Shaw et al., 2012). For the general factor sustain-
ability improvements, the dominant factor is CO2 reduction. According to de Kok
et al. (2015), in the FMCG industry retailers demand high-frequency shipments
to their distribution centers and a low truck utilization efficiency. As a result,
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it is reasonable that sustainability improvement, especially CO2 reduction, is an
often-named intrinsic motivation factor.
All benefits, except for three factors, the benefits were mentioned in the con-
text of successful SCCs initiatives (see columns “C” and “NC”). This supports the
finding that benefits have a positive influence on SCCs. Moreover, the interviews
showed that some parties also launched collaborations without any intrinsic mo-
tivation. In the majority of these cases, forces instead of benefits were mentioned.
Table 2.1: Allocation of the benefits
General Factors Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Customer
improvements
Increased customer
satisfaction
1 1 2
Efficiency Cost reduction 9 3 7 18 1
improvements Efficiency improvement 3 1 4 8
Employee reduction 1 1
Increased quality 1 1
Time reduction 1 5 4 2
Enhanced enablers Increased transparency 1 1
Stronger partnership 1 1
Image improvements Image improvement 2 2
Sustainability CO2 reduction 2 2 3 7
improvements Sustainability 1 2 3
Technology New possibilities/ 1 1
improvements technologies
2.4.2 Forces
All extrinsic motivation factors identified by parties from the Dutch FMCG indus-
try during the interviews (see Table 2.2) are assigned to already existing general
factors (see Appendix 2C.2).
Unlike the intrinsic motivation, only two different extrinsic motivation factors
were mentioned by the parties from the Dutch FMCG industry. Furthermore,
exclusively manufacturers and LSPs stated extrinsic motivation factors to launch
SCCs. The dominant force mentioned by these parties is that they were forced by
the retailers to launch a specific collaboration. Three LSPs and five manufactur-
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ers were forced by retailers to, for example, use a specific software. One supply
chain manager stated that they had “no choice”, they were “forced by the retailer”
(interview with one manufacturer on 14.04.2015). This might be due to the pow-
erful position of the retailer in the Dutch FMCG industry, as outlined by another
manufacturer: “the retailer is the most powerful party in the supply chain” (in-
terview with one manufacturer on 24.04.2015). This is in line with the research
by Adolfsson and Solarz (2005). They investigate relationships between suppliers
and a retailer in the Swedish FMCG industry. Adolfsson and Solarz (2005) out-
line that the retailer has a powerful position in the Swedish FMCG industry and
that suppliers are highly influenced by retailers. The retailer is highly intrinsically
motivated. This finding contradicts the research by Walker et al. (2008). In their
article, the authors identify important drivers and resistors for retailers to launch
a green SCC. In this context, the retailers were not exclusively intrinsically moti-
vated, but also often forced to launch the green collaboration. However, retailers
in the FMCG industry seem to be mainly intrinsically motivated.
The analysis revealed that whenever a retailer forced an LSP and/or a manu-
facturer to join the collaboration, a collaboration launched although this was the
only mentioned motivating factor for the parties to launch the SCC and apart from
it only resistors were named. This stresses the powerful position of the retailer.
Table 2.2: Allocation of the forces
General Factors Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Forced by other parties Demanded by
manufacturer
1 1
Forced by retailer 3 5 8
2.4.3 Enablers and Barriers
In total, 48 enablers and barriers were mentioned during the interviews. For the
other three categories, fewer factors were mentioned (12 benefits, 2 forces and 9
risks), which stresses the importance of the enabler/barrier category. Due to the
amount of mentioned factors, in this section only the most frequently mentioned
general factors are outlined. The total overview is presented in Appendix 2B.
Unlike the other categories, not all identified factors for the category enablers/
barriers can be assigned to existing general factors. Twelve times, parties from the
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Dutch FMCG industry claimed that talking about money in the first meeting leads
to rough negotiations and, in some cases, even result in not launching the SCC. As
one retailer mentioned: “if you are speaking about money at the beginning, the
collaboration will immediately end” (interview with one retailer on 22.04.2015).
For this factor, no academic evidence has been found. Many researchers already
discussed the problem of a fair gain share allocation (e.g. Cruijssen et al., 2007a),
but it has not been mentioned that this is especially a problem in the first meeting.
Hence, an additional general factor was added, presence of neglecting money in the
first meeting, if it is an enabler and lack of neglecting money in the first meeting,
otherwise. All other identified factors provide new examples for already existing
general factors (see Appendix 2C.3).
In the Dutch FMCG industry, especially organizational compatibility and trust
are important enablers for launching SCCs. As one manager mentioned: “trust is
most important” (interview with one retailer on 15.05.2015). Another interviewee
also outlined that “without trust, it is not possible to collaborate” (interview with
one LSP on 22.04.2015). In addition, it was stated that without organizational
compatibility it is nearly impossible to collaborate (interview with one LSP on
13.05.2015). Other important enablers mentioned by the parties from the Dutch
FMCG industry are transparency and interdependence. In the literature, it is often
stated that in addition to these enablers, commitment is very important to launch
collaborations (e.g. Mohr and Spekman, 1994). However, in the Dutch FMCG it
seems to be less relevant, since it was only identified as an enabler for seven SCCs,
see Appendix 2B.
Unlike the enablers, more variety exists for the barriers indicating that barriers
are mostly individual and therefore highly dependent on the party and the specific
situation. The major barrier for parties from the Dutch FMCG industry to launch
an SCC is the lack of organizational compatibility. This is in line with former lit-
erature. The majority of studies discussing barriers to launch a collaboration also
named lack of compatibility as a barrier (e.g Lambert et al., 1999; Simatupang and
Sridharan, 2002). Furthermore, decreased efficiency, lack of using same technology
and upfront investments are additional relevant factors. Another important bar-
rier which was mentioned by parties from all echelons is the difficulty to establish
a fair allocation of the gains. As outlined by some interviewees: “gain sharing is
very difficult” (interview with one retailer on 22.04.2015) and “one of the bottle-
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necks was to speak about gain sharing” (interview with one LSP on 30.04.2015).
Cruijssen et al. (2007a) referred to this barrier as one of the most severe bar-
riers for the implementation and success of SCCs. In the context of fair gain
sharing, interviewees additionally outlined the importance of open communication
and transparency. According to one retailer, “basis for fair gain sharing is open
communication” (interview with one retailer on 15.05.2015). This is stressed by
another retailer and one LSP, who mentioned that transparency is an important
prerequisite for fair gain sharing (interview with one retailer on 28.04.2015; inter-
view with one LSP on 11.06.2015). The connection between transparency/open
communication and fair gain sharing was also identified by Cruijssen (2006). The
majority of the factors were either identified as an enabler for a specific SCC or
as a barrier. However, a few parties also identified the same factor as enabler
and barrier for one collaboration. In these cases, the parties outlined the general
importance of an enabler to launch a collaboration. However, for the specific SCC
the factor was mentioned as a barrier. The majority of these factors can be as-
signed to collaborations where the retailer forced parties to use specific software.
In these cases, the manufacturers and LSPs outlined the general importance of
organizational compatibility, but simultaneously mentioned the lack of organiza-
tional compatibility for the vertical collaboration.
By looking at the difference between collaboration and non-collaboration fac-
tors, it can be observed that the barrier upfront investments was often mentioned
as a barrier for failed initiatives to SCC.
Table 2.3: Allocation of the enablers/barriers
General Factors Enablers/
Barriers
Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Presence of
neglectable
Lack of
neglectable
High investments in
technology
2 1 2 1
costs costs Relationship-specific 1 2 3 2 4
upfront investments
Presence of Presence of Honesty 1 1
communication, communica- Information 1 2 2 5
transpar- tion, trans- sharing
ency and parency and Information 3 5 4 12
openness openness technology
Transparency 5 5 7 17
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Table 2.4: Allocation of the enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Presence of Lack of Difficulty to 1 1
communica- communication, share
tion, trans- transparency confidential
parency and and openness information
openness Lack of 1 1
communication
Lack of 3 3
communication
between RE
and LSP in
triangular
relationships
Lack of 1 1
transparency
Lack of using 2 2 2 5 1
same
technology
Presence of Presence of Common goals 4 1 2 7
compatibility compatibility Organizational 5 7 5 17
compatibility
Shared values 1 1
Strategic fit 2 1 2 5
Lack of Difficulty to 1 1
compatibility work with
competitors
Lack of 3 3
common goals
Lack of 3 7 9 18 1
organizational
compatibility
Power
imbalance
1 1
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Table 2.5: Allocation of the enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Presence of Presence of Awareness of 1 1
(fair) benefits (fair) benefits possible
benefits
Lack of (fair) Adjustment 1 1
benefits of entire
internal
process
Difficulties in 1 1 3 5
establishing a
fair allocation
of the benefits
Efficiency 4 4 8
concerns
Presence of Presence of Interdepend- 5 5 6 16
interdepend- interdepend- ence
ence ence
Presence of Presence of Neglecting 1 4 5 10
neglecting neglecting money in the
money in the money in the first meeting
first meeting first meeting
Lack of Difficulty to 1 1 5 2
neglecting speak about
money in the money in the
first meeting first meeting
Presence of Presence of Relation to 1 6 5 12
right contact right contact contact person
person person
Lack of Different 2 2 4
right contact thinking of
person contact person
Wrong contact 1 1
person
Presence of Presence of trust Trust 4 5 7 16
trust Lack of trust Lack of trust 1 1
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2.4.4 Risks
The identified risks (Table 2.6) can be assigned to already existing general factors
(see Appendix 2C.4).
Only a few risks were mentioned by the interviewed parties. In the literature,
also only a fairly limited number of studies discuss potential risks. The most fre-
quently mentioned risk is dependency. The parties often stated that dependency
combined with short-term contracts, which are common in this industry, results
in high risks (interview with one LSP on 30.04.2015). Dependency has been men-
tioned as an important risk by Niederkofler (1991) as well.
Moreover, it has been identified that despite the risks the SCCs were launched
in all cases, which might indicate that risks are not the main reason for rejecting
an SCC.
Table 2.6: Allocation of the risks
General Factors Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Uncertainty of additional
costs
Risk of additional costs 1 2 2 5
Uncertainty of changes Risk of party leaving 1 2 3
of key personnel SCC during
collaboration
Uncertainty of high Contract uncertainty; 2 2 4
dependency parties are mutually
dependent
Risk of dependency 2 2 2 6
Uncertainty of changes Uncertainty of losing 1 1
in transparency transparency
Risk of confidential 1 1
information security
Uncertainty of Data reliability 2 2
performance problems Quality performance 1 1
problems
Uncertainty of outcome 1 1
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2.4.5 Further Findings
To evaluate a potential SCC, it is important for parties to be aware of all potential
factors. However, it is not necessarily the case that all (general) factors, except
for the (general) factors of the category enablers/barriers, are relevant in every
SCC; it depends on the party, its industry and the SCC structure. During the
interviews, differences between the parties, but also between SCC structures were
identified. An example for a special factor for one SCC structure is the following:
Four LSPs intended to launch a horizontal SCC. As a barrier, legal barriers was
mentioned. This is a specific barrier for a horizontal SCC. The problem is that the
European Commission competition law prohibits any agreements between parties
that are restrictive of competition like price agreements etc. (Cruijssen et al.,
2007b). By law, competition is considered to be restricted if the collaborative
parties together exceed a market share of 20% (Commission, 2012). Moreover,
it is possible that an entire category is not relevant for a specific party. The
findings show that especially when parties are forced to collaborate, the intrinsic
motivation to launch an SCC is often absent. Overall, it is important to recognize
that each SCC and party is individual and therefore for every collaboration the
relevant drivers and resistors have to be identified by each party individually.
2.5 Conclusion, Implications and Future Research
As outlined by one party during the interviews: “collaborations are crucial and
necessary to be competitive on the dynamic market” (interview with one LSP on
15.04.2015). However, apart from advantages, SCCs bring along challenges. In
this chapter, the challenge of identifying and understanding all important drivers
and resistors for launching SCCs has been investigated. Overcoming this chal-
lenge is important in order to be able to eliminate e.g. a barrier before it leads to
the failure of an SCC. For this purpose, an awareness of the barriers is essential.
This awareness can be gained by means of a complete overview of all potential
drivers and resistors. In this chapter, based on an extensive literature review a
comprehensive, structured and consistent framework including all drivers and re-
sistors for launching an SCC for all SCC structures, industries and perspectives
mentioned in the literature has been developed. Furthermore, the completeness of
the framework has been validated by investigating important drivers and resistors
in the Dutch FMCG industry. It has been outlined that the drivers and resistors
mentioned in the interviews are in line with the ones in the general framework ex-
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cept for one general factor of the category enablers/barriers. In the Dutch FMCG
industry, supply chain actors perceive that it is difficult to talk about money in the
first meeting. After adding a further general factor, which is called presence of ne-
glecting money in the first meeting if it is an enabler and lack of neglecting money
in the first meeting if it is a barrier, the framework is complete for the investi-
gated industries, SCC types and perspectives. This complete framework provides
the parties with the opportunity to more holistically evaluate the considered SCC
and identify collaborations with high failure potential.
2.5.1 Theoretical Implications
The contribution of this chapter to the existing SCM literature is twofold. First,
the chapter provides the first comprehensive framework of all potential drivers and
resistors for launching SCCs mentioned in the literature. Although prior research
widely discussed potential drivers and resistors, until now a study including all
drivers and resistors for launching SCCs for all investigated SCC structures, in-
dustries and perspectives is missing. Moreover, the current literature displays a
level of incompleteness; factors for a specific category mentioned in one paper are
not mentioned in other articles. In addition, in this research ambiguities of two
different kinds have been identified in the current literature. The first kind of am-
biguity is that the same terms are used for various driver and resistor categories
and that there are no unique terms for the driver and resistor categories. The sec-
ond kind of ambiguity is that factors are assigned to more than one category. In
this chapter, a structured framework with a consistent terminology and definitions
has been developed, which enriches the SCM literature with an extensive specifi-
cation of all potential drivers and resistors for launching SCCs. The completeness
of the framework has been investigated in the Dutch FMCG industry. Until now,
no research investigated all relevant drivers and resistors for the FMCG industry.
Therefore, the second research contribution of this chapter is the investigation of
all potential drivers and resistors for launching an SCC in the FMCG industry.
2.5.2 Practical Implications
The structured and complete framework supports parties to more holistically eval-
uate the considered SCC and identify collaborations with high failure potential.
The evaluation of an SCC is enhanced through an improved understanding and
identification of the drivers and resistors for launching SCCs. The understanding
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is improved through a clear distinction between the four driver and resistor cate-
gories, consistent definitions and explanations of the influence of these categories
on the SCC success. Furthermore, identification is improved, since the framework
provides an extensive checklist of potential drivers and resistors for launching col-
laborations. To identify all relevant drivers and resistors for the considered SCC,
every party should evaluate all (general) factors of the four categories with regard
to their relevance. Based on the identified factors, the decision to launch the SCC
can be made by evaluating whether the factors that have a positive influence on
the collaboration outweigh the negative ones.
2.5.3 Further Research Directions
This chapter offers several opportunities for further research. The completeness of
the framework was tested in the Dutch FMCG industry. Testing the framework
in other geographical areas and/or industries may result in stronger support. As
stated previously, the framework provides the first complete overview not only for
dyadic relationships, but also for SCCs with several collaborative parties. Never-
theless, a limited sample size for each SCC was used. To build a framework for
a specific type of SCC, it is necessary to conduct more interviews with parties
participating in this special kind of collaboration. Furthermore, the framework
should be tested in practice to discover whether it can actually close the gap be-
tween theory and practice. Therefore, it is useful to conduct surveys among parties
which already participated in a failed SCC to investigate whether the SCC would
either not have been launched or if failure would have been prevented if all parties
involved had taken into account all factors included in the framework. Finally,
this study only investigated which drivers and resistors are relevant for parties
to launch an SCC, but the importance of the factors has not been quantified for
the specific parties and collaborations. Quantifying the factors for each party and
collaboration can be beneficial and could also be considered in further research.
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2A References - Observed Industries, Perspectives
and SCC Types
Table 2.7: Overview of investigated studies
Reference Industry Perspective SCC Type
Akintoye et al. (2000) Construction Manufacturer Vertical
Anbanandam et al. (2011) Apparel Retailer Vertical
Barratt (2004) - - -
Beach et al. (2005) Construction Manufacturer Vertical
Boddy et al. (2000) Electronic Supplier Vertical
Manufacturer
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) Computer Manufacturer Horizontal
Semiconductor
Cao and Zhang (2011) - Manufactuer Vertical
Cruijssen et al. (2007a) Logistics - Horizontal
Daugherty et al. (2006) - - -
de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009) Fashion Manufacturer Vertical
FMCG Retailer
High-tech electronics
Ellram and Cooper (1990) - Shipper Vertical
LSP
Fawcett and Magnan (2002) - Retailer Vertical
Fawcett et al. (2008a) FG assembler
Fawcett et al. (2008b) Supplier
Fawcett et al. (2015) LSP
Ganesan (1994) - Supplier Vertical
Retailer
Gibson et al. (2002) Logistics Shipper Vertical
Carrier
Heikkila¨ (2002) Telecommunication Supplier Vertical
Customer
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Table 2.8: Overview of investigated studies
Reference Industry Perspective SCC Type
Horvath (2001) - - -
Jharkharia and Shankar (2005) Automobile Manufacturer -
FMCG
Engineering
Process
Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) - Supplier Vertical
Lambert et al. (1999) - - Vertical
Landeros et al. (1995) - Buyer Vertical
Supplier
Matopoulos et al. (2007) Agri-food Buyer Vertical
Supplier
Min and Zhou (2002) - - -
Min et al. (2005) - - -
Mohr and Spekman (1994) Computer Dealer Vertical
Niederkofler (1991) - - -
Perry and Sohal (2001) Textiles Retailer Vertical
Clothing Manufacturer
Footware Supplier
Reniers et al. (2010) Chemical - Vertical
Horizontal
Richey Jr et al. (2010) - Retailer -
FG assembler
Supplier
Service provider
Ryu et al. (2009) - Buyer Vertical
Supplier
Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) - - -
Simatupang and Sridharan (2004) - Supplier Vertical
Manufacturer
Walker et al. (2008) - Retailer -
Whipple and Frankel (2000) Food Buyer Vertical
Health Supplier
Personal care
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2B Case Study: Enablers/Barriers
Table 2.9: Allocation of the enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Presence of Presence of Legal 1 1 2
neglectable neglectable compliance
barriers barriers
Lack of absence Legal barriers 2 2 4
of barriers
Presence of Lack of High 2 1 2 1
neglectable neglectable investments in
costs costs technology
SCC-specific 1 2 3 2 4
upfront
investments
Presence of Presence of Commitment 2 1 4 7
commitment commitment
and support and support
Presence of Presence of Honesty 1 1
communica- communication, Information 1 2 2 5
tion, trans- transparency sharing
parency and and openness Information 3 5 4 12
openness technology
Transparency 5 5 7 17
Lack of Difficulty to 1 1
communication, share
transparency confidential
and openness information
Lack of 1 1
communica-
tion
Lack of 3 3
communica-
tion in
triangular
SCC
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Table 2.10: Allocation of the enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Presence of Lack of com- Lack of 1 1
communica- munication, communication
tion, trans- transparency Lack of using 2 2 2 5 1
parency and and openness same
openness technology
Presence of Presence of Common goals 4 1 2 7
compatibility compatibility Organizational 5 7 5 17
compatibility
Shared values 1 1
Strategic fit 2 1 2 5
Lack of Difficulty to 1 1
compatibility work with
competitors
Lack of 3 3
common goals
Lack of 3 7 9 18 1
organizational
compatibility
Power
imbalance
1 1
Presence of Presence of Continuous 1 1
continuous continuous improvement
improvement improvement of SCCs
Presence of Presence of Upfront 1 1
contract contract agreements in
form of
contracts
Presence of Presence of Step-by-step 1 1
experience, experience, approach: start
learning and learning and with smaller
knowledge knowledge SCCs if
successful
take next step
Presence of Presence of Awareness of 1 1
(fair) benefits (fair) benefits possible
benefits
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Table 2.11: Allocation of the enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Presence of Lack of (fair) Adjustment 1 1
(fair) benefits benefits of entire
internal
process
Difficulties in 1 1 3 5
establishing
a fair
allocation
of benefits
Efficiency 4 4 8
concerns
Presence of Lack of Lack of 2 2
flexibility flexibility flexibility
Presence of Presence of Goodwill 1 1
goodwill goodwill
Presence of Presence of Interdepend- 5 5 6 16
interdepen-
dence
interdependence ence
Presence of Lack of Short-term 1 1
long-term long-term relationship
relationship relationship
Presence of Presence of Neglecting 1 4 5 10
neglecting neglecting money in the
money in the money in the first meeting
first meeting first meeting
Lack of Difficulty to 1 1 2
neglecting speak about
money in the money in the
first meeting first meeting
Presence of Lack of Missing 1 1
resources resources capacity
Missing 1 1
employees
Not enough 2 1 1 4
time & energy
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Table 2.12: Allocation of the enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors LSP MA RE C NC
Presence of Presence of Relation to 1 6 5 12
right contact right contact contact
person person person
Lack of Different ways 2 2 4
right contact of thinking of
person contact person
Wrong 1 1
contact person
Presence of Presence of Factor time: 1 1
time time launch the
SCC
at the right
time
Presence of Presence of trust Trust 4 5 7 16
trust Lack of trust Lack of trust 1 1
Presence of Presence of Willingness 1 1 2
willingness willingness and drive to
to change to change change
Willingness to 1 1
work together
with different
parties
Lack of Other projects 2 1 1
willingness have higher
to change priorities
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2C Factor Allocation
2C.1 Allocation Benefits
Table 2.13: Allocation benefits
General Factors Factors Reference
Customer Increased customer Fawcett et al. (2008b); Cao and
Zhang (2011)improvements: responsiveness
Factors which indicate Increased customer Fawcett et al. (2008a); Horvath
(2001); Min and Zhou (2002);
*, MA and LSP perspective
improvements that satisfaction
have a direct
effect on customers Increased delivery Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b);
Horvath (2001); Lambert et al.
(1999); Simatupang and
Sridharan (2002, 2004)
performance
Improved customer Akintoye et al. (2000);
service Beach et al. (2005); Cruijssen et
al. (2007a); Horvath (2001)
Efficiency Access to missing Cao and Zhang (2011)
improvements: knowledge
Factors which indicate Best value, which can Beach et al. (2005)
improvements in how be drawn out of SCC
well expended resources utilizing the specialist
are utilized knowledge and
expertise of suppliers
Better pricing Min et al. (2005)
Closer link between Akintoye et al. (2000)
demand/supply
Cost reduction (e.g. Kalwani and Narayandas
(1995); Lambert et al. (1999);
Min et al. (2005); Reniers et al.
(2010); Richey Jr et al. (2010);
Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002, 2004); Walker et al.
(2008); *
distribution,
inventory and
manufacturing costs)
* refers to the case studies of Chapter 2
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Table 2.14: Allocation benefits
General Factors Factors Reference
Efficiency Efficiency improvement Cao and Zhang (2011); Horvath
(2001); *improvements
Employee reduction *, RE perspective, vertical SCC
Firm productivity Fawcett et al. (2008a)
Focus on core Cao and Zhang (2011); Cruijssen et
al. (2007a); Ellram and Cooper
(1990), shipper perspective
competencies
Gaining competitive Ellram and Cooper (1990), shipper
perspective; Walker et al. (2008)advantages
Improved asset Fawcett et al. (2008b); Lambert et al.
(1999); Min and Zhou (2002)utilization
Improved expertise Beach et al. (2005); Ellram and
Cooper (1990), shipper and LSP
perspective
Improved firm Richey Jr et al. (2009)
performance
Improved sales Cao and Zhang (2011); Min et al.
(2005); Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002, 2004)
Increased cash-to-cash Fawcett et al. (2008b)
velocity
Increased cost Fawcett et al. (2008b)
competitiveness
Increased productivity
Fawcett et al. (2008a); Horvath (2001)
Increased profitability Akintoye et al. (2000); Cao and
Zhang (2011); Kalwani and Narayan-
das (1995); Lambert et al. (1999)
Increased quality Akintoye et al. (2000); Cao and Zhang
(2011); Fawcett et al. (2008b); Walker
et al. (2008); *, RE perspective
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Table 2.15: Allocation benefits
General Factors Factors Reference
Efficiency Project success Beach et al. (2005)
improvements Rationalization and Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b)
simplification
Reducing Akintoye et al. (2000)
bureaucracy/paperwork
Reducing obsolete
inventory
Simatupang and Sridharan (2002,
2004)
Return on investment Cao and Zhang (2011); Min
et al. (2005); Min and Zhou
(2002); Simatupang and
Sridharan (2002, 2004)
(ROI)
Streamlining product Perry and Sohal (2001)
flow
Streamlining supply Horvath (2001); Min et al. (2005)
chain process
Time reduction Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b);
Min et al. (2005); Simatupang
and Sridharan (2004); *, LSP
and RE perspective
Enhanced
enablers:
Increased commitment Min et al. (2005)
Factors which Increased Min et al. (2005)
indicate improve- interdependence
ments in the Increased involvement Min et al. (2005)
enablers through Increased transparency *, LSP perspective
SCC Increased trust Beach et al. (2005); Min et al.
(2005)
Stronger partnership Beach et al. (2005); Fawcett
et al. (2008b); *, LSP
perspective, vertical SCC
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Table 2.16: Allocation benefits
General Factors Factors Reference
Flexibility Ability to handle Fawcett et al. (2008a)
improvements: unexpected events
Factors which indicate Environmental Richey Jr et al. (2010)
improvements in every flexibility
kind of flexibility Global flexibility Ellram and Cooper (1990),
shipper perspective
Market flexibility Horvath (2001); Richey Jr
et al. (2010)
Image improvements: Image improvements *, MA perspective
Factors which indicate Potential for Walker et al. (2008)
improvements in the receiving publicity
reputation of a partner
Market position Access new Fawcett et al. (2008a)
improvements: markets
Factors which indicate Improved market Reniers et al. (2010)
improvements in the positioning
ranking of a brand, Increase in market Min et al. (2005); Simatupang
and Sridharan (2002, 2004)product or partner in share
terms of its sales volume New product Horvath (2001); Lambert et al.
(1999); Min et al. (2005)relative to the sales development
volume of its Product quality Fawcett et al. (2008a)
market or industry improvements
Protecting market Cruijssen et al. (2007a);
Lambert et al. (1999)shares
Serving larger Cruijssen et al. (2007a)
customers
Unique products and Fawcett et al. (2008b)
services
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Table 2.17: Allocation benefits
General Factors Factors Reference
Marketing Marketing Lambert et al. (1999)
advantages: Factors advantages
which indicate
advantages in
marketing
Risk reduction: Environmental risk Walker et al. (2008)
Factors which indicate a minimization
reduction of every kind Reduced risk of Walker et al. (2008)
of risk customer criticism
Reduced risk of Min and Zhou (2002)
information failure
Reduced risk of Horvath (2001)
inventory failure
Reduced risk of Min and Zhou (2002)
quality failures
Risk reduction Lambert et al. (1999)
Sustainability CO2 reduction *
improvements: Sustainability Walker et al. (2008); *, MA
and LSP perspectiveFactors which indicate
improvements with
regard to sustainability
Technology New possibilities/ *, RE perspective
improvements: technologies
Factors which indicate Technology transfers Min and Zhou (2002)
improvements in
technology
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2C.2 Allocation Forces
Table 2.18: Allocation forces
General Factors Factors Reference
Customer issues: Changed consumer Matopoulos et al. (2007)
Factors which indicate attitude
that the force is based Customer demand de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009),
fashion, FMCG and high tech
electronics industry, MA and
RE perspective
on market and customer becomes less
demands predictable
Increased supply de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009),
high tech electronics industry,
MA perspective
uncertainty
More demanding de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009),
high tech electronics industry,
MA perspective; Fawcett et al.
(2008a, 2008b); Walker et al.
(2008)
customers
Forced by other Demanded by MA *, LSP perspective, vertical SCC
parties: Factors which
indicate that a partner Forced by RE de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009),
fashion, FMCG and high tech
electronics industry, MA
perspective; *, MA and LSP
perspective, vertical SCC
and/or its surrounding
forced the party
to launch the SCC
Regulatory Matopoulos et al. (2007);
Walker et al. (2008)compliance
Globalization: Factors Economic Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b)
which indicate that a party globalization
is forced by worldwide Globalization Matopoulos et al. (2007)
movements towards trade,
economic, financial and
communication integration
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Table 2.19: Allocation forces
General Factors Factors Reference
Greater competitive Greater competitive Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b);
Matopoulos et al. (2007)intensity: Factors intensity
which indicate that the
force is based on
competitiveness issues
Information issues: Information Fawcett et al. (2008b)
Factors which indicate revolution
that the force is based Need for better Fawcett et al. (2008a)
on information issues information
Monetary issues: Increased financial Fawcett et al. (2008b)
Factors which indicate pressure
that the force is based Pressure for lower Walker et al. (2008)
on monetary issues prices
Product issues: Critical product de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009),
fashion, FMCG and high tech
electronics industry, MA and
RE perspective
Factors which indicate
that the force is based
on product issues
Product de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009),
FMCG and high tech
electronics industry, MA and
RE perspective
customization
Shifting issues: Factors Shifting channel Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b)
which indicate that the power
force is based on changes Shifting competitive Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b)
in persons, configurations focus
or focuses
Technology issues: New information Fawcett et al. (2008a)
Factors which indicate technology
that the force is based Rapid technological Bucklin and Sengupta (1993)
on technology issues change
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Table 2.20: Allocation forces
General Factors Factors Reference
Tighter relationships: Merge and Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b)
Factors which indicate that acquisition activities
the force is based on Tighter alliance Fawcett et al. (2008a)
changes in relationships relationships
Time issues: Factors Compressed product Fawcett et al. (2008a);
which indicate that the cycles Richey Jr et al. (2009)
force is based on time Compressed Fawcett et al. (2008b)
issues technology cycles
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2C.3 Allocation Enablers/Barriers
Table 2.21: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Factors Enablers/ Barriers Factors Reference
Presence of Presence of Legal *, MA and LSP
perspective, vertical
SCC
neglectable neglectable compliance
barriers: barriers
Factors No organiza- Walker et al. (2008)
which tional barriers
indicate the Lack of Distinguish one- Cruijssen et al. (2007a)
presence or neglectable self towards the
lack of barriers coalition
neglectable partners in a
legal, horizontal SCC
industrial Industry Matopoulos et al. (2007);
or organiza- specific Walker et al. (2008)
tional barriers
barriers Legal barriers *, LSP and MA
perspective, horizontal
SCC
Organizational Akintoye et al. (2000);
Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Matopoulos et al.
(2007); Walker et al.
(2008)
boundaries (e.g.
culture barriers)
Conflicting Walker et al. (2008)
goals and/ or
priorities
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Table 2.22: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Factors Enablers/ Factors Reference
Barriers
Presence of Lack of High Cruijssen et al. (2007a); *,
LSP and RE perspectiveneglectable neglectable investments
costs: Factors costs in technology
which indicate Increased costs Walker et al. (2008)
the presence Relationship- Beach et al. (2005);
Lambert et al. (1996); Min
and Zhou (2002); Reniers
et al. (2010); *
or lack of specific upfront
neglectable costs investments
Presence of Presence of Clarity of Riggin et al. (1992)
accountabil- account- accountability
ity: Factors ability
which indicate
the presence
or lack of
obligation
of a partner
Presence of Presence of Define an Fawcett et al. (2008b)
appropriate appropriate appropriate
type of SCC: type of SCC type of SCC
Factors which to establish
indicate the with supply
presence or chain partners
lack of the Scale of the Walker et al. (2008)
appropriate SCC
type of SCC SCC Scope Lambert et al. (1999)
Presence of Presence of Ability to meet
Whipple and Frankel (2000)
capabilities: capabilities (performance)
Factors which expectation
indicate the Partner de Leeuw and Fransoo
(2009), fashion, FMCG and
high tech electronics
industry, MA and RE
perspective
presence or capabilities
lack of an
ability
Lack of Lack of partner Jharkharia and Shankar
(2005)capabilities capabilities
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Table 2.23: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Factors Enablers/
Barriers
Factors Reference
Presence of Presence of Commitment Anbanandam et al. (2011);
Barratt (2004); Beach et al.
(2005); Fawcett et al.
(2008b); Heikkila¨ (2002);
Lambert et al. (1999);
Mohr and Spekman (1994);
Perry and Sohal (2001);
Ryu et al. (2009); *
commitment commitment
and support: and support
Factors which
indicate the
presence or
lack of
commitment
and/or Support Barratt (2004); Niederkofler
(1991); Whipple and
Frankel (2000)
support of
parties and
their Lack of Lack of Akintoye et al. (2000)
surroundings commitment commitment
and support Lack of
support
Fawcett et al. (2008b);
Lambert et al. (1999);
Niederkofler (1991)
Presence of Presence of Communica- Barratt (2004); Beach et al.
(2005); Cao and Zhang
(2011); Fawcett et al.
(2008a); Heikkila¨ (2002);
Lambert et al. (1999); Min
and Zhou (2002); Min et al.
(2005); Perry and Sohal
(2001); Ryu et al. (2009)
communica- communication, tion
tion, trans- transparency
parency and and openness
openness:
Factors which
indicate the
presence or
lack of formal
and informal
information Communica- Mohr and Spekman (1994)
sharing with tion behavior
the parties in Communica- Heikkila¨ (2002); Mohr and
Spekman (1994);
Niederkofler (1991)
a timely and tion quality
qualitative
manner
and in an
appropriate way
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Table 2.24: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Factors Enablers/ Factors Reference
Barriers
Presence of Presence of Free flow of Akintoye et al. (2000);
Min et al. (2005); Perry
and Sohal (2001)
communica-
tion,
communica-
tion,
information
transparency transparency
and openness and openness
Honesty Barratt (2004); Heikkila¨
(2002); *, LSP
perspective
Information Anbanandam et al.
(2011); Barratt (2004);
Cao and Zhang (2011);
Fawcett et al. (2008a,
2008b); Gibson et al.
(2002); Heikkila¨ (2002);
Perry and Sohal (2001);
Richey Jr et al. (2010);
Simatupang and
Sridharan (2002); *
sharing
Information Akintoye et al. (2000);
Barratt (2004); Boddy
et al. (2000); Fawcett et
al. (2008a, 2008b);
Horvath (2001); Perry
and Sohal (2001); *
technology
Openness Barratt (2004); Heikkila¨
(2002); Reniers et al.
(2010)
Transparency *
Lack of Difficulty to *, LSP perspective
communica- share confidential
tion, information
transparency Lack of Akintoye et al. (2000);
Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Fawcett et al. (2015);
Jharkharia and Shankar
(2005)
and openness (appropriate)
information
technology
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Table 2.25: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Presence of Lack of Lack of Riggin et al. (1992)
communica- communica- availability,
tion, tion, accessibility and
transparency transparency validity of data
and openness and openness Lack of *, LSP perspective
communication
Lack of communi- *, RE perspective
cation between RE
and LSP in trian-
gular relationships
Lack of Fawcett et al. (2008a,
2008b); Fawcett et al.
(2015); Lambert et al.
(1999); Simatupang and
Sridharan (2002);
Richey Jr et al. (2010);
Walker et al. (2008)
information
sharing
Lack of Fawcett and Magnan
(2002); *, MA
perspective
transparency
Lack of using the *
same technology
No implementation Niederkofler (1991)
issues addressed
during negotiations
Very complex ICT *, LSP perspective
system
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Table 2.26: Allocation enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors Reference
Presence of Presence of Business process Barratt (2004); Boddy
et al. (2000)compatibil-
ity:
compatibility compatibility
Factors which Common/clear Cao and Zhang (2011);
Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Whipple and Frankel
(2000); *
indicate the goals
presence or
lack of
complementar-
ties
between the Common Akintoye et al. (2000)
partners in interests
terms of e.g. Common operat- Fawcett et al. (2008a)
goals and ing procedures
cultures Common vision Beach et al. (2005); Fawcett
et al. (2008b)
Compatibility in Boddy et al. (2000)
structure
Corporate Lambert et al. (1999)
compatibility
Cultural Boddy et al. (2000); Reniers
et al. (2010)compatibility
Decision Cao and Zhang (2011);
Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002)
synchronization
Equal power Gibson et al. (2002)
Exclusivity Lambert et al. (1999)
Incentive
alignment
Cao and Zhang (2011);
Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002)
Internal
alignment
Min et al. (2005)
Level of being Reniers et al. (2010)
supplementary/
complementary
Management Lambert et al. (1999)
compatibility
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Table 2.27: Allocation enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors Reference
Presence of Presence of Objective Beach et al. (2005); Fawcett
et al. (2008b); Simatupang
and Sridharan (2002)
compatibil- compatibility alignment
ity
Operational Niederkofler (1991); Ryu
et al. (2009)compatibility
Organizational Bucklin and Sengupta (1993);
Richey Jr et al. (2010); *compatibility
Partner Whipple and Frankel (2000);
Fawcett et al. (2008a, 2008b);
Reniers et al. (2010)
compatibility
People/employee Boddy et al. (2000)
compatibility
Physical
proximity
Lambert et al. (1999)
Prior history of Bucklin and Sengupta (1993);
Lambert et al. (1999)working together
with the partner
Shared
competitors
Lambert et al. (1999)
Shared high
value
Lambert et al. (1999)
end users
Shared values *, MA perspective, vertical
SCC
Strategic fit Gibson et al. (2002);
Niederkofler (1991); Ryu et al.
(2009); *
Symmetry of the Lambert et al. (1999)
parties; parties
benefit from
each
other
VMI Fawcett et al. (2008a)
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Table 2.28: Allocation enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors Reference
Presence Lack of Cultural Lambert et al. (1999)
of compa- compatibility differences
tibility Difficulty to *, MA perspective, horizontal
SCCwork with
competitors
Disagreement
over
Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002)
the domain of
decision
Firms’ way of Niederkofler (1991)
managing their
businesses are
different and
clash
Incentive Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002)misalignment
Inconsistent Fawcett et al. (2008a)
operating goal
Lack of common Lambert et al. (1999);
Richey Jr et al. (2010); *, RE
perspective
goals
Lack of Richey Jr et al. (2010); *
organizational
compatibility
Managerial
resource
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993)
imbalance
No strategic fit Fawcett et al. (2008b); Fawcett
et al. (2015); Lambert et al.
(1999); Niederkofler (1991)
Objective Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002)differences
Operating misfit Fawcett et al. (2008b);
Niederkofler (1991)
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Table 2.29: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Factors Enablers/
Barriers
Factors Reference
Presence of Lack of Power Boddy et al. (2000);
Bucklin and Sengupta
(1993); Cruijssen et al.
(2007a); Lambert et al.
(1999); Matopoulos et al.
(2007); *, MA perspective,
vertical SCC
compatibility compatibility imbalance
Unrealistic Lambert et al. (1999)
expectations
Presence of Lack of Lack of Walker et al. (2008)
confidential-
ity:
confidentiality confidential-
ity
Factors which
indicate the
presence or
lack of
exchanging
proprietary
information
Presence of Presence of Continuous Beach et al. (2005); Gibson
et al. (2002)continuous continuous performance
improvement: improvement evaluation/
Factors which improvement
indicate the Continuous *, RE perspective
presence or improvement
lack of of SCCs
continuous
improvement
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Table 2.30: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Presence of Presence of Clear guidelines Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Gibson et al. (2002);
Niederkofler (1991);
Richey Jr et al. (2010)
contract: contract
Factors which
indicate the
presence or Formalization Daugherty et al. (2006);
Min et al. (2005)lack of
agreements Right contract style Lambert et al. (1999)
between the Upfront agreements *, RE perspective,
horizontal and vertical SCCpartners in form of contracts
Lack of Lack of alliance Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Richey Jr et al. (2010)contract guidelines
Presence of Presence of Joint operating Lambert et al. (1999)
control: control controls
Factors which Lack of Loss of control Ellram and Cooper (1990),
shipper perspective;
Lambert et al. (1999)
indicate the control
presence or
lack of control
Presence of Presence of Coordination Mohr and Spekman (1994);
Riggin et al. (1992)coordination: coordina-
Factors which tion
indicate the
presence or
lack of
synchronization
and integrating
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Table 2.31: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Presence of Presence of Exchange of Beach et al. (2005); Cao
and Zhang (2011); Fawcett
et al. (2008a, 2008b);
Reniers et al. (2010)
experiences, experiences, knowledge
skills and skills and
knowledge: knowledge
Factors which
indicate the Step-by-step Min et al. (2005);
Niederkofler (1991); *, RE
perspective
presence or approach: start
lack of with smaller SCCs,
experiences, if successful
skills and take next step
knowledge of Lack of Lack of Fawcett et al. (2015)
parties experiences, experiences on how
skills and to build SCCs
knowledge
Presence of Presence of Benefits sharing Anbanandam et al. (2011);
Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Gibson et al. (2002);
Lambert et al. (1999);
Matopoulos et al. (2007)
(fair)
benefits:
(fair)
benefits
Factors which
indicate the
presence or
lack of
benefits and Awareness of Beach et al. (2005); Bucklin
and Sengupta (1993); Min
et al. (2005); *, RE
perspective
their fairness possible benefits
Lack of Adjustment of *, MA perspective
(fair) internal process
benefits Difficulty in Cruijssen et al. (2007a);
Fawcett and Magnan (2002)determining the
costs and
(monetary)
benefits
Difficulty in Cruijssen et al. (2007a); *
establishing a fair
allocation of the
benefits
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Table 2.32: Allocation enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors Reference
Presence of Lack of Difficulty in Cruijssen et al. (2007a)
(fair) (fair) establishing a fair
benefits benefits allocation of
shared workload
Efficiency concerns *, LSP and MA
perspective
Lack of benefit Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Richey Jr et al. (2010)sharing
Lack of mutual Lambert et al. (1999)
benefits/
profitability
for either party
Local nature of Walker et al. (2008)
SCC
Strategic benefits Akintoye et al. (2000)
unclear
Unfairness in cost Lambert et al. (1999)
and pricing
Presence of Presence of Flexibility Gibson et al. (2002);
Niederkofler (1991)flexibility: flexibility
Factors Lack of Failure to respond Lambert et al. (1999)
which flexibility to changes
indicate the Lack of flexibility *, LSP perspective
presence or
lack of
flexibility
Presence of Presence of Goodwill Niederkofler (1991); *, RE
perspectivegoodwill: goodwill
Factors
which
indicate the
presence or
lack of value
of the SCC
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Table 2.33: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Presence of Presence of Senior Fawcett et al. (2008a,
2008b)interaction: interaction management
Factors which interaction
indicate the
presence or
lack of
interaction
Presence of Presence of Interdepen- Richey Jr et al. (2010);
Ryu et al. (2009); *interdepen- interdepen- dence
dence: Factors dence Mutuality Barratt (2004); Lambert
et al. (1999)which indicate
the presence or Lack of Lack of Fawcett and Magnan (2002)
lack of a interdepend- interdepend-
relations between ence ence
independent
parties
Presence of Presence of Leadership Perry and Sohal (2001);
Riggin et al. (1992)leadership: leadership
Factors which Lack of Lack of Fawcett et al. (2015)
indicate the leadership leadership
presence or
lack of
leadership
Presence of Presence of Long-term Akintoye et al. (2000);
Anbanandam et al.
(2011); Beach et al.
(2005); Ganesan (1994);
Gibson et al. (2002);
Min et al. (2005)
long-term long-term relationship
relationship: relationship
Factors which
indicate the
presence or
lack of a Lack of Short-term Niederkofler (1991); *,
MA perspectivelong-term long-term relationship
relationship relationship
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Table 2.34: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Presence of Presence of Neglecting money *
neglecting neglecting in the first
money in the money in the meeting
first meeting: first meeting
Factors which Lack of Difficulty to speak *, MA and LSP
perspectiveindicate the neglecting about money in the
presence or money in the first meeting
lack of not first meeting
talking about
money in the
first meeting
Presence of no Lack of no Opportunistic Ellram and Cooper
(1990), shipper and LSP
perspective; Lambert
et al. (1999)
opportunistic opportunistic behavior
behavior: behavior
Factors which
indicate the
presence or
lack of
opportunistic
behavior
Presence of Presence of Involvement of Beach et al. (2005)
partner partner the partners
contribution: contribution
Factors which Lack of Lack of Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Niederkofler (1991)indicate the partner involvement
presence or contribution of partner
lack of
partner
contribution
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Table 2.35: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Presence of Presence of Joint business Akintoye et al. (2000);
Gibson et al. (2002);
Heikkila¨ (2002); Lambert
et al. (1999); Riggin et al.
(1992)
planning: planning planning
Factors which
indicate the
presence or
lack of Lack of Internal planning Richey Jr et al. (2009)
deciding how to planning failure
do something Poor upfront Lambert et al. (1999)
planning
Presence of Presence of Reliability Heikkila¨ (2002)
reliability: reliability Reliability of Akintoye et al. (2000)
Factors which supply
indicate the
presence or
lack of
reliability
Presence of Presence of Availability and Akintoye et al. (2000),
construction industry, MA
perspective; Riggin et al.
(1992)
resources: resources quality of non-
Factors which financial resources
indicate the
presence or External innovation Reniers et al. (2010)
lack of potential
useful or Financial resources Boddy et al. (2000);
Reniers et al. (2010); Riggin
et al. (1992)
valuable
resources or
quality of
a partner Management of Riggin et al. (1992)
resources
Resources Barratt (2004)
Shared resources Cao and Zhang (2011)
Lack of Lack of Fawcett et al. (2012);
Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Jharkharia and Shankar
(2005); Niederkofler (1991);
Walker et al. (2008)
resources resources
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Table 2.36: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Presence of Lack of Missing capacity *, RE perspective
resources resources Missing employee *, RE perspective
Not enough time *
and energy
Presence of Presence of Joint decision Barratt (2004)
right contact right contact making
person: person Relation to contact *
Factors which person
indicate the Lack of Different ways of *, MA and RE perspective
presence or right thinking between
lack of a contact contact persons
compatible person Inappropriate Niederkofler (1991)
contact liaison
person managers
Wrong contact *, RE perspective
person
Presence of Presence of Risk sharing Anbanandam et al. (2011);
Beach et al. (2005); Fawcett
et al. (2008a); Gibson et al.
(2002); Lambert et al.
(1999); Matopoulos et al.
(2007)
risk sharing: risk sharing
Factors which
indicate the
presence or
lack of risk
sharing Lack of risk Lack of willingness Fawcett et al. (2008a,
2008b); Richey Jr et al.
(2010)
sharing to share risk
Presence of Presence of Factor time: launch *, RE perspective
time: Factors time the SCC at the
which indicate right time
the presence No time pressure at Niederkofler (1991)
or lack of the negotiation
enough time process
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Table 2.37: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Presence of Presence High degree of Niederkofler (1991)
tolerance: of tolerance
Factors which tolerance
indicate the
presence or
lack of the
willingness to
accept behavior
and beliefs
which are
different from
your own
Presence of Presence Adaptation of the Barratt (2004); Fawcett et
al. (2008a, 2008b); Min and
Zhou (2002)
tools: Factors of tools/ measurements
which indicate tools for the supply chain
the presence Conflict resolution Beach et al. (2005);
Heikkila¨ (2002)or lack of e.g. techniques/
aligned management
methods and Education and Beach et al. (2005); Fawcett
et al. (2008a, 2008b)measurements training
External monitoring Richey Jr et al. (2009)
failure
Integrated teams Beach et al. (2005)
Joint problem Mohr and Spekman (1994)
solving
More frequent Akintoye et al. (2000);
Perry and Sohal (2001)meetings
Partnering workshop Beach et al. (2005)
Same measurement Fawcett et al. (2008a,
2008b); Fawcett and
Magnan (2002); Gibson
et al. (2002); Richey Jr
et al. (2010); Simatupang
and Sridharan (2002)
methods (e.g.
performance)
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Table 2.38: Allocation enablers/barriers
General En- Factors Reference
Factors ablers/
Barriers
Presence of Lack of Conflicts between Bucklin and Sengupta
(1993); Fawcett et al.
(2008b); Matopoulos et al.
(2007)
tools tools firms/functions
Lack of training Fawcett et al. (2008b)
No adaptation of Fawcett et al. (2008a);
Richey Jr et al. (2010)the measures/ tools
Non-aligned Fawcett and Magnan
(2002); Fawcett et al.
(2008a, 2008b); Fawcett
et al. (2015); Richey Jr
et al. (2010); Simatupang
and Sridharan (2002)
measures
Presence of Presence Trust Akintoye et al. (2000);
Anbanandam et al. (2011);
Barratt (2004); Beach et al.
(2005); Boddy et al. (2000);
Fawcett et al. (2008b);
Ganesan (1994); Gibson
et al. (2002); Heikkila¨
(2002); Lambert et al.
(1999); Mohr and Spekman
(1994); Niederkofler (1991);
Perry and Sohal (2001);
Reniers et al. (2010); Ryu
et al. (2009); Whipple and
Frankel (2000); *
trust: Factors of
which indicate trust
the presence
or lack of
partners perceiving
each other as
credible and
benevolent
Lack of Difficulty in finding Cruijssen et al. (2007a)
trust a trusted partner/
person to lead the
SCC
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Table 2.39: Allocation enablers/barriers
General Enablers/ Factors Reference
Factors Barriers
Lack of Lack of Lack of trust Fawcett et al. (2008b);
Fawcett et al. (2015);
Jharkharia and Shankar
(2005); Lambert et al.
(1999); Matopoulos et al.
(2007); *, RE perspective
trust trust
Presence of Lack of Lack of
Fawcett and Magnan (2002)
understand-
ing:
understand-
ing
understanding the
process
Factors
which Poor understanding Akintoye et al. (2000)
indicate the of the SCC concept
presence or Understanding of the Fawcett and Magnan
(2002); Niederkofler (1991)lack of parties partner’s resources
understanding and interests
each other and
the concepts
Presence of Presence of Development of Simatupang and Sridharan
(2002)willingness willingness integrated polices
to change: to change External willingness Reniers et al. (2010)
Factors which to change and
indicate the collaborate
presence or
lack of inertia
Need for change Fawcett et al. (2008b)
should be visible
Relationship Barratt (2004); Gibson
et al. (2002); Min et al.
(2005)
orientation
Willingness and drive *, MA and LSP
perspective, vertical SCCto change
Willingness to work *, RE perspective
together with
different parties
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Table 2.40: Allocation enablers/barriers
General
Factors
Enablers/
Barriers
Factors Reference
Presence Lack of Inertia Fawcett et al. (2008b); Fawcett
et al. (2015); Niederkofler
(1991); Simatupang and
Sridharan (2002); Walker et al.
(2008)
of willing- willingness
ness to to change
change
Lack of
integration
Fawcett et al. (2015);
Jharkharia and Shankar (2005)
Lack of
motivation
Richey Jr et al. (2009);
Richey Jr et al. (2010)
towards
integration
Other
projects have
Jharkharia and Shankar (2005); *,
RE perspective
higher
priorities
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2C.4 Allocation Risks
Table 2.41: Allocation risks
General Factors Factors Reference
Uncertainty of Risk of additional costs *
additional costs: additional costs
Factors which indicate Uncertainty of the Fawcett and Magnan (2002)
an uncertainty of costs
additional future costs
Uncertainty of changes Assignment of new Landeros et al. (1995)
in key personnel: employees to
Factors which indicate partnership teams
an uncertainty of Reassignment of Landeros et al. (1995)
changes in key partnership leader
personnel Risk of partner *, RE perspective
leaving the SCC
during collaboration
Uncertainty of Acquisition of one Landeros et al. (1995)
changes in ownership: partner by a third party
Factors which indicate Having unequal Landeros et al. (1995)
an uncertainty of share of financial
changes in the responsibility in
ownership the SCC
Uncertainty of Entrance of new Landeros et al. (1995)
changes in the partner firms in the base
base: Factors which Exiting of existing Landeros et al. (1995)
indicate an uncertainty firms from base
of changes in the partner Expanding for Landeros et al. (1995)
base technological
advantages in the
base
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Table 2.42: Allocation risks
General Factors Factors Reference
Uncertainty of Increasing or Landeros et al. (1995)
changes in the partner decreasing purchases
base by firms in the base
Increasing or Landeros et al. (1995)
decreasing sales by
firms in the base
Uncertainty of Environmental Landeros et al. (1995)
climate related factors: issues
Factors which indicate Natural disasters Landeros et al. (1995)
an uncertainty of Weather changes Landeros et al. (1995)
changes in the climate
and their impacts
Uncertainty of Entrance of new Landeros et al. (1995)
competition: Factors competition or
which indicate an new competitive
uncertainty of future advantages in the
competition and industry
competitiveness of the
partner
Uncertainty of Balance of Landeros et al. (1995)
economy: Factors payment
which indicate an Deficits Landeros et al. (1995)
uncertainty of changes Depression Landeros et al. (1995)
of the system and/or Fiscal policies Landeros et al. (1995)
industry Inflationary or Landeros et al. (1995)
deflationary trend
Interest rates Landeros et al. (1995)
Monetary policies Landeros et al. (1995)
Prosperous Landeros et al. (1995)
business cycle
Recession Landeros et al. (1995)
Recovery Landeros et al. (1995)
Surpluses Landeros et al. (1995)
Tax rates Landeros et al. (1995)
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Table 2.43: Allocation risks
General Factors Factors Reference
Uncertainty of Americans with Landeros et al. (1995)
government: Factors Disables Act
which indicate an Domestic content Landeros et al. (1995)
uncertainty of the requirements
government Equal employment Landeros et al. (1995)
opportunity
Safety and health Landeros et al. (1995)
regulations
Wage and price Landeros et al. (1995)
control
Uncertainty of high Contract uncertainty; *, MA and RE perspective
dependency: Factors parties are
which indicate an mutually dependent
uncertainty of the Risk of Ellram and Cooper (1990),
shipper perspective; Ganesan
(1994); Niederkofler (1991); *
dependency on another dependency
partner
Uncertainty of losing Risk of losing Cruijssen et al. (2007a)
clients: Factors which clients to competitors
indicate an uncertainty
of losing customers
Uncertainty of losing Risk of confidential Jharkharia and Shankar
(2005); *, LSP perspectivetransparency: Factors information security
which indicate an Risk of information Ellram and Cooper (1990),
shipper perspectiveuncertainty of changes transfer
in transparency in the Uncertainty of *, MA perspective
future losing transparency
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Table 2.44: Allocation risks
General Factors Factors Reference
Uncertainty of Enriching team Landeros et al. (1995)
organizational potency
socialization: Factors Establishing the Landeros et al. (1995)
which indicate an partnership team’s
uncertainty of changes importance, purpose
in the process through and identity
which new employees Setting up Landeros et al. (1995)
learn to adapt to the SCC among
organizational culture members
Setting team Landeros et al. (1995)
tasks
Training existing Landeros et al. (1995)
and new members
Uncertainty of Data reliability *, RE perspective
performance Late or missed Landeros et al. (1995)
problems: Factors deliveries
which indicate an Quality performance Ellram and Cooper (1990),
shipper perspective; Landeros
et al. (1995); *, RE perspective
uncertainty of problems problems
with the performance
and quality in the future
Uncertainty of Jharkharia and Shankar
(2005); *, RE perspectiveoutcome
Withholding or Landeros et al. (1995)
delaying necessary
information
Uncertainty of social Personal values Landeros et al. (1995)
factors: Factors which and attitude shift
indicate an uncertainty
of social factors in the
future
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Table 2.45: Allocation risks
General Factors Factors Reference
Uncertainty of Acquiring new Landeros et al. (1995)
strategic intent: technologies to
Factors which indicate exploit future
an uncertainty of a opportunities
change in the strategic Capturing existing Landeros et al. (1995)
intent in the future markets
Expanding into Landeros et al. (1995)
global markets
Exploiting Landeros et al. (1995)
competitors’
weaknesses
Opening new Landeros et al. (1995)
markets
Uncertainty of Embracing Landeros et al. (1995)
strategic match: just-in-time
Factors which indicate philosophies
an uncertainty of Implementing total Landeros et al. (1995)
changes in the strategic quality management
match in the future concepts
Installing cycle Landeros et al. (1995)
time reducing
goals
Partners’ interest Niederkofler (1991)
and resources
requirements shift
over time
Requiring Landeros et al. (1995)
continuous
improvement
objectives
Uncertainty of New product or Landeros et al. (1995)
technology: Factors process advancements
which indicate an
uncertainty of
technology in the future
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2D Extract of the Interview Guide
2D Extract of the Interview Guide
Date:
Location:
Organization:
Party: LSP Manufacturer Retailer
Name of the interviewer(s):
Name/Position/Function of the Interviewee:
Other participant during interview:
Name/Position/Function:
Record of the interview: Audio Video
1. Introducing questions
(a) General questions about the company (volume, size, turnover, number
of employees etc.).
(b) What does “supply chain collaboration” in general mean for you and
your company?
(c) What comes into your mind when you hear the term “supply chain
collaboration”? (horizontal/vertical/lateral)
2. Discussion about collaborations
(a) Short description of the collaboration; which supply chain parties were
involved in this supply chain collaboration? Names? Number of par-
ticipants in total? Number of participants per party?
(b) What type of collaborations? (e.g. horizontal, vertical or lateral SCC)
(c) When did you start to collaborate?
(d) Was the supply chain collaboration successful?
3. Discussion about enablers for launching a collaboration
(Definition of the category enabler)
(a) Are there any prerequisites (enablers) that enable you to launch the
collaboration? Which? How would you define them? Why? How
important?
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4. Discussion about forces/benefits for launching a collaboration
(Definition of the categories force and benefit)
(a) What made you launch the specific SCCs? Why are you willing to col-
laborate with your fellow supply chain parties? Which factors? Why?
How important?
5. Discussion about barriers/risks of launching a collaboration
(Definition of the category barrier and risk)
(a) What are barriers that could limit the success of the collaboration before
launching the SCC? Which? Why? How important?
(b) What are risks that might occur during the collaboration? Which?
Why? How important?
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Chapter 3
Disagreement on the Gain
Sharing Method in Supply
Chain Collaborations 1
3.1 Introduction
The case studies in Section 2.4 confirmed the importance of cost reduction as a
motivation to launch collaborations. This motivation factor is at the same time
also one of the main challenges for collaborations. By reducing costs through SCC,
a coalition gain can be achieved, which also needs to be distributed among the
collaborative parties. This distribution is, according to Cruijssen et al. (2007a)
and Leng and Parlar (2009), a main barrier for the implementation and the success
of an SCC. The case studies in the Dutch FMCG industry described in Chapter 2
stress the findings of Cruijssen et al. (2007a) and Leng and Parlar (2009), as well.
If one partner is not satisfied with its allocated share or feels like not receiving a
fair portion of the coalition gain, future SCCs are less likely to occur (Jap, 2001).
Cruijssen et al. (2007b) also mention that mistrust regarding the fairness of the
applied allocation method already caused many SCC failures. This is stressed
by Cruijssen (2012), who state that having a fair allocation method, one that is
also perceived as fair by the collaborative parties, is essential for a successful and
sustainable SCC. Based on the importance of fair gain sharing, several researchers
1This chapter is based on the paper Jung et al. (2018a)
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already developed gain sharing methods to allocate the coalition gain among the
collaborative parties (e.g. Frisk et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2010; Schmeidler, 1969;
Shapley, 1953; Tijs and Driessen, 1986). The general idea of these gain sharing
methods is to distribute the gains in such a way that everyone is satisfied to ensure
the establishment and sustainability as well as to realize the potential of the SCC
(Liu et al., 2010). Although the above-mentioned statements express the impor-
tance of the acceptance of a gain sharing method by all parties, until now the
actual acceptance levels of gain sharing methods have not been investigated. This
chapter attempts to fill this gap. It extends the works by Cruijssen et al. (2007a),
Leng and Parlar (2009) as well as the work presented in Chapter 2 by investigat-
ing the parties’ acceptance levels of selected gain sharing methods. Section 3.3.1,
provides an overview of the selected gain sharing methods. In this chapter the
allocation methods are outlined as cost allocation methods since this is common
in current literature. Dividing the costs or gains among the coalition partners is
equivalent, since the total gains of all collaborative parties equals the difference
between the sum of all stand-alone costs and the total collaborative costs. In
this study, the acceptance of the selected gain sharing methods is investigated in
vertical three-echelon SCCs (manufacturer, LSP, retailer) in the Dutch FMCG in-
dustry. The FMCG industry was chosen as SCCs are very important for all parties
in this industry in order to be competitive (de Kok et al., 2015). As a result, to
ensure sustainable SCCs in the FMCG industry all collaborative parties have to
be satisfied with and accept the assigned gain share.
In order to investigate the cause for the acceptance or rejection of a gain shar-
ing method, the influence of behavioral decision-making aspects on the acceptance
levels of these gain sharing methods is examined. Special attention is paid to two
behavioral decision-making aspects: information availability and cognitive biases.
The focus is first on information availability, since in the case studies a connection
between the access of information and gain sharing was identified, see Section 2.4.3.
Second, cognitive biases are considered due to their close connection to information
availability. Parties rely on cognitive biases if incomplete information is provided
(Sterman, 1989). In addition to the investigation of the acceptance levels of gain
sharing methods, the incorporation of behavioral research literature within SCM
research is another contribution of this chapter. For a long time, the predominant
assumption in economics was that human beings are rational thinking agents,
which implies that decisions are made in a rational and consistent way (Sterman,
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1989). However, human beings are limited due to restrictions in available time, in-
formation and cognitive capabilities (Simon, 1979). They tend to rely on heuristics
or cognitive biases to deal with complex problems (Schenk, 2011). Until now, the
research published in the fields of logistics and SCM literature dealing with the in-
fluence of human behavior, judgment and decision-making is limited. However, to
ensure practical validity it is necessary to incorporate behavioral research in SCM
studies (Tokar, 2010). This is stressed by Mantel et al. (2006), who outline the
greater understanding of decisions made in SCM by integrating decision-making
literature in SCM research.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, gain
sharing methods are outlined and the behavioral decision-making literature is dis-
cussed. Next, the acceptance of selected gain sharing methods as well as the
influence of behavioral aspects on the acceptance levels of these allocation meth-
ods are investigated. The research methodology is outlined in Section 3.3. In
Section 3.4, the statistical analysis and results are presented, followed by a discus-
sion in Section 3.5. The chapter concludes with a short summary, implications for
theory and practice as well as directions for further research.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Gain Sharing Methods
As the goal of an SCC is to increase the participants’ efficiency and since collabo-
ration often results in additional gains, a great deal of scientific literature focuses
on the identification of efficient gain sharing methods (e.g Frisk et al., 2010; Liu
et al., 2010; Tijs and Driessen, 1986). Verdonck et al. (2016) provide a structured
review of gain sharing methods applied in logistics collaborations distinguishing be-
tween proportional sharing mechanisms, allocation mechanisms using game theory
concepts and allocation techniques designed to cope with additional cooperation
properties.
In practice, the most commonly used gain sharing method is the proportional
allocation method (Liu et al., 2010). In this case, coalition gains are shared among
the parties in proportion to their individual cost level or the volume they have to
transport within the context of the collaboration (Verdonck et al., 2016). These
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methods are preferred in practice due to their simplicity and transparency (Crui-
jssen et al., 2007b).
Furthermore, an SCC matches the structure of a cooperative game. The collab-
oration process results in an allocation of gains to each collaborative partner that
may be considered equivalent to the outcome of a cooperative game. A relevant
concept in this context is the core (Shapley, 1952). The core of a game con-
sists of all gain allocations that are budget balanced and guarantee that no single
partner or coalition of partners benefits from leaving the collaboration. Another
well-known gain sharing method based on the foundations of game theory is the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). This value allocates to each partner the weighted
average of its contributions to all (sub)coalitions, assuming that the grand coali-
tion is formed successively, with one party joining at a time. A more complex game
theoretic sharing mechanism is the Nucleolus. This method minimizes the maxi-
mal excess, which constitutes the difference between the total costs of a coalition
and the sum of the costs allocated to its parties (Schmeidler, 1969).
Finally, several authors have developed distinct gain sharing mechanisms that
account for specific collaboration characteristics (Verdonck et al., 2016). Tijs and
Driessen (1986) discuss allocation methods that split the collaborative costs in
a separable and a non-separable part. The separable part is directly linked and
assigned to a specific party. The remaining costs, the non-separable part, have to
be divided among the parties. Tijs and Driessen (1986) mention different ways
of how the non-separable part of the costs can be allocated. They discuss the
equal charge method (ECM), the alternative cost avoided method (ACAM) and
the separable cost remaining benefits (SCRB). They also introduce a new method,
the cost gap method (CGM). Frisk et al. (2010) use their equal profit method
(EPM) to identify stable allocations that minimize the largest relative difference
in cost savings between any pair of collaborative parties. The weighted relative
savings model (WRSM) proposed by Liu et al. (2010) is similar to the EPM, but
takes additionally the difference in the parties’ contribution into account. The
gain sharing methods developed by O¨zener and Ergun (2008) ensure that existing
parties do not lose savings when an additional party joins the collaboration.
Although simple proportional methods are appealing to collaborative parties
in practice due to their simplicity and transparency, Cruijssen et al. (2007b) point
out that these simple methods might systematically undervalue a party’s true share
in the SCC success. In the long run, this might lead to frustration and one party
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leaving the collaboration. Unlike these simple methods, game theoretic allocation
methods “objectively take into account each player’s impact and produce compro-
mise allocations that distribute the benefits of cooperation based on clear fairness
properties” (Cruijssen et al., 2007a). Therefore, in the case study introduced in
Section 3.3 the focus is on game theoretic allocation methods as well as allocation
techniques designed to cope with additional cooperation properties.
3.2.2 Behavioral Decision-Making
For a long time, the predominant assumption in economics was that human beings
think rational. However, Simon (1979) describes a restriction on rational decision-
making due to limitations of available time, information and cognitive capabilities
of the decision-makers. Although people think that they are rationally thinking
creatures, their thinking, their memory and also their decision-making are influ-
enced by cognitive biases. To date, a wide range of cognitive biases have been
identified. Among these is the recency bias, according to which people tend to
put more weight on the latest information they receive (Hallowell and Gambatese,
2009). Another example is the so-called salience bias. Human beings influenced
by this bias tend to focus on the most easily-recognizable items or information of a
concept and ignore the ones that are not as apparent (Schenk, 2011). The choice-
supportive bias states that people tend to feel positive about their choice, even if
the choice has a flaw (Mather and Johnson, 2000). As a final example, the framing
effect bias could be named. According to De Martino et al. (2006), human beings
are remarkably vulnerable to the manner in which options are presented, which is
the so-called framing effect. Therefore, when facing decision problems with identi-
cal consequences, people’s decisions may differ depending on how the options are
presented; in a positive, in terms of gains, or in a negative, in terms of losses, frame.
As already outlined in the introduction, the focus of this chapter is on two
behavioral aspects: information availability and cognitive biases. Attention is paid
to these two aspects due to the identified connection between the availability of
information with gain sharing as well as with cognitive biases, see Sterman (1989)
as well as Chapter 2. The availability of time might also have an influence on the
acceptance of a gain sharing method. However, in the case studies introduced in
Chapter 2 no connection between these two aspects was identified for the Dutch
FMCG industry. Nevertheless, time availability might be an interesting aspect to
take into account in further research.
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3.3 Research Procedure
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no researcher has investigated the ac-
ceptance levels of gain sharing methods in practice. Therefore, this research is
exploratory. According to (Yin, 2013), a case study approach is, under these con-
ditions, the best-suited approach. Therefore, a quantitative case study approach
is used. By means of the case study, the following questions will be examined:
1. What are the acceptance levels of gain sharing methods in the Dutch FMCG
industry?
(a) What are the manufacturers’ acceptance levels of gain sharing methods?
(b) What are the LSPs’ acceptance levels of gain sharing methods?
(c) What are the retailers’ acceptance levels of gain sharing methods?
2. What is the influence of behavioral decision-making aspects on the accep-
tance levels of gain sharing methods in the Dutch FMCG industry?
(a) What is the influence of information availability on the acceptance levels
of gain sharing methods?
(b) What is the influence of cognitive biases on the acceptance levels of gain
sharing methods?
The research procedure is divided into four steps. In Table 3.1, the main
aspects for each step are outlined.
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Table 3.1: Research Procedure
Steps Procedure Comments Refer-
ence
Step Variable Independent Variables Section
1 Selection Gain sharing method (Nucleolus, Shapley 3.3.1
value, WCM - Power/Initiator, ECM)
Information availability (Phase 1, 2 and 3)
Perspective (Manufacturer,LSP, Retailer)
Dependent Variable
Acceptance
Step Data Online Survey Section
2 Collection Accept or reject certain gain shares 3.3.2
for all allocation methods in all phases
Exclusively gains (ordered from the lowest to the
highest) are presented
Step Population Population Section
3 and Sample Companies from the Dutch FMCG 3.3.3
Selection industry/participants in logistics competition
Sample Size
4 manufacturers, 4 LSPs, 4 retailers
Step Data Analytical Tool Section
4 Analysis Binary logistic regression 3.3.4
Independent Variables
Gain sharing method (Method):
Categorical variable (Baseline: Nucleolus)
Information availability (Phase):
Categorical variable (Baseline: Phase 1)
Perspective (Type):
Categorical variable (Baseline: Manufacturer)
Dependent Variable
Acceptance: Binary variable
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3.3.1 Variable Selection
In order to answer the introduced questions, the influence of three aspects - gain
sharing method, information availability and perspective - on the acceptance of
selected gain sharing methods is investigated. These aspects are outlined in detail
in the following sections.
Gain Sharing Method
First, the influence of the gain sharing method, which represents the first variable,
is investigated. The gain sharing method determines the gain that is assigned to
each party. As the assigned gain shares differ among the gain sharing methods, the
level of acceptance of the allocation methods are most likely different, which might
uncover possible cognitive biases. In this research, the focus is on four gain sharing
methods: the Shapley value, the Nucleolus and two methods based on separable
and non-separable costs, the weighted charge method (WCM) and the ECM. For
the WCM, two weights were chosen. Therefore, five gain sharing methods were
investigated in total. The first two allocation methods are well-known game theo-
retic allocation methods and the most preferred methods in theory (Moulin, 1991).
The other allocation methods are, according to a preliminary study, most similar
to what is already used in practice. In this preliminary study, 20 companies from
the Dutch FMCG industry were interviewed in order to identify their understand-
ing of a (fair) gain sharing, their willingness to share gains and their experiences
with gain sharing. The interview guide as well as some additional information are
outlined in Appendix 3A.
Shapley Value
For the Shapley value, the formation of the grand coalition N, which includes every
collaborative party, can be seen as a sequential process, in which the collaborative
parties enter one by one. For every partner i, the value is defined as the average
marginal contribution of the partner to every possible subcoalition S of the grand
coalition N containing this partner. The Shapley value is based on the four axioms
formulated by Shapley (1953) and can be computed by:
xi =
∑
(S∪N\i)
(|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |! ∗ (c(S ∪ i)− c(S)) (3.1)
where xi represents the allocated costs for partner i. Furthermore, let |N | and |S|
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denote the number of partners in a grand coalition and subcoalition, respectively.
Lastly, c(S) represents the costs of a subcoalition S.
Nucleolus
The Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is based on the idea of minimizing the maximum
excess. The excess is the gain the parties in a subcoalition S obtain if they exit
the grand coalition N . For a subcoalition S given an allocation x, the excess for
a subcoalition e(x, S) is denoted as:
e(x, S) = c(S)−
∑
(i∈S)
xi (3.2)
where c(S) represents the costs of a subcoalition S.
Weighted Charge Method
The WCM is based on the idea of Tijs and Driessen (1986) that the costs are
at first split in a separable (mi = c(N) − c(N \ i)) and a non-separable part
(c(N)−∑Ni=0 mi ). The non-separable part is divided among the parties according
to a specific weight wi. The allocation for a partner i is then computed as follows:
xi = mi + (c(N)−
N∑
i=0
mi) ∗ wi (3.3)
where xi represents the allocated costs for partner i, mi represents the separable
part of the costs for partner i and c(N) represents the costs of the grand coalition
N .
Based on the preliminary study (see Appendix 3A), two different types of
weights could be identified, one based on the power position and one based on the
initiator. In the Dutch FMCG industry, the retailer is the most powerful party.
Therefore, the highest weight wr = 0.5 is assigned to the retailer. In comparison
to the manufacturer, the LSP is more powerful. Therefore a weight of wl = 0.3
is allocated to the LSP and the rest wm = 0.2 is assigned to the manufacturer.
Furthermore, in the Dutch FMCG industry the LSP often initiates the launch of
an SCC. As a result, the highest weight (wl = 0.4) is allocated to the LSP. The
rest is equally split among the manufacturer and retailer (wr = wm = 0.3).
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Equal Charge Method
The ECM is also based on the idea of Tijs and Driessen (1986). Unlike the WCM,
the non-separable part is equally distributed among the parties. Therefore, the
total amount allocated to each partner i is:
xi = mi +
(c(N)−∑Ni=0 mi)
(|N |) (3.4)
Information Availability
Second, the influence of the information availability, which represents the second
variable, is examined. This behavioral decision-making aspect refers to the limita-
tion of available information outlined by Simon (1979) in the context of bounded
rationality. Human beings make their decisions based on cognitive biases when
available information is limited (Sterman, 1989). In order to investigate the in-
fluence of information availability, three different phases were developed. The
amount of information increases with each phase. In the first phase, participants
only receive information about their own financial consequences. This includes
information about their benefits, costs related to the SCC and the resulting profit,
which is equal to the contribution they make to the coalition gain, see Table 3.2.
In addition, they receive information about the gain they will receive according
to each of the five gain sharing methods, see Table 3.3. In the second phase,
the participants also receive information about the financial consequences of their
coalition partners. Finally, in the last phase, market information for each collab-
orative party is included. Here, information about the market share, products
and the importance of a collaboration with the other partners is included, see
Figure 3.1.
Table 3.2: Information about the financial consequences after a five year SCC
Manufacturer LSP Retailer
Benefits 80,000e 50,000e 250,000e
Costs 85,000e 10,000e 80,000e
Profits - 5,000e 40,000e 170,000e
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Table 3.3: Gain assigned to the different parties according to the gain sharing
methods
Manufacturer LSP Retailer
Nucleolus 4,333.33e 55,333.33e 145,333.33e
Shapley 36,333.33e 61,833.33e 106,833.33e
WCM-Power 41,000.00e 61,500.00e 102,500.00e
WCM-Initiator 61,500.00e 82,000.00e 61,500.00e
ECM 68,333.33e 68,333.33e 68,333.33e
Figure 3.1: Market information for each collaborative party
Perspective
Third, the influence of the perspective, which represents the third variable, is in-
vestigated. The case study focuses on a vertical SCC between one manufacturer,
one LSP and one retailer. Different collaborative parties have different and there-
fore incomplete information. As a result, the collaborative parties will most likely
show various cognitive biases since, as stated by Sterman (1989), human beings
rely on cognitive biases if incomplete information are available.
3.3.2 Data Collection
The data of the quantitative case study was collected using online surveys. The
strong methodology control is the main reason to use an online survey. In an online
survey, the order of the questions, the completeness of the answers and the filtering
can be controlled by the researcher (Evans and Mathur, 2005). Participants were
asked in each phase of information availability and for each gain sharing method
to evaluate whether they would accept or reject the assigned gain. Thereby, the
order of the questions from Phase 1 to Phase 3 is crucial in order to observe the
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influence of the available information. The participants only see the outcome of
the gain sharing method, but they do not know which method was applied. As a
result, the acceptance of the allocation method was examined through the accep-
tance of a specific gain. The assigned gain shares are ranked from lowest to highest
in order to prevent parties from rejecting a gain share which is lower than a pre-
vious one. Another important advantage of the online survey is that participants
cannot look ahead like in a mail survey. However, not knowing the amount of ques-
tions might discourage a respondent from continuing the online survey (Evans and
Mathur, 2005). In order to prevent this, a graphical progress indicator was used.
The predetermined order and preventing participants from skipping ahead to later
questions reduce the survey bias. Moreover, through the use of an online survey
rather than a personal survey or a telephone survey, the so-called interview bias is
avoided, which can always occur in case of personal contact between interviewer
and respondent (Evans and Mathur, 2005). Among others, the goal of the online
survey is to observe cognitive biases. Therefore, preventing biases resulting from
the surveys themselves is essential. Furthermore, split samples were used. The
online surveys were different for each collaborative party. According to Evans and
Mathur (2005), “online surveys are particularly effective when multiple samples
are involved”.
The online surveys were distributed through a link to the survey URLs in an
e-mail. Reminders were sent out to achieve a higher response rate. An example
of the online survey can be found in Appendix 3B.
3.3.3 Population and Sample Size Selection
The online surveys were conducted with companies from the Dutch FMCG in-
dustry. It was selected due to the importance of SCCs for this industry (de Kok
et al., 2015). In the FMCG industry, it is necessary for parties to collaborate
with their supply chain partners. To ensure sustainable SCCs, all parties need to
be satisfied with and accept their assigned gain share. Participants were selected
from a population of 26 companies that participated in the logistics competition
introduced in Chapter 2. The sample size is 12, including four manufacturers, four
LSPs and four retailers. The online surveys were conducted with supply chain or
logistics managers of the companies due to their experiences and expertise in SCC.
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3.3.4 Data Analysis
To analyze the outlined research questions, a binary logistic regression is performed
(Hosmer Jr et al., 2013). In order to use the logistic regression, some data prepa-
rations have to be made. The dependent variable is a binary variable with a value
equal to 1 if the gain is accepted and 0 otherwise. The three independent variables
are all categorical variables. The gain sharing method variable is coded as Nucle-
olus, Shapley, WCM-Power, WCM-Initiator and ECM. Taking the Nucleolus as
a baseline, the gain sharing variable is represented by four binaries. To represent
the five gain sharing methods, only four design variables are necessary due to an
intercept used in the model (Hosmer Jr et al., 2013). Information availability is
represented by two variables with Phase 1 designated as the reference phase. The
perspective is also represented by two variables, while the Manufacturer is taken
as the baseline.
Problems with the logistic regression occurred as a consequence of a data pat-
tern known as quasi-complete separation. Quasi-complete separation occurs if the
dependent variable of an independent dummy variable is always either equal to
1 or to 0. As a consequence, the maximum likelihood estimate does not exist.
This problem often occurs if a small sample size is used (Allison, 2008). There-
fore, a binary logistic regression with a penalized maximum likelihood estimation
is used. The penalized maximum likelihood estimation method was proposed
by Firth (1993) to reduce the bias in maximum likelihood estimates. Heinze and
Schemper (2002) show that this method provides a solution for the quasi-complete
separation problem. The basic idea of the penalized maximum likelihood estima-
tion method is to introduce a modified score function which removes the bias of
the maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients (Firth, 1993). For a more
elaborate explanation of this method, the reader is referred to Firth (1993) and
Heinze and Schemper (2002).
Both binary logistic regressions are performed on R (version 3.3.2), using the
package logistf. The package uses the penalized log likelihood ratio test as a de-
fault. As this method is also recommended by Heinze and Schemper (2002) for
the binary logistic regression with maximum likelihood estimation, the penalized
log likelihood ratio test is used.
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The data analysis starts with a multicollinearity test. Based on the results of
the multicollinearity tests, binary logistic regressions are performed. At first, the
influence of all independent variables on the acceptance levels of the selected gain
sharing methods is investigated. This is followed by an analysis of the influence
of behavioral aspects on the acceptance level of each partner separately. For
this, three additional logistic regressions, one for manufacturers, one for LSPs and
one for retailers, are performed. Through an extensive comparison between the
logistic regressions, differences in the parties’ acceptance levels and the influence
of behavioral aspects are identified. In Figure 3.2, an overview of the procedure
of the data analysis is presented.
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Figure 3.2: Procedure of the data analysis
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3.4 Statistical Analysis and Results
In the following, the statistical analysis and results are presented. At first, the
results of the multicollinearity test are outlined. This is followed by outcomes of
the logistic regression, in which the influence of all independent variables on the
acceptance levels is observed. Next, results for each collaborative party are shown
separately. In the remainder of this section, a significance level of 5% is taken as
the standard significance level.
3.4.1 Multicollinearity
One common problem when using multiple independent variables in a logistic re-
gression is the occurrence of correlations among independent variables. A strong
correlation between two independent variables leads to a problem known as mul-
ticollinearity. This can seriously distort the interpretation of the model (Greene,
2003). Table 3.4 shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables used in
the logistic regression. All correlation coefficients have small values (≤ 0.5), indi-
cating no problems with multicollinearity. Consequently, all independent variables
are included in the logistic regressions.
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3.4.2 Regression
In this section, acceptance levels of the gain sharing methods are investigated. In
Figure 3.3, the acceptance levels of the three parties over all gain sharing meth-
ods and phases are displayed. The overall business practitioners’ acceptance level
is 54.44%. Looking at each partner individually, LSPs show the highest level of
acceptance, while retailers show the lowest. This is confirmed by the logistics re-
gression, see Table 3.5. The coefficient of the LSPs is positive, indicating that in
comparison to manufacturers, the LSPs have a significantly higher level of accep-
tance even at a 1% significance level. In contrast, the retailers show a negative
coefficient, indicating a significantly lower acceptance level in comparison to the
manufacturers even at a 1% significance level.
Figure 3.3: Acceptance levels of each collaborative party
In Figure 3.4, the acceptance levels of the five gain sharing methods in each
phase are displayed. For the collaborative parties, the Nucleolus reveals the small-
est level of acceptance with an average of 44.44% over three phases. This is also
observed by the logistic regression, see Table 3.5. All allocation methods show a
positive coefficient, indicating that, compared to the Nucleolus, all other methods
have a higher level of acceptance. However, only the ECM shows a significant
increase in the acceptance levels. Taking the phases into account, no significant
difference between the phases is observed, see Table 3.5.
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Figure 3.4: Acceptance levels of the five different gain sharing methods and the
three different phases
Table 3.5: Logistic regression output for all collaborative parties
Coefficient Significance
Intercept -.242 .633
Shapley .474 .399
WCM-Power .790 .161
WCM-Initiator .317 .574
ECM 1.274 .025
Phase 2 -.287 .512
Phase 3 -.096 .827
LSP 1.769 .000
Retailer -1.564 .000
3.4.3 Regression Manufacturer
In Figure 3.5, the manufacturers’ acceptance levels of the five gain sharing methods
in each phase are displayed. For the manufacturers, the overall level of acceptance
is 55%. Huge differences in the acceptance levels between the methods can be
observed. Moreover, an increase in acceptance from the Nucleolus to the ECM
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is noticeable. Therefore, the Nucleolus is the least accepted method with 8.33%,
averaged over all three phases. On the contrary, the most accepted method with
an acceptance level of 100% is the ECM. In Table 3.6, the results of the logistic
regression are presented. A significant increase in the acceptance levels for all
other gain sharing methods compared to the Nucleolus is identified. Furthermore,
a significant influence of the information availability on the acceptance levels is
observed. Compared to Phase 1, the acceptance levels of Phase 2 and Phase 3 are
significantly lower, with the lowest level of acceptance in Phase 2.
Figure 3.5: Acceptance levels of the five gain sharing methods and the three phases
for the manufacturers
Table 3.6: Logistic regression output for the manufacturers
Coefficient Significance
Intercept -.944 .292
Shapley 2.355 .037
WCM-Power 3.239 .003
WCM-Initiator 3.665 .001
ECM 6.517 .000
Phase 2 -3.152 .000
Phase 3 -2.171 .015
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3.4.4 Regression LSP
In Figure 3.6, the LSPs’ acceptance levels of the five gain sharing methods in each
phase are displayed. The LSPs show a high overall acceptance level of 88.33%.
Moreover, for each allocation method acceptance levels of 75%, averaged over the
three phases, and higher are identified. Furthermore, differences in the accep-
tance levels of the phases are observed. A significant influence of the information
availability on the acceptance levels is identified at a 10% significance level, see
Table 3.7.
Figure 3.6: Acceptance levels of the five gain sharing methods and the three phases
for the LSPs
Table 3.7: Logistic regression output for the LSPs
Coefficient Significance
Intercept .296 .719
Shapley .710 .553
WCM-Power .710 .553
WCM-Initiator .000 1.000
ECM .710 .553
Phase 2 2.757 .010
Phase 3 1.644 .050
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3.4.5 Regression Retailer
Figure 3.7 displays the retailers’ acceptance levels of the five gain sharing methods
in each phase. In general the retailers have a low level of acceptance. They show
a decrease in the acceptance from the Nucleolus to the ECM, with the lowest
level of acceptance for the WCM-Initiator, which is not accepted. The highest
acceptance level can be assigned to the Nucleolus with on average of 41.67% over
the three phases. Furthermore, a significantly lower acceptance compared to the
Nucleolus is identified for the WCM-Initiator and the ECM at a 10% significance
level. Overall, no significant influence of the phases is observed, see Table 3.8.
Figure 3.7: Acceptance levels of the five gain sharing methods and the three phases
for the retailers
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Table 3.8: Logistic regression output for the retailers
Coefficient Significance
Intercept -.296 .675
Shapley -.659 .418
WCM-Power -.659 .418
WCM-Initiator -2.830 .014
ECM -1.666 .075
Phase 2 .000 1.000
Phase 3 .000 1.000
3.5 Result Discussion
The case studies reveal two main findings. First, the parties’ acceptance of the
gain sharing method is influenced by the available information and cognitive bi-
ases. Second, each partner is individually influenced by the information availability
and different parties reveal various cognitive biases. As a result of the individual
influence of information availability and varying cognitive biases, no allocation
method is accepted by all collaborative parties. In the following, the influence of
available information and cognitive biases on the decision to accept is outlined for
each party. In addition, for each party separately and for all participants together,
the preferred gain sharing method, which results from the influence of behavioral
aspects, is identified.
The results show a significant influence of the information availability for man-
ufacturers and LSPs. However, the manufacturers are negatively influenced by
the information availability, whereas the LSPs in the Dutch FMCG industry are
positively influenced. For the manufacturers, a significantly negative influence was
observed for Phase 2, even at a 1% significance level. In this phase, the manu-
facturers received the information that the lowest gain share had been assigned
to them, omitting the fact that they are the smallest player in the supply chain.
The information was only provided in Phase 3, which increased the acceptance
level compared to Phase 2. Nevertheless, the acceptance level of Phase 3 was
lower than in Phase 1. Unlike the manufacturers, the LSPs in the Dutch FMCG
industry were significantly positively influenced by the available information. On
the contrary, no significant influence of information availability could be identified
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for the retailers.
In addition to the influence of an information availability, the influence of
cognitive biases could be identified for all parties. With regard to manufacturers’
acceptance levels for the Nucleolus, there was only one manufacturer who accepted
the gain share assigned by the Nucleolus in Phase 1. The allocation method was
rejected by all other business practitioners, even though the assigned gain share
of 4,333.33e was greater compared to the manufacturer’s contribution of -5,000e.
Consequently, an impact of cognitive biases can be assumed for business practi-
tioners. The manufacturers had to invest the highest amount for the launch of
the SCC, see Table 3.2. Taking this into account, the manufacturers’ reason for
rejecting the gain sharing methods might be the small share of the gain, that can-
not justify the costs and efforts. The LSPs in the Dutch FMCG industry show
the highest acceptance. This can be explained by the influence of a cognitive
bias, the so-called choice-supportive bias (Mather and Johnson, 2000). The LSPs
are usually the ones initiating the collaborations in the Dutch FMCG industry.
Therefore, no matter which gain share is assigned to them, the LSPs always show
a high acceptance level. On the contrary, the retailers reveal a very low acceptance
level of 20%. The low acceptance level of the retailers can be explained by their
high contribution to the coalition gain combined with a generally lower gain in
all gain sharing methods, see Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The missing influence of the
information availability on the acceptance levels indicates an additional influence
of cognitive biases. One explanation might be the powerful position of the retailers
in the Dutch FMCG supply chain, identified in Chapter 2. Taking into account
the powerful position of the retailers, this party might demand a bigger portion
of the gain. Tijs and Driessen (1986) also outline that the choice of the method
depends on the parties’ feelings of power. The WCM-Power already considered
the parties’ positions of power; the highest weight was assigned to the retailers.
However, also this allocation method revealed a low acceptance. Based on this
result, it is assumed that the weight did not fully represent the retailers’ power in
the Dutch FMCG industry.
The above-mentioned findings clearly show that the different parties are not
influenced by the available information in the same way and that different par-
ties show various cognitive biases. Due to the individual influence of information
availability and varying cognitive biases, no allocation method is preferred by all
collaborative parties. The manufacturers preferred the ECM with an acceptance
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level of 100%. In contrast, the retailers had a clear preference for the Nucleolus
with 41.67% and the LSPs showed equal acceptance for the Shapley value, the
WCM-Power and the ECM. In addition, the overall acceptance of all parties com-
bined for the different gain sharing methods revealed only minor differences, and
these acceptance levels were far from 100%. With an acceptance level of 66.67%,
the business practitioners showed a slight preference for the ECM. These findings
confirm the result from the literature that no gain sharing method is preferred by
all collaborative parties (Tijs and Driessen, 1986; Vanovermeire et al., 2014) and
demonstrate the challenge of applying a gain sharing method that is accepted by
all collaborative parties, which is, however, essential for the implementation and
success of an SCC (Cruijssen et al., 2007a; Crujssen and ArgusI, 2012; Leng and
Parlar, 2009).
3.6 Conclusion, Implications and Future Research
In this chapter, one of the most important SCC challenges, the allocation of the
coalition gain, has been investigated. For this purpose, the acceptance levels of se-
lected gain sharing methods have been observed in vertical three-echelon SCCs in
the Dutch FMCG industry. In addition, in order to identify the cause of the accep-
tance or rejection of an assigned gain share, the influence of behavioral decision-
making aspects, namely information availability and cognitive biases, on the ac-
ceptance decision has been examined. The results indicate that the acceptance
of a gain sharing method depends on available information and cognitive biases.
Furthermore, due to different influences of information availability and varying
cognitive biases, no allocation method is accepted by all collaborative parties.
3.6.1 Theoretical Implications
This chapter is an extension of the works by Cruijssen et al. (2007a) and Leng
and Parlar (2009). In their study, Cruijssen et al. (2007a) identify the need for a
fair gain allocation for the implementation and success of horizontal SCCs. In the
context of vertical collaborations, Leng and Parlar (2009) confirm the importance
of a fair allocation method for parties to stay in the SCC. Although the acceptance
of and satisfaction with a gain sharing method is necessary for a sustainable col-
laboration, until now, the acceptance of these gain sharing methods in practice has
not been examined. This chapter tries to fill this gap and thus enriches the SCM
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literature through the investigation of the acceptance levels of selected gain sharing
methods in vertical three-echelon SCCs in the Dutch FMCG industry. Another
contribution to the SCM literature is the integration of behavioral decision-making
research. For a long time, the predominant assumption was that decision-makers
are thinking rationally. However, decision-makers are human beings and therefore
their decisions are influenced by bounded rationality and cognitive biases (Schenk,
2011; Simon, 1979; Sterman, 1989). To ensure practical validity, it is necessary to
incorporate behavioral research in studies (Tokar, 2010). In this chapter, two be-
havioral aspects, namely information availability and cognitive biases, were taken
into account and therefore novel insights in the SCC’s allocation challenges are
provided.
3.6.2 Practical Implications
Results show that providing the same information to all collaborative parties in the
Dutch FMCG industry would lead to unsatisfactory gain allocations. As stated
by Cruijssen et al. (2007a), a gain sharing method which is perceived as fair and
is accepted by all collaborative parties is crucial for the implementation and suc-
cess of the SCC. As a result, one practical implication to overcome the barrier is
to provide all relevant information for each party individually. Furthermore, dif-
ferences between the different parties indicated the influence of various cognitive
biases. Cognitive biases influence our rational behavior resulting in unpredictable
decisions (Schenk, 2011). Therefore, in order to increase the predictability of the
behavior, one idea based on research by Soll et al. (2014) is to apply so-called
debiasing-techniques. One debiasing-technique is to provide all relevant informa-
tion packaged in an intuitively comprehensible and compelling format. A sugges-
tion is to show a figure as a graph, which provides clear and relevant information
about the gain allocation.
3.6.3 Further Research Directions
This chapter offers several opportunities for further research. The small sample
size represents one limitation of the quantitative case study research. This is bal-
anced by the experience and expertise with regard to the SCC of the respondent
base. Furthermore, the results support statements from the literature that there is
no gain sharing method which is accepted by all collaborative parties, (e.g Tijs and
Driessen, 1986) and that decision-makers are influenced by available information
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and cognitive biases (Sterman, 1989). Therefore, it is assumed that surveys with
a greater sample size, in other industries and/or geographical areas will confirm
the findings of this study. Moreover, the participants of the online survey were
confronted with one specific artificial situation without e.g. monetary incentives.
Conducting the online survey in a real-life situation could identify other important
behavioral decision-making aspects. Furthermore, additional allocation methods
and weights can be considered. In the study, four selected allocation methods
have been tested; further research could also include gain sharing methods like the
EPM or the WRSM in the survey. In addition, two weights, determined based
on interviews, were taken into account in the survey. For the retailer, it has been
identified that the chosen weight for the WCM-Power is no adequate representa-
tion for its powerful position. Further research should therefore take into account
other important aspects of the FMCG industry and/or other industries as well
as vary the weights assigned to the parties. Moreover, two behavioral decision-
making aspects were taken into account. In addition, debiasing-techniques have
been proposed. Additional research could also take other aspects into consider-
ation, for instance the availability of time, which is another component of the
bounded rationality mentioned by Simon (1979). The lack of available time forces
people to use heuristics or cognitive biases (Schenk, 2011; Simon, 1979). Future
surveys should also integrate the availability of time by conducting the surveys in
a controlled environment where participants only have a predetermined time to
make a decision. Furthermore, debiasing-techniques should be tested in practice.
Finally, it could be identified that due to the different influences of information
availability and varying cognitive biases no gain sharing method is accepted by
and satisfies all collaborative parties. Developing allocation methods that focus
on the parties’ acceptance of and satisfaction with the assigned gain share might
be one option to deal with the outlined problem.
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3A Preliminary Study
The preliminary study consisted of 20 companies including seven manufacturers,
six LSPs and seven retailers from the Dutch FMCG industry. For the data col-
lection, individual semi-structured interviews were conducted mostly face-to-face
with the supply chain managers from the companies. The following questions con-
cerning the gain sharing methods were asked to the interviewees:
• What does ”fair gain sharing” mean to you and your company?
• To what extent are you willing to share gains among the entire supply chain?
(answer on a 5-point Likert scale)
• Would it be a problem for your company to share gains, that are achieved
by your company, but are a result of a collaboration with other collaborative
parties? To what extent and why?
• In your experience, how do other parties within your supply chain react to
gain sharing?
• Before you launch a collaboration, is the transparency of how much each
party needs to invest in collaborations an important issue?
• Before you launch a collaboration, is it crucial information for you to know
how parties will benefit? To what extent and why?
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3B Online Survey
In the following an example of the online surveys is presented. The online survey
is one for a participant party A, the manufacturer.
Figure 3.8: Example of the online survey
Figure 3.9: Example of the online survey
Figure 3.10 to Figure 3.12 show examples for the part of the online survey
belonging to Phase 1. In Figure 3.12 an example for the question in Phase 1 is
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shown. In the online survey in total five questions were asked; one for each gain
sharing method.
Figure 3.10: Example of the online survey
Figure 3.11: Example of the online survey
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Figure 3.12: Example of the online survey
Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14 show examples for the part of the online survey
belonging to Phase 2. In Figure 3.14 an example for the question in Phase 2 is
shown. In the online survey in total five questions were asked; one for each gain
sharing method.
Figure 3.13: Example of the online survey
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Figure 3.14: Example of the online survey
Figure 3.15 to Figure 3.17 show examples for the part of the online survey
belonging to Phase 3. In Figure 3.17 an example for the question in Phase 3 is
shown. In the online survey in total five questions were asked; one for each gain
sharing method.
Figure 3.15: Example of the online survey
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Figure 3.16: Example of the online survey
Figure 3.17: Example of the online survey
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Chapter 4
A Comprehensive Gain
Sharing System Maximizing
Satisfaction in Supply Chain
Collaborations1
4.1 Introduction
This chapter builds upon the research findings of Chapter 3. As outlined in Chap-
ter 3, no gain sharing method is accepted by and satisfies all collaborative parties,
which is however essential for the implementation and success of SCCs. In ad-
dition, the preliminary study with collaborative parties from the Dutch FMCG
industry, which is provided in Appendix 3A, indicated that parties do not see the
need for complex gain sharing methods. In practice, simple rules that are easy to
understand are preferred (interview with one LSP on 13.05.2015; interview with
one manufacturer on 28.05.2015). This is stressed by Cruijssen et al. (2007b)
as well as Leng and Parlar (2005), who outline that mathematical simplicity, ap-
plicability and transparency constitute key allocation characteristics in practice.
Furthermore, the literature overview in Section 3.2.1 demonstrates the presence of
a wide range of gain sharing methods. As each method has its specific advantages
1This chapter is based on the paper Grigoriev et al. (2019b), submitted for publication.
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and drawbacks, it remains ambiguous which technique should be applied in an
SCC comprised of parties with different objectives.
Since mathematical simplicity, applicability and transparency constitute key
allocation characteristics in practice, in this chapter a simple gain sharing method
is introduced. To ensure an allocation’s simplicity, its intuitive understanding and
a fair acceptance, the new gain sharing system focuses on the maximization of
the parties’ satisfaction. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no gain sharing
method has focused on all these criteria together. Furthermore, the gain sharing
system adds value to the current gain allocation research by providing managers
with a complete gain sharing scheme which requires limited input data in order to
provide robust output on the gain sharing decision as well as with related useful key
performance indicators (KPIs). Moreover, the majority of SCC publications focus
on the application of gain sharing methods in horizontal collaborations (Guardi-
ola et al., 2007). In this chapter, the proposed allocation system is applied to a
vertical SCC. In addition, except for the paper by Leng and Parlar (2009), all
articles discuss gain sharing methods applied to only two-echelon supply chains.
This study considers a three-level vertical SCC between one manufacturer, one
LSP and one retailer. The essential contribution of this work is twofold. On the
one hand, this research is the first to identify a gain sharing approach focusing on
the parties’ satisfaction. On the other hand, the gain sharing decision is supported
by providing practitioners with a complete, simple and robust gain sharing system.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces
the gain sharing system developed in this study, followed by the application of
the system to a vertical SCC in the Dutch FMCG industry in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.4, the system stability is discussed based on various general fairness
properties and a sensitivity analysis is presented. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes
the chapter with key findings, theoretical and managerial implications as well as
further research directions.
4.2 Gain Sharing System
As was stressed in the introduction, practical appreciation requires a gain sharing
system that is simple to understand and to use while producing a fair and robust
allocation of the coalition gain. In this section, a comprehensive and simple gain
sharing system is presented. The goal of the system is to maximize the satisfaction
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of all collaborative parties through a minimax regret approach. In Figure 4.1,
the proposed gain sharing system is illustrated in a block diagram. The gain
sharing system consists of three parts: input, gain sharing algorithm and output.
Furthermore, the dynamic character of an SCC was taken into consideration. The
input factors of the gain sharing system may change during the SCC. As a result,
the gain sharing (re)allocation should be recomputed when necessary. In the
following sections, the three system parts are explained in detail. Section 4.2.1
explains the input factors, followed by a clarification of the gain sharing algorithm
in Section 4.2.2. Finally, the output is discussed in Section 4.2.3.
Figure 4.1: Block diagram of the comprehensive gain sharing system
4.2.1 Input
The gain sharing algorithm demands two input elements: the parties’ satisfaction
functions and the financial information of the SCC.
The literature proposes many definitions of the term satisfaction. One defini-
tion from Oliver (2014) is that “satisfaction is the customer’s fulfillment response.
It is a judgment that a product/service feature or the product or service itself
provided (or is providing) a pleasurable level of consumption - related fulfillment,
including levels of under- and overfulfillment”. Lozano et al. (2013) define the
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satisfaction of a (sub)coalition in the context of gain sharing methods as the ex-
cess of cost savings of the grand coalition minus the total gain of a (sub)coalition.
In this chapter, it is assumed that the party’s satisfaction depends on the gain
share that is assigned to this party. The author is aware that the gain share is not
the only aspect that has an influence on the parties’ satisfaction levels and there-
fore in Section 4.5 additional aspects that could be considered in further research
are proposed. In order to derive the parties’ satisfaction functions, the parties’
satisfaction levels for various possible gain shares need to be identified. For this
purpose, questionnaires need to be distributed to the collaborative parties. Using
questionnaires as a research instrument is useful since they are usually inexpen-
sive to administer, little training is required to develop them and they are easy
and quick to analyze (Wilkinson and Birmingham, 2003). This contributes to the
simplicity of the gain sharing system.
In the questionnaire, the parties are asked how satisfied they are with a certain
gain share. An example question would be: “How satisfied are you with a gain
share of 20% of the coalition gain?”. The party’s responses are elicited on a five-
point Likert scale ranging from ‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’. Using a Likert
scale to measure the satisfaction is common practice. Examples are the works by
Mueller and McCloskey (1990) as well as Traynor and Wade (1993), which both
measure the job satisfaction of employees on a five-point Likert scale. In order to
receive valid responses, it is necessary to indicate how many parties are involved in
the SCC. After conducting the questionnaires, they are analyzed and the parties’
satisfaction functions are derived from the data. To identify the most appropri-
ate satisfaction function for each party individually, several non-linear regressions
could be performed. For the purpose of narrowing down the possible functions,
it is advisable to plot the data first. In order to evaluate the performance of the
functions, not only the investigation of the significance levels of the coefficients are
compared, but also the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) and the
Schwarz information criterion (SIC) (Schwarz et al., 1978). These two statistical
criteria, which are both based on information theory, are often used when selecting
the most appropriate model for underlying data (Sin and White, 1996). The func-
tion with the smallest AIC and SIC value should be preferred (Ludden et al., 1994).
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The second input factor is the financial information of the collaboration. Im-
portant information in this context is the overall coalition gain achieved by the
grand coalition as well as the gain for each possible subcoalition.
4.2.2 Gain Sharing Algorithm
The gain sharing algorithm aims to increase the satisfaction of the collaborative
parties through the minimization of the maximum regret. According to Loulou
and Kanudia (1999) as well as Mausser and Laguna (1999), the minimax criterion
is a reliable criterion for evaluating and selecting decisions under uncertainty and
imperfect information. The minimax regret approach has been used to put more
weight on the least satisfied party and thereby to increase the probability that no
partner leaves the SCC, which in turn results in an increased probability of hav-
ing a sustainable collaboration. In this study, the regret represents the difference
between the best possible satisfaction level that is achieved when 100% of the gain
is assigned to a party, and the actual satisfaction level of that party.
Let N be the set of collaborative parties. For each partner i ∈ N , let 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1
denote the gain share of partner i and let si(xi) represent the satisfaction level
of partner i ∈ N when xi share of the gain is allocated to i. Furthermore, v(S)
and v(N) represent the gain share of a subcoalition S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ and the gain
share of the grand coalition, respectively. The following simple and intuitive gain
sharing algorithm is proposed:
min
0≤x≤1
max
i∈N
{si(1)− si(xi)} (4.1)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi = 1 (4.2)∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)/v(N) ∀S ⊂ N, (4.3)
The objective function is to minimize the maximum regret of the collaborative
parties. Constraints 4.2 and 4.3 ensure that the gain allocation is in the core and
thus stable. As outlined in Section 3.2.1, being in the core guarantees that no
party can increase its share/profit by leaving the grand coalition (Shapley, 1952).
These constraints are included to ensure that there is no rational incentive for any
party to leave the SCC.
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4.2.3 Output
The output of the gain sharing algorithm is the gain allocation, which minimizes
the maximum parties’ regret or, in other words, distributes the gain to satisfy
all parties. In particular, the objective function represents one of the KPIs that
will support managers to evaluate the performance of the gain sharing system.
Other outputs are the satisfaction levels/functions for each party as well as the
corresponding regrets.
4.3 Implementation
In this section, the proposed gain sharing system is applied to a vertical SCC
between one manufacturer, one LSP and one retailer in the Dutch FMCG industry.
The practical example is based on data provided by a Dutch logistics company
specializing in efficient and sustainable solutions for supply chains. Note that
the gain sharing system has been applied in order to theoretically illustrate the
potential and high performance of the system. The practical implementation of
the gain sharing system into an SCC is not part of this research. Furthermore,
although the gain sharing system is applied to a vertical SCC the gain sharing
system is not limited to vertical SCCs, but can easily be applied to horizontal or
lateral SCCs as well.
4.3.1 Satisfaction Functions and Financial Information
In order to identify the most appropriate satisfaction function for the three parties
individually, information about the satisfaction levels of various gain shares is
needed for each party individually. For this purpose, results generated in the study
introduced in Chapter 3 are used. In Chapter 3, among others the influence of the
gain share on the parties’ acceptance levels of selected gain sharing methods was
examined in a vertical three-echelon SCC in the Dutch FMCG industry. Assuming
that the acceptance levels are equal to the parties’ satisfaction levels, the results
of the study introduced in Chapter 3 were taken as a basis for the relationship
between the assigned gain share and the satisfaction levels of the three parties.
Based on this information, the satisfaction levels for the different gain shares were
determined. For this purpose, a simulation tool was used. The satisfaction levels
were simulated with 100 runs and 50 trials per run. Examples of the simulations
are provided in Table 4.1. For various gain shares, the corresponding satisfaction
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levels for the three parties were displayed on a five-point Likert scale.
Table 4.1: Satisfaction levels of the three parties for varying gain shares
Gain Share Satisfaction level on Likert scale (1-5)
in % Manufacturer LSP Retailer
10 2 4 1
20 3 4 1
30 4 5 1
40 5 5 2
50 5 5 3
60 5 5 3
70 5 5 3
80 5 5 4
90 5 5 4
100 5 5 5
Plotting the data shown in Table 4.1 revealed the characteristic S-shape curve,
also known as the sigmoid curve. In order to identify the most appropriate sig-
moid function to represent the parties’ satisfaction levels for the different gain
shares, several non-linear regressions were performed using the software EViews
9 SV. EViews uses the Gauss-Newton algorithm as modified by Levenberg (1944)
and Marquardt (1963). The straightforward logit model, also known as logit or
logistics regression, turned out to be the best fit to represent the satisfaction of all
collaborative parties (based on the significance levels, the AIC and the SIC):
si(xi) =
ai
bi + ecixi
, (4.4)
where xi represents the gain share assigned to each partner i = m, l, r. Here, the
index m refers to the manufacturer, l refers to the LSP and r to the retailer. Coef-
ficients a, b and c are determined by the non-linear regression. The corresponding
outputs of the non-linear regressions for the three parties are depicted in Table 4.2.
For all parties, the coefficients (reported in columns “Coef.”) are highly significant
at a 1% significance level, see columns “Prob.”.
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Table 4.2: Output of the non-linear regression
Manufacturer LSP Retailer
Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob.
ai 1.23 .000 8.48 .000 0.72 .000
bi 0.24 .000 1.69 .000 0.13 .000
ci -9 .000 -9 .000 -3.5 .000
Figure 4.2 shows the plotted satisfaction functions. The LSP is the party
which is most easily satisfied. As outlined in Chapter 3, the LSP is influenced by
a cognitive bias; the so-called choice-supportive bias. Here, people tend to think
positively about a decision they made, even if the decision has a flaw (Mather and
Johnson, 2000). In the Dutch FMCG industry, the LSP often acts as the initiator
for the launch of an SCCs. As a result, no matter what gain share is assigned to
the LSP, this party will always be satisfied. In contrast, retailers have typically
very low acceptance/satisfaction levels. Even if the largest portion of the gain is
assigned to the retailers, this party is not satisfied, which might be a result of
the powerful position of the retailer in the Dutch FMCG industry as outlined in
Chapter 2. Regarding the manufacturer, the satisfaction function shows a steep
increase from the beginning until a gain share of around 50% is received. Above
that amount, the manufacturer is generally satisfied.
Figure 4.2: Graphical illustration of the satisfaction functions
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In order to perform the gain sharing algorithm, financial information on the
SCC is required. Table 4.3 provides an overview of the expected benefits, costs
and the resulting profits of the vertical SCC, as already introduced in Chapter 3
(Table 3.2). The resulting total profit achieved by the grand coalition is 205,000e.
Table 4.3: Expected benefits, costs and resulting profits of the vertical SCC
Manufacturer LSP Retailer Overall
Benefits 80,000e 50,000e 250,000e 380,000e
Costs 85,000e 10,000e 80,000e 175,000e
Profits -5,000e 40,000e 170,000e 205,000e
As already outlined in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, not only knowledge on the grand
coalition gain, but also on the subcoalition gains is needed. The gain for a coalition
between the manufacturer and the LSP is 9,000e, whereas a collaboration between
the manufacturer and the retailer results in a coalition gain of 99,000e. A gain of
150,000e can be achieved by a coalition between the LSP and the retailer. If the
parties are not collaborating with each other, no gain can be achieved by any party.
Based on the input data described above, the gain sharing algorithm (4.1)-(4.3)
for the vertical SCC between one manufacturer, one LSP and one retailer from
the Dutch FMCG industry can be specified as follows:
min
0≤xm,xl,xr≤1
max (4.5){
5.12− 1.23
0.24 + e−9xm
; 5.02− 8.48
1.69 + e−9xl
; 4.49− 0.72
0.13 + e−3.5xr
}
(4.6)
s.t.xm + xl + xr = 1 (4.7)
xm + xl ≥ 0.04 (4.8)
xm + xr ≥ 0.48 (4.9)
xl + xr ≥ 0.73 (4.10)
4.3.2 Output Discussion
In Figure 4.3, the gain allocation for the vertical SCC in the Dutch FMCG in-
dustry is depicted. With 68.33%, the retailer receives the largest portion of the
gain, followed by the manufacturer with 26.83%. The remaining part of 4.84% is
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assigned to the LSP, which represents only a small portion of the coalition gain.
Figure 4.3: Gain share allocation
Table 4.4 presents the satisfaction levels corresponding to the assigned gain
shares and regrets. The latter one is calculated by subtracting the actual satisfac-
tion level of the assigned gain share from the maximum possible satisfaction level.
The manufacturer’s satisfaction level for the assigned gain share of 26.83% is the
largest one with 3.73. The retailer possesses the lowest satisfaction level with 3.25
for the largest gain share. Nevertheless, the retailer has the lowest regret with
1.24. When looking at the regret of the manufacturer and the LSP, it can be seen
that the regret is the same with 1.39. When comparing this regret to the retailer’s
regret, no big difference can be observed, which leads to the conclusion that the
optimum is reached.
Table 4.4: Satisfaction levels and regrets of all parties
Gain share in % Satisfaction level Regret
Manufacturer 26.83 3.73 1.39
LSP 4.84 3.63 1.39
Retailer 68.33 3.25 1.24
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The retailer has the most power in the Dutch FMCG supply chain and in
addition in this setting the retailer has the highest financial contribution to the
coalition gain, which results in low satisfaction levels for all gain shares. In turn,
this results in the allocation of the largest portion of the coalition gain to the
retailer. As already mentioned, the LSP is influenced by the choice-supportive
bias. The influence of this bias results in a high acceptance/satisfaction level for
all possible gain shares. Obviously, this leads to the smallest gain share.
In order to proof the advantage of the proposed gain sharing system, it is
compared to the two most referred to (and preferred) game theoretic allocation
methods, the Shapley value and the Nucleolus (Moulin, 1991). Table 4.5 shows the
satisfaction levels and the regrets for these two methods. Here, the manufacturer
receives the smallest portion of the gain and, compared to the gain sharing system,
the satisfaction level is lower resulting in a higher regret. The LSP receives a
larger portion of the gain resulting in a very high satisfaction level and in a small
regret. The retailer receives a larger portion of the coalition gain according to the
Nucleolus and a lower portion according to the Shapley value. As a whole, the
maximum regrets in the two game theoretic methods are much higher than in the
proposed gain sharing system. This might result in a decreased probability of a
sustainable SCC, which is, however, essential for every party in any supply chain
(Jap, 2001).
Table 4.5: Satisfaction levels and regrets for the Shapley value and Nucleolus
Shapley Value Nucleolus
Gain Share
in %
Satisfaction
Level
Re-
gret
Gain Share
in %
Satisfaction
Level
Re-
gret
MA 17.72 2.78 2.34 2.11 1.15 3.97
LSP 30.16 4.83 0.19 26.99 4.77 0.25
RE 51.63 2.45 2.04 70.89 3.37 1.12
4.4 System Stability
In this section, the gain sharing system stability is investigated. First, basic fair-
ness properties of allocation methods, which represent interesting KPIs, are in-
troduced and the satisfaction of these properties for the developed gain sharing
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system is investigated. This is followed by a sensitivity analysis of the uncertain
parameter of the system, the satisfaction functions.
4.4.1 Fairness Properties
Considering the characteristics of an SCC, it is essential that any proposed sharing
mechanism is desirable on a collaborative and individual level. In addition, it
is important to ensure that the applied sharing technique is perceived by the
cooperating parties as reasonable and easy to understand. Accounting for these
challenges, a general definition of a fair sharing mechanism is difficult to develop.
As such, Table 4.6 provides an overview of the basic fairness properties desirable
in the SCC context (Guardiola et al., 2007; Leng and Parlar, 2009; Liu et al., 2010;
Verdonck, 2017).
Table 4.6: Allocation properties of gain sharing methods
Property Definition
Efficiency The total coalition gain is shared as the grand coalition
forms:
∑
i∈N xi = v(N)
Individual
rationality
No partner gains less than their stand-alone gain: xi ≥ v({i})
Subgroup
rationality
Parties are never better off forming a subgroup by excluding
other parties:
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S)
Stability No single participant or (sub)coalition of participants
of the collaboration would benefit from leaving the
grand coalition:
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S)
Additivity The profit allocation of a combination of several separate
coalitions is equal to the sum of the separate allocation
values of these coalitions: x(i ∪ j) = x({i}) + x({j})
Since the fairness properties of the developed allocation system may have a
significant influence on the sustainability of the SCC, the satisfaction of these
properties for the proposed gain sharing system were tested by means of an illus-
trative numerical example. The example relates to the already outlined vertical
SCC between the manufacturer (M), LSP (L) and retailer (R) from the Dutch
FMCG industry. The third column of Table 4.7 lists the collaborative profits for
all possible (sub)coalitions. The second column lists the profits allocated by the
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developed gain sharing algorithm when the grand coalition is formed.
Table 4.7: Collaborative profit and allocated profit for all (sub)coalitions
(Sub)coalition Allocated Profit Collaborative Profit
M 54,999.45 0.00
L 9,930.20 0.00
R 140,070.35 0.00
ML 64,929.65 9,000.00
MR 195,069.80 99,000.00
LR 150,000.55 150,000.00
MLR 205,000.00 205,000.00
Analyzing this example, it can be stated that the proposed gain sharing system
is efficient. The total coalition gain is shared as the grand coalition forms (205,000
= 205,000). Moreover, constraint 4.2 of the gain sharing system satisfies the ef-
ficiency property. The proposed gain sharing system also satisfies the individual
rationality property. The stand-alone gain for each party is 0, while the allocated
gain for each individual party is larger than 0. In addition, the subgroup ratio-
nality property is satisfied. No subcoalition has the incentive to leave the grand
coalition and be better-off when acting alone. This is because the collaborative
profit of subcoalitions is smaller than its allocated profit in a grand coalition.
Constraints 4.2 and 4.3 guarantee the stability of the allocation defined by the
proposed system. Finally, the additivity property is satisfied. The profit alloca-
tion of any (sub)coalition is equal to the sum of the separate allocation values of
the (sub)coalition members, e.g., for M and L, 64, 929.65 = 54, 999.45 + 9, 930.20.
The analysis indicates the fulfillment of all considered fairness properties. As a
result, it can be stated that the proposed gain sharing system can be perceived as
fair and will likely result in sustainable SCCs.
4.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was performed to examine the effect of the uncertain satis-
faction functions on the parties’ satisfaction levels. Depending on the satisfaction
function, the assigned gain to the party will get smaller or larger and the remain-
ing part needs to be split among the other two parties. For example, if the gain
share assigned to the manufacturer changes from the current 26.83% to 20% of
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the coalition gain, 6.83% of the collaborative profit will need to be split among
the LSP and the retailer. In order to assign the remaining gain share to the LSP
and the retailer in a fair way, the gain sharing system was run for an SCC between
these two parties. Depending on the outcome of the gain sharing system for xl
and xr, the remaining part will be split among the two parties. The same holds for
the reverse case, namely if the assigned gain share to the manufacturer increases.
The results of the gain sharing system for the two-level collaborations are shown
in Table 4.8. A collaboration between the manufacturer and the LSP results in
an allocated share of 60.82% to the manufacturer and the rest is assigned to the
LSP. The gain share assigned to the manufacturer is halved (29.63%) if the man-
ufacturer and the retailer are collaborating. The highest gain share is assigned to
the retailer (83.32%) if this party is engaged in a two-level collaboration with the
LSP.
Table 4.8: Gain share allocation for two-level collaborations
Coalition xm xl xr
ML 0.6082 0.3918
MR 0.2963 0.7037
LR 0.1668 0.8332
Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show the results of the sensitivity analysis for a change
in the manufacturer’s, the LSP’s and the retailer’s satisfaction function, respec-
tively. The parties’ satisfaction levels vary in relation to changes in the satisfaction
functions. A change in the LSP’s satisfaction function has the highest impact on
the satisfaction levels of the manufacturer and the retailer, see Figure 4.5. If
the assigned gain share to the LSP increases, the satisfaction levels of the man-
ufacturer and the retailer decrease rapidly. Both satisfaction functions follow an
S-shape and do not cross each other, thus indicating that, in comparison to the
manufacturer, the retailer is always less satisfied.
The LSP is the party that is always satisfied no matter what gain share it is
assigned. As a result, the satisfaction levels of the LSP are not highly influenced by
changes in the retailer’s and manufacturer’s satisfaction function, as demonstrated
in Figures 4.4 and 4.6.
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Figure 4.4: Sensitivity analysis for the manufacturer’s satisfaction function
Figure 4.5: Sensitivity analysis for the LSP’s satisfaction function
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Figure 4.6: Sensitivity analysis for the retailer’s satisfaction function
Concluding this section, especially the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s sat-
isfaction levels are highly influenced by a change in the satisfaction functions.
Therefore, in order to assure a stable SCC, a precise determination of the satisfac-
tion functions is important. One essential aspect achieving a precise determination
of the satisfaction functions are honest answers in the questionnaires. However,
if the survey questions demand responses which are too revealing, participants
may refuse to answer or even lie (Clark and Desharnais, 1998; Warner, 1965).
Anonymity is one option which might increase the probability of receiving honest
answers (Mu¨hlenfeld, 2005). In the survey in Chapter 3, anonymity was guaran-
teed. Through the use of an online survey, no personal interaction between the
interviewer and the interviewee took place. Furthermore, except for one question
on the nature of the respondent’s supply chain positions, no personal questions
were asked. Through the use of self-administered questionnaires and therefore the
absence of an interviewer, the probability of getting truthful answers can also be
increased (Nederhof, 1985). In addition, according to Mu¨hlenfeld (2005), instruct-
ing the participants to answer truthfully before and during the survey might be
another way to increase honesty.
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4.5 Conclusion, Implications and Future Research
In this chapter, a comprehensive, simple and robust gain sharing system has been
introduced. In order to ensure the acceptance and satisfaction of all collaborative
parties and to increase the probability of a sustainable SCC, the system focuses on
the maximization of the parties’ satisfaction by using a minimax regret approach.
The proposed gain sharing system has been applied to a vertical SCC in the Dutch
FMCG industry to theoretically illustrate the potential and high performance of
the system. Results show the maximization of the parties’ satisfaction and the
decrease of the regrets. In addition, a system stability analysis proved the fairness
of the gain allocation and revealed the importance of an accurate determination
of the satisfaction functions.
4.5.1 Theoretical Implications
The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is twofold. First, while
existing gain sharing methods are not accepted by or satisfactory for the collabo-
rative parties, the scheme developed in this chapter focuses on the maximization
of the parties’ satisfaction. Second, known game theoretic allocation methods are
perceived as too hard to understand and too complex to implement, while the
presented method is intuitive and simple.
4.5.2 Practical Implications
The new gain sharing system requires only limited input data to provide robust
output for the gain sharing decision. In addition, the proposed gain sharing system
provides all key characteristics which are appreciated in practice: mathematical
simplicity, applicability and transparency. Furthermore, important KPIs such as
the optimal gain share allocation and the fairness properties have been introduced
in order to support managers to evaluate the performance of the proposed gain
sharing system. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis revealed the importance of the
precision of the satisfaction functions. In order to achieve this, honest question-
naire replies are essential.
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4.5.3 Further Research Directions
This chapter offers several opportunities for further research. In the study, it has
been assumed that the only influencing aspect on the parties’ satisfaction is the
gain share. Further research should include additional influencing aspects such
as the amount and the quality of information for parties to share. Furthermore,
the proposed gain sharing scheme has been tested in an artificial vertical SCC in
the Dutch FMCG industry. Applying the gain sharing system also to horizontal
and/or lateral collaborations as well as to a real-life situation may result in stronger
support. In addition, the acceptance of the gain sharing system could be observed
in practice. The implementation of the new gain sharing system into practice
requires a precise determination of the satisfaction functions for each collaborative
party individually. Thus, it is of high importance to implement the techniques that
ensure and improve honesty in questionnaire replies.
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Chapter 5
Urban Area Tessellations:
Are Regular Tessellations
Good for a Non-uniformly
Distributed Demand? 1
5.1 Introduction
In the course of the last decades, the population shifted from rural to urban areas;
a trend known as urbanization (Cohen, 2006). This is a result of migration due
to income growth, but also linked to demographic factors such as a rapid internal
urban population growth (Jedwab et al., 2015). In 2018, 55% of the total pop-
ulation lived in urban regions. The most urbanized continent with 82% of the
population living in urban areas is Northern America, whereas Africa is with 43%
the continent with the lowest amount of people living in urban areas. In Europe,
74% of the total population is living in metropolises (Statista, 2018). The urban
population is expected to grow even further in the next years. In Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries such as Austria,
Spain and the United States, 83% of the population is anticipated to dwell in ur-
ban regions by 2020 (OECD, 2003) and 54% of the African population is expected
1This chapter is based on the paper Grigoriev et al. (2019a), submitted for publication.
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to live in cities by 2030 (Hay et al., 2005).
Urbanization has a great impact on cities since they are growing both in geo-
graphical area and in population, which brings along many societal and logistical
challenges (Antrop, 2004; Brinkman, 2016; Cohen, 2006; OECD, 2003). Figure 5.1
shows the shapes of several metropolises all over the world, such as Amsterdam,
Beijing, London, Melbourne, Moscow, New York, Paris and Rome. Concentric
growth around a historic center is evident in most European or “Old World”
cities, like Amsterdam, London, Moscow and Rome. Figure 5.1 shows that these
cities are formed around rings and radial lines (depicted on the maps). Typically,
demand density for commodities and services is high in the center and decreases
towards the suburbs (e.g. Antrop, 2004). This property is very roughly described
and there are significant deviations. For instance, Paris can be viewed as a col-
lection of non-concentric rings with many distinct radial lines, see Figure 5.1f.
Another example is Beijing, where the map is concentric but instead of rings there
are increasing nested rectangles with joints instead of radial lines, see Figure 5.1i.
Following the famous Commissioners’ Plan of 1811, see Morris et al. (1811),
the shape of Manhattan is a regular rectangular grid, see Figure 5.1g. This pat-
tern was specifically designed and implemented for better accessibility to public
services and goods. Many cities in the “New World” took over this practice such
as Melbourne depicted in Figure 5.1h. In the grids, streets/avenues are placed hor-
izontally and vertically at an angle of approximately 90 degrees. In grid-shaped
cities, the demand density is supposed to be almost uniform: the demand is meant
to concentrate along streets/avenues and to decrease towards the block centers,
while all blocks are meant to be very similar to each other. However, even in the
“New World” cities, the population and the demand are not uniformly distributed.
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(a) Shape of Amsterdam (b) Shape of Rome (c) Shape of London
(d) Shape of Moscow (e) Shape of Paris (f) Shape of Paris, close up
(g) Shape of New York
City
(h) Shape of Melbourne (i) Shape of Beijing
Figure 5.1: Shapes of selected metropolises
In geometry, tessellations (also known as tilings) are used to cover a plane with-
out gaps and overlaps using regular polygons. Applied to urban areas, a single
regular polygon forms a district with a facility or a commodity distribution center
in the center of the polygon. Nowadays, it is quite common to use regular tessella-
tion to subdivide urban areas into commodity/service distribution districts under
the assumption of a uniform demand distribution. However, the population and
urban activities are not uniformly distributed (Narula and Ogbu, 1979). To the
best of the author’s knowledge, until now no research has focused on the perfor-
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mance of regular tessellations under a non-uniform demand distribution. Hence,
the central idea of the present chapter is to identify the performance of regular
tessellations under irregularly distributed demand. Next to the regular tessella-
tion, the performance of semi- as well as demi-regular tessellations is evaluated.
In addition, it will be investigated if there is one (semi-, demi-) regular tessellation
which performs best under a given city layout and commodity demand distribution.
As the key performance measure of a tessellation, the objective value of the
well-known facility location problem is used since facility location problems are
omnipresent in location theory, see e.g. Current et al. (1990). The goal of the
facility location problem is to find locations for facilities (commodity distribution
centers) that minimize the total costs, including transport as well as facility fixed
costs. In this chapter, the objective values for different facility location patterns
resulting from the different investigated tessellations are compared in terms of the
total costs under several non-uniform demand distributions that are common in
practice. This is explained in detail in Section 5.3.2.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, basic
terminology and contemporary literature on tessellations is briefly outlined. Next,
the research methodology is depicted in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, the perfor-
mance of (semi-, demi-) regular tessellations as solutions to the facility location
problem is studied under given city layouts and demand distributions. In addition,
two new tessellations are introduced and analyzed. Finally, concluding remarks
will be given in Section 5.5.
5.2 Tessellations
A tessellation is a technique to cover a plane with shapes without gaps or overlaps.
Whenever a tessellation is made up of congruent regular polygons, it is referred to
as a regular tessellation (Grunbaum and Shephard, 1977). There are only three
regular polygons that can cover an entire plane: triangle, square and hexagon. Fig-
ure 5.2 shows examples for planes tessellated with these regular polygons (Mallozzi
et al., 2017).
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Figure 5.2: Regular tessellations
Whenever a variety of regular polygons are used to cover an area, it is referred
to as a semi-regular tessellation. These tessellations have an important property:
the arrangement of polygons at every vertex is identical (Watson, 1973). Unlike
the regular and semi-regular tessellations, demi-regular tessellations allow for two
or more types of regular polygon arrangements at a vertex (Yan et al., 2017). In
total, there are eight semi-regular tessellations (Hann, 2013) and 14 demi-regular
tessellations (Critchlow and Critchlow, 1969). In Figures 5.3a and 5.3b, examples
for the semi-regular and demi-regular tessellations are given, respectively.
(a) Semi-regular (b) Demi-regular
Figure 5.3: Semi- and demi-regular tessellations
From all introduced tessellations, the hexagonal tessellation is assumed to be
most fitting for the description of a uniformly distributed population. The mathe-
matical reason for the preference of the regular hexagon for practical applications
is that this shape can cover the plane with the smallest number of tiles (Mallozzi
et al., 2017; Schultz, 1970), which is the most efficient economic solution under reg-
ularly distributed demand. Hexagonal tessellations have been studied in various
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settings and implemented in many practical applications under the assumption of
a regular demand distribution, e.g., in wireless sensor networks (Liu et al., 2007;
Patel and Joshi, 2009), and even in the areas of science quite distant from location
theory, like image processing and parallel computing (Stojmenovic, 1997). As was
mentioned in the introduction, under a non-uniformly distributed demand regu-
lar tessellations have hardly been studied so far. In the present literature, only
irregular tessellations such as Voronoi diagrams, also known as Dirichlet tessella-
tions, were applied to problems under the assumption of a non-uniform demand
distribution (e.g. Didandeh et al., 2013; Gastner and Newman, 2006; Mendes and
Themido, 2004). Irregular tessellations, though economically optimal, are quite
impractical as they require detailed prior knowledge of the (future) demand dis-
tribution, which is barely possible in urban planning (Davis, 1965). Given the
impracticality of irregular tessellations, in this chapter the focus is on regular
tilings, which are much easier to implement and to use under a non-uniformly
distributed demand.
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 City Layouts and Demand Distribution Models
In this section two typical city layouts, London representing a concentric and New
York City representing a grid structured urban area are outlined. For complete-
ness, the triangular layout, which is quite rare in practice (see Figure 5.1) but
methodologically interesting as it represents yet another demand distribution pat-
tern that is close to the uniform demand distribution, is also considered.
Triangular layout In Figure 5.4, the triangular customer spread is shown.
Here, a customer is located in every vertex (indicated by a blue cross). Please note
that for simplicity, the customers in this study are solely located in the vertexes
and not on the edges. As mentioned above, the triangular demand distribution
is not common in practice, but it is chosen in order to compare the tessellation
performance under an almost uniformly distributed demand with the one under a
non-uniformly distributed demand. In this research, two customers are referred to
as neighbors if they share one basic tile/triangle. This layout represents a regular
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customer distribution as all distances between neighbors are equal. In this sense,
the triangular customer spread is the closest one to a uniform demand distribu-
tion. In contrast, consider a grid customer spread: Customers are located in the
corner points of square blocks. For each basic tile/square, there are four neighbors
but the distances between the neighbors are different: the distance between the
diagonal neighbors is factor
√
2 higher than the distances between the neighbors
on rectilinear lines. The triangular layout is easy to implement since the cus-
tomers’ allocation on a plane is completely determined by a single parameter, the
inter-neighbor distance. In this study, the inter-neighbor distance is chosen to be
1. The customers are located in a square area of 10× 10.
Figure 5.4: Triangular layout
New York City As illustrated in Figures 5.1g and 5.1h, for some urban areas
a grid network of roads can be clearly identified. These roads serve as lines of
concentrated communication, supply and, therefore, demand distribution. The
typical practical setting, and therefore the setting in the present computational
study, is that the customers are allocated on the rectilinear grid defining lines
equidistant from each other. This layout is also easy to implement. The customers’
allocation is determined, again, by a single parameter: the number of customers on
a side of a basic tile/square or simply the distance between the nearest neighbors.
In the New York City layout, the 10 × 10 square grid with a tile length of 1
represents the city map. Figure 5.5 shows an example of the New York City
layout with a population of five customers per edge, indicated by the crosses.
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Figure 5.5: New York City layout
London Apart from the grid-shaped cities, especially cities in the “Old World”
exhibit a shape of circles with radii-lines, see Figures 5.1a to 5.1d. Since this
leads to a completely different demand distribution, another customer spread is
introduced. Figure 5.6 shows an example of this customer spread called London.
Around the center, there are two (or more) circles of different radii. On each circle
and on each radius-line, the customers are evenly distributed. In Figure 5.6, each
circle contains 36 customers, yielding that customers are located at a degree of 0,
10, 20, 30,..., 350. Furthermore, on each radius-line at 0, 30, 60, 90, ..., 330 degrees,
there are four additional customers: two between the origin and the inner circle
and two between the inner and the outer circle. Therefore, on each radius-line
there are 6 customers. Note that such a setting represents a city layout where the
customers’ density around the origin, the city center, is higher than the customer
density in the suburbans.
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Figure 5.6: London layout
5.3.2 Suitable Tessellations
A computational study was conducted to test several tessellations and measure
their performance on different layouts. Among all known regular, semi-regular
and demi-regular tessellations, the ones depicted in Figure 5.7 were chosen. For
clarification, the dots in the polygons in Figure 5.7 represent locations of facil-
ities. The dots are exactly in the center of every tile. The possible location of
the facilities depends therefore on the chosen tessellation. Note that for every
(semi-, demi-) regular tessellation, the side length of any tile is the same. Let
this parameter - the side length of a tile - be denoted by l. Given l, every (semi-,
demi-) regular tessellation is completely determined. The larger/smaller the value
of l the fewer/more tiles are needed to cover the area, respectively. Since each tile
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contains a single facility in the center, the amount of facilities decreases/increases
in l, respectively.
The choice for a (semi-, demi-) regular tessellation can be explained as follows.
The choice was based on the range of the tile areas and the regularity of the facil-
ity distribution. Note that even for the same side length l, the areas of different
tiles are the same (Winkler et al., 2015). Tessellations with a high discrepancy of
tile areas are seen as impractical as they lead to significant differences in facility
capacities. In addition, some semi- and demi-regular tessellations exhibit irregular
patterns of the facilities distribution: there are points/areas/stripes of high or low
concentration of facility. This asymmetry is not appreciated in practice.
Wolfram (2017) displays all possible semi- and demi-regular tessellations. A
reader can verify that the five selected tessellations are, indeed, the most balanced
ones with respect to the two criteria outlined above.
(a) Hexagon tessellation
(b) Square tessellation
(c) Triangle tessellation
(d) Semi-regular tessella-
tion
(e) Demi-regular tessella-
tion
Figure 5.7: Tessellations used in research
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5.3.3 Performance of Tessellations on Different Layouts
To analyze the tessellation performance on the three demand distributions, the
tessellation-determined layer of facilities and the layout-determined layer of cus-
tomers are put on top of each other. The performance of the tessellations is
compared in terms of costs. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the
facility location objective is considered for this purpose. The mathematical pro-
gramming formulation for the facility location problem can be described as follows.
Let C be the sets of customers, as described in Section 5.3, and F be the sets of
potential facilities, as described in Section 5.3.1. Furthermore, let dij ∈ C, j ∈ F ,
denote the distance between customer i and facility j and let cj , j ∈ F , be the
fixed cost to open/operate facility j. The facility location problem has two binary
variables. Let yj , j ∈ F take value 1 if facility j is open and the value 0 otherwise.
Let xij , i ∈ C, j ∈ F take the value 1 if customer i is served at facility j and the
value 0 otherwise. Then, the integer linear program modeling the facility location
problem reads:
min
x,y
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈F
dijxij +
∑
j∈F
cjyj (5.1)
(5.2)
subject to ∑
j∈F
xij = 1, ∀i ∈ C; (5.3)
xij ≤ yj , ∀i ∈ C, j ∈ F ; (5.4)
xij , yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ C, j ∈ F. (5.5)
For the computational experiments, it is assumed that (a) the distances be-
tween the facilities and the customers are measured using the Euclidean distance
omitting obstacles; (b) all facilities are identical with respect to fixed costs; (c)
for all customers, per-unit-distance transport costs are the same. The author is
aware that these are simplistic assumptions deviating from reality, where fixed and
transport cost structures are quiet diverse. However, such simplicity provides a
deeper insight and intuition than any study based on very diverse urban network
cases. It is further implicitly assumed that all facilities are homogeneous, i.e. all
facilities provide identical services, have identical prices, opening hours and the
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same quality of goods/services. In addition, unlimited supply of goods/services
at any facility and an unlimited unit demand of customers are assumed. As a re-
sult of these implicit assumptions, it may be claimed that each customer receives
services at the closest facility.
In the experiments, the tessellation performance is studied under varying ratios
between facility fixed costs and per-unit-distance transport costs. Four different
cost structures are used: 1:1, 1:10, 1:50, 1:100. Here, in contrast to the literature
on a classic facility location problem, more weight is put on the transport costs
than on the fixed costs. This is a valid assumption for transport and telecommu-
nication industries as well as for the water supply. For some other industries, e.g.
financial services and retail including food supply, the fixed costs should receive
greater weight than the transport costs.
The setup for the computational experiments is as follows. For each of the three
city layouts, for each of the five selected tessellations, and for each of the four cost
structures, the optimal length l of the tile side is determined using an approximate
solution to the facility location problem, in which all facilities are open. Note that
the tile side also influences the number of facilities. In addition to the optimal
tile length l, the transport costs (Transp) - defined as
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈F dijxij -, the
fixed costs (Fixed) - defined as
∑
j∈F cjyj - and the total costs (Total) - defined
as
∑
i∈C
∑
i∈F dijxij +
∑
j∈F cjyj - are reported as the solution to the facility
location problem. The value for the tile length is found by means of an exhaustive
search in a range of l ∈ [0.1, 3], discretized to one decimal. Solutions to the facility
location problem are obtained by computing the nearest tessellation-determined
facility for each customer and calculating the corresponding transport costs.
5.4 Tessellation Comparison through Computa-
tional Experiments
5.4.1 Triangular City Layout
As already outlined, the triangular city layout is mapped on an area of 10 × 10.
The same area is used for the tessellations. In Tables 5.1 and 5.2, optimal values
for the side length of each polygon l and the costs in optimal solutions are reported
for each of the selected tessellations and cost structures (ratios).
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In case of a 1:1 ratio of opening vs. transport costs, the square tessellation
yields the lowest total cost of 101.97 at a tile side length of l = 2 and 25 open
facilities. In contrast, the tessellation which exhibits the weakest performance is
the triangular tessellation. It uses 49 open facilities. Although this high number
of facilities reduces the transport costs, the gain in transport does not compensate
for the high opening cost. This is a first striking result indicating there is no per-
fect match between the tessellation shape and the demand distribution shape.
Even though the square tessellation was the tessellation exhibiting the low-
est cost for a 1:1 cost ratio, for all remaining cost structures this tessellation is
sub-optimal. The dominant tessellation for the remaining cost structures is the
triangular tessellation. This result indicates that for a demand distribution that
is approximating a uniform distribution, the triangular tessellation would be the
best choice on average. Note that this is not in line with the suggestions from liter-
ature, which propose that the best tessellation is hexagonal in case of a uniformly
distributed demand. However, the author is aware that a triangular tessellation is
merely approximating a uniformly distributed population and that customers are
not randomly distributed across the plane. This needs to be taken into consider-
ation when comparing the computational experiments with the present literature.
In addition, the weighted distribution between transport and opening costs should
be taken into account. For instance, for the majority of the literature focusing on
location addresses cases of medical facility locations. The opening/fixed/operating
costs of such a facility are so high that only a few facilities will serve a city. In
this case the area coverage argument fits perfectly, which makes the hexagonal
tessellation the best choice. However, when the transport costs start dominating
the fixed costs it is rather beneficial to open several extra facilities to decrease the
transport expenses. Thus, generally, the coverage argument should not be the only
driver in decision-making, and the hexagonal tessellation is not necessarily the best
layout for a commodity distribution even under (almost) uniform demand. This
is a second interesting finding of these very simple computational experiments.
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1:1 Cost Ratio 1:10 Cost Ratio
l Transp Fixed Total l Transp Fixed Total
Triangular 2.2 61.79 49 110.79 1 173.21 241 414.21
Square 2 76.97 25 101.97 1.2 487.85 81 568.85
Hexagonal 1.2 79.98 23 102.98 0.6 381.41 105 486.41
Semi-regular 2.6 85.29 22 107.29 1 319.97 162 481.97
Demi-regular 2.2 76.08 31 107.08 1.4 389.42 95 484.42
Table 5.1: Results for the triangular city layout
1:50 Cost Ratio 1:100 Cost Ratio
l Transp Fixed Total l Transp Fixed Total
Triangular 1 866.03 241 1,107.03 1 1,732.05 241 1,973.05
Square 0.4 830.27 625 1,455.27 0.4 1,660.54 625 2,285.54
Hexagonal 0.2 660 941 1,601 0.2 1,320 941 2,261
Semi-
regular
0.6 954.60 456 1,410.60 0.4 1,329.01 1,008 2,337.01
Demi-
regular
0.6 1,036.61 459 1,495.61 0.4 1,327.38 997 2,324.38
Table 5.2: Results for the triangular city layout
New York City
The city map is again situated on a 10 × 10 grid. In Tables 5.3 and 5.4, the
results for the New York City layout are displayed. For this demand distribution
under the 1:1 cost ratio, the hexagonal tessellation reveals the lowest total costs of
748.85 at a tile side length of l = 0.4. The hexagonal tessellation is also the best
for the 1:10 and 1:50 cost ratios. Interestingly, the triangular tessellation, which
was one of the best in triangular layout, turns out to be one of the worst in the
New York City layout. More precisely, this tessellation is performing worst for the
1:1 and 1:10 ratios. Surprisingly, the triangular tessellation is the best performing
tessellation for a 1:100 cost structure. This leads to the conclusion that there are
no strong dominants amongst the tessellations and every specific case requires its
own analysis and decision making.
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1:1 Cost Ratio 1:10 Cost Ratio
l Transp Fixed Total l Transp Fixed Total
Triangular 1 571.49 241 812.49 0.4 2,260.35 1,505 3,765.36
Square 0.6 509.24 289 798.24 0.4 3,076.97 625 3,701.97
Hexagonal 0.4 501.85 247 748.85 0.2 2,464.18 941 3,405.18
Semi-regular 0.8 505.45 262 767.45 0.4 2,538.1 1,008 3,546.1
Demi-
regular
0.8 534.99 245 779.99 0.4 2,718.31 997 3,715.31
Table 5.3: Results for New York City
1:50 Cost Ratio 1:100 Cost Ratio
l Transp Fixed Total l Transp Fixed Total
Triangular 0.2 4,753.11 5,693 10,446.11 0.2 9,506.21 5,693 15,199.21
Square 0.3 10,648.6 1,089 11,737.6 0.3 21,297.2 1,089 22,386.2
Hexagonal 0.1 6,101.09 3,853 9,954.09 0.1 12,202.20 3,853 16,055.2
Semi-
regular
0.2 6,153 4,034 10,187 0.2 12,306 4,034 16,340
Demi-
regular
0.2 6,303.61 3,907 10,210.61 0.2 12,607.2 2,907 16,514.2
Table 5.4: Results for New York City
London
The results for the London layout are outlined in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Considering
a 1:1 cost ratio, the triangular tessellation exhibits the lowest costs of 102.63 at
the tile side length of l = 2.6. At the tile side length of l = 1, the demi-regular
tessellation reveals overall costs of 519.87 at a 1:10 cost ratio, representing the
lowest value. The square tessellation is the tessellation which reveals the lowest
costs at a 1:50 as well as a 1:100 cost structure. Therefore, it can be concluded
that also for this customer spread no superior tessellation can be determined.
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1:1 Cost Ratio 1:10 Cost Ratio
l Transp Fixed Total l Transp Fixed Total
Triangular 2.6 71.63 31 102.63 1.2 370.82 161 531.82
Square 1.8 82.23 25 107.23 0.9 411.9 121 532.9
Hexagonal 1.2 91.59 23 114.59 0.4 276.45 247 523.45
Semi-regular 2 97.2 40 137.2 1.1 507.06 134 641.06
Demi-regular 2.2 79.28 31 110.28 1 362.87 157 519.87
Table 5.5: Results for the London layout
1:50 Cost Ratio 1:100 Cost Ratio
l Transp Fixed Total l Transp Fixed Total
Triangular 0.8 1,211.42 361 1,572.42 0.5 1,566.63 963 2,529.63
Square 0.4 795.41 625 1,420.41 0.4 1,590.82 625 2,215.82
Hexagonal 0.2 705.21 941 1,646.21 0.2 1,410.41 941 2,351.41
Semi-
regular
0.6 1,387.34 456 1,843.34 0.4 1,884.42 1,008 2,892.42
Demi-
regular
0.5 952.66 633 1,585.66 0.4 1,539.37 997 2,536.37
Table 5.6: Results for the London layout
It is not surprising that (semi-, demi-) regular tessellations do not perform well
on the concentric demand map. A high demand in the center combined with low
demand on the periphery creates a cost disbalance across the map. This demand
distribution is different from both the New York City or the triangular one with
a grid structure and an almost uniformly distributed demand. For this concentric
demand distribution, more facilities in the center and fewer facilities on the pe-
riphery would solve the problem. However, at least a certain extend of logic and
regularity in the tessellation is maintained. In the following, two new hexagon-
based tessellations are introduced. These tessellations are referred to as expanding
hexagonal tessellations.
In Figure 5.8, two expanding hexagonal tessellation structures are displayed.
Note that none of the triangles or rhombuses in these tessellations contain a facil-
ity, e.g., all black areas are facility-free. The idea behind the expanding hexagons
is that the size of the tiles increases with the distance from the center. As stated
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in Section 5.3.1, these tessellations would reasonably match a typical concentric
demand distribution of “Old World” cities. The two expanding hexagonal tes-
sellations are also in line with the literature: according to Gastner and Newman
(2006), an increase of the population density should be associated with an increase
in facility density.
The common structure of expanding hexagons can be described as follows. In
the expanding hexagon structure 1, the tile side length of the outer (second level)
hexagons is three times larger than the tile length of the inner hexagon, see Fig-
ure 5.8a. If an additional layer of hexagons was added, the hexagons in the new
circle would have a tile length of nine times the length of the most inner hexagons
and so on. Each new layer is multiplied by three. For the expanding hexagon
structure 2, see Figure 5.8b, the hexagon growth factor is two, i.e, the tile side
length of the outer hexagons is twice the side length of the inner hexagons and if
another layer of hexagons was added, it would be four times the side length of the
inner hexagons and so on.
(a) Structure 1: Growth factor 3 (b) Structure 2: Growth factor 2
Figure 5.8: Expanding hexagons
In the following, the performance of the two expanding hexagonal tessellations
is investigated for a concentric customer spread. For the two expanding hexagonal
tessellation structures, first a range for the polygon length l is defined in such a
way that an additional surrounding layer of even larger hexagons is unnecessary
to cover the customer area. This restriction is made in order to match the shape
of several “Old World” cities that consist of two circles. Within this range of l,
the polygon length contributing to the lowest costs is determined. In the case of
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the expanding hexagonal tessellations, the transport costs are the leading costs for
determining the best polygon length since due to the restriction to two circles the
number of facilities is fixed. Using computational experiments, the performance of
the expanding hexagonal tessellations for a 1:1 cost ratio is investigated. Due to
the fact that the number of polygons as well as the customer distribution is fixed,
changing the cost ratio would not yield any conclusions as to which tessellation is
better suited.
The results in Table 5.7 show that for the London layout the expanding hexago-
nal tessellation with the growth factor 2 reveals the lowest costs. Not surprisingly,
in comparison to the (semi-, demi-) regular tessellations, the costs achieved by
the expanding hexagonal tessellations are significantly lower. The cost decrease
through the use of the expanding hexagonal tessellation structure 2 can be at-
tributed to a reduction of the fixed costs by 58%. This is the result of the length
difference of the polygons. Consequently, in peripheral regions facilities can cover
a larger area due to the lower population density in these areas.
l Transp Fixed Total
Structure 1: Growth factor 3 0.46 70.01 13 83.01
Structure 2: Growth factor 2 0.62 62.61 13 75.61
Table 5.7: New tessellations for London under cost ratio 1:1
In summary, it can be concluded that among regular, semi-regular, and demi-
regular tessellations there is no clear winner for all cost ratios even in the case of a
uniform demand distribution. The message of these computational experiments is
that every specific case should be treated individually as the results are relatively
difficult to foresee. Furthermore, it can be concluded that in the case of a con-
centric customer spread, the expanding hexagonal tessellation structure 2 is the
recommended tessellation.
5.5 Conclusion, Implications and Future Research
In this chapter the performance of (semi-, demi-) regular tessellations under the
assumption of a non-uniformly distributed demand has been investigated. Apart
from five different “regular” tessellations and three city layouts, four different cost
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structures were considered. The computational study revealed several insights in
the performance of (semi, demi-) regular tessellation under an irregular demand
distribution.
First, due to the imperfect match between the tessellation and demand distribu-
tion shapes, no superior tessellation could be identified. As a result, every specific
case should be treated individually. Second, when solving the commodity distribu-
tion problem using tessellations, not only the area coverage argument, but also the
fixed-to-transport cost ratio is a crucial factor for determining the optimal tiling.
When the transport costs dominate the facility fixed costs, the triangular tiling
outperforms the hexagonal tessellation even under a uniform demand distribution.
Third, under the assumption of a concentric demand distribution, as occurring in
“Old World” cities, the concentrically expanding hexagonal tessellations reveal
very promising results and outperform all “regular” tessellations. In compari-
son to the irregular tessellations, which are often introduced for a non-uniformly
distributed demand, the expanding hexagonal tessellations do not require detailed
(prior) knowledge about the demand distribution and are therefore more practical.
5.5.1 Theoretical Implications
This chapter contributes to research by investigating whether (semi-, demi-) reg-
ular tessellations can be used for a facility location problem if customers are non-
uniformly distributed. Contemporary literature that considered regular tessella-
tion always assumes a uniform demand distribution. Solely irregular tessellations
have been applied to problems with a non-uniform demand distribution. Further-
more, two new expanding hexagonal tessellation structures have been developed
that outperform (semi-, demi-) regular tessellations for a concentric demand dis-
tribution and that are easy to use in practice with limited prior knowledge on
demand distribution.
5.5.2 Practical Implications
The results of the computational experiments revealed that there is no superior
tessellation which can be applied to every demand structure. As a result, each case
needs to be treated individually. Fortunately, such experiments are straightforward
and easily implementable, even for non-uniform demand distribution. Fixing an
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origin and computing the costs for a range of a single varying parameter l on dif-
ferent tessellations completely determines the choice of the tessellation. Even on a
very modest personal computer, this routine does not take much time to compute
the best tessellation for the facility location. In addition, a new tessellation has
been introduced which can be recommended to be used in case of a concentric
demand distribution. The introduced tessellation is very easy to use and to imple-
ment in practice due to the fact that limited knowledge on demand distribution is
needed in advance.
5.5.3 Further Research Directions
This chapter provides several directions for further research. First, it is interesting
to know what precisely influences the transport-to-fixed cost ratio in the choice of
the tessellation. Therefore, in further research special attention should be paid to
the threshold of that cost ratio to determine at which point the triangular tessel-
lation starts outperforming the hexagonal tessellation. Second, in this paper the
growth factor two as well as the growth factor three has been taken into considera-
tion for expanding hexagonal tessellations. Further research should investigate the
performance of hexagonal tessellations that allow for other growth factors. Third,
in this chapter the optimization of costs for a specific tessellation was done by
choosing an optimal value of a single parameter, the tile side length l. In further
research, other parameters, e.g. the selection of an origin and/or rotation of the
tiling should be taken into account in order to determine their influence on the
tessellation performance.
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Chapter 6
Final Conclusions and
Further Research Directions
The purpose of this thesis was to study three SCC challenges and to present ap-
proaches to overcome these three obstacles to a successful SCC. First, the difficulty
of identifying and understanding relevant drivers and resistors for launching a col-
laboration has been investigated in Chapter 2. Second, the gain sharing challenge
has been discussed in-depth in Chapters 3 and 4. Third and last, in Chapter 5 an
approach to handle the challenge of finding the right coalition partner based on
geographical dimensions has been outlined. This final chapter provides an overall
conclusion (Section 6.1) and outlines directions for further research (Section 6.2).
6.1 Final Conclusions
SCC has become an important research area ever since increased competition
amongst organizations, scarce resources and higher customer expectations forced
supply chain partners to engage in collaborations. SCCs offer parties the oppor-
tunity to achieve significant competitive advantages, such as cost reduction, time
reduction and increased customer satisfaction. However, in practice SCCs often
break down due to challenges, such as the identification and understanding of all
relevant drivers and resistors for launching the SCC, fair gain sharing and the se-
lection of the right coalition partners. It is thus essential to approach SCCs from
a business perspective to find ways to tackle these obstacles.
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The existing literature discussing drivers and resistors for launching an SCC is
lacks several important aspects. First, although a significant amount of literature
already investigated potential drivers and resistors for launching an SCC, until now
a study including all drivers and resistors for launching a collaboration is missing.
Existing studies provide insights into a selection of drivers and resistors as well
as, in some cases, a selection of perspectives, SCC structures and/or industries. A
comprehensive overview of all potential drivers and resistors for all SCC structures,
perspectives and/or industries is not provided yet in academic literature. Second,
in the literature two types of ambiguity can be identified. The first one is the lack
of unique terms for each driver and resistor category. So far, the same term is used
for different driver and resistor categories. The second type of ambiguity is that es-
pecially drivers are assigned to more than one category. Third, most current work
is prone to incompleteness, namely that: drivers or resistors identified in previous
research are not presented in more recent literature. Fourth and last, literature
identifying drivers and resistors for the FMCG industry is non-existent. The exist-
ing literature mainly focuses on forces and barriers. In order to fill these research
gaps, a comprehensive, structured and consistent framework including all drivers
and resistors for launching SCCs for all collaborative structures, perspectives and
industries mentioned in the literature was developed in Chapter 2. The frame-
work consists of four categories: benefits, forces, enablers/barriers and risks. The
driver categories, benefits and forces, both include motivating factors for parties
to launch a collaboration. Whereas, the benefits represent the intrinsic motivation
of a party to launch an SCC, the forces represent the extrinsic motivation. The
resistor category, risks, is future-oriented and includes events that might occur
in the future but are uncertain yet. The final category, enablers/barriers, com-
bines the driver category, enablers, and the resistor category, barriers. Enablers
represents factors which enable someone to collaborate, whereas barriers include
factors which keep parties from launching an SCC. Based on an extensive liter-
ature review, a connection between these two categories was identified, since for
every enabler a corresponding barrier could be observed. To show this connection,
the factors of these two categories were combined. When evaluating SCCs, factors
will be identified either as an enabler, presence of..., or as a barrier, lack of.... In
addition, a case study approach was used to identify relevant drivers and resistors
for the Dutch FMCG industry in order to validate the completeness of the con-
ceptual framework. The case study revealed one missing factor in the literature.
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In the Dutch FMCG industry, discussions about gains in the first SCC meeting
lead to rough negotiations, which, in some cases, result in a breakdown of the SCC
initiative. After adding an additional general factor, which is called presence of
neglecting money in the first meeting if it is an enabler and lack of neglecting money
in the first meeting if it is a barrier, the framework is complete for all investigated
industries, relationships and perspectives. On the practical side, the introduced
framework enables parties to more holistically evaluate considered SCCs and thus
helps with identifying collaborations with a high failure potential. The evalua-
tion of an SCC is enhanced through an improved understanding and identification
of the drivers and resistors for launching SCCs. The understanding is enhanced
through a clear distinction between the four driver and resistor categories, consis-
tent definitions and explanations for the influence of these categories on an SCC.
Furthermore, the identification is improved through an extensive checklist provided
by the framework of all potential drivers and resistors for launching collaborations
that need to be taken into account and evaluated on their importance for every
potential SCC. Only if the factors that have a positive influence on the collabo-
ration, outweigh those with a negative influence, it is advisable to launch the SCC.
Although other researchers have already outlined the importance of the par-
ties’ acceptance of and satisfaction with the assigned gain share for a sustainable
SCC, the actual acceptance levels of existing gain sharing methods have not been
investigated. Chapter 3 tries to close this research gap through the investigation of
the acceptance of selected gain sharing methods (Nucleolus, Shapley value, WCM
(power, initiator) and ECM) in vertical SCCs in the Dutch FMCG industry. Fur-
thermore, by investigating the impact of behavioral aspects, namely the availability
of information and cognitive biases, on the acceptance decision, Chapter 3 further
contributes to the SCM literature by integrating behavioral decision-making re-
search. Up to now, limited research has been published in the logistics and SCM
literature dealing with the influence of human behavior, judgment and decision-
making. However, to ensure the practical validity, the integration of behavioral
decision-making is essential since human beings do not think rationally. Rather
their decisions are influenced by e.g. limitations in available information as well as
cognitive biases. The study in Chapter 3 revealed that in general no gain sharing
method is accepted by all collaborative parties. This is due to the fact that the
availability of information as well as the cognitive biases have a different influ-
ence on each party. Based on these results, one managerial implication is to not
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provide all parties with the same amount of information since this leads to no
preferred gain sharing method. For this purpose, it is necessary to observe which
and how much information one collaborative party should receive in order to show
the highest acceptance level. This information can be obtained by e.g. conducting
the survey introduced in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the influence of cognitive biases
makes the party’s decision unpredictable, since decisions are not made in a ratio-
nal and consistent way. In order to reduce the occurrence of cognitive biases and
simultaneously increase the predictability of the decisions, debiasing-techniques
should be applied. One example of a debiasing-technique is to provide all relevant
information in an intuitively comprehensive and compelling format. A suggestion
is to show a figure which provides information about the gain allocation.
Building upon the research findings of Chapter 3, a comprehensive, simple and
robust gain sharing system that is desirable on an individual and collaborative
level was proposed in Chapter 4. The developed gain sharing system focuses on
the maximization of the parties’ satisfaction by using a minimax regret approach
in order to overcome the lack of the parties’ acceptance of the gain sharing meth-
ods. In this way, the newly introduced gain sharing method contributes to an
increased probability of sustainable collaborations. Another contribution of the
gain sharing system is that it provides managers with a complete gain sharing
system and many related useful KPIs to support managers when evaluating the
performance of a proposed gain sharing system. In order to theoretically illus-
trate the potential and performance of the system, it was applied to a vertical
SCC between one manufacturer, one LSP and one retailer in the Dutch FMCG
industry. The results show a maximization of the parties’ satisfaction and a de-
crease in regrets. In addition, the gain sharing system stability was investigated.
The system stability proved the fairness of the gain allocation and revealed the
importance of an accurate determination of the satisfaction functions. The pro-
posed gain sharing system can be easily applied in practice since it provides all key
characteristics which are appreciated in real-life: mathematical simplicity, applica-
bility and transparency. The system only requires limited input data, namely the
parties’ satisfaction functions and the financial information of the SCC, to provide
a robust output for the gain sharing system. In order to determine the parties’
satisfaction functions, the parties’ satisfaction levels can be derived through e.g.
questionnaires. In this context, it is important to ensure that the questionnaires
are answered honestly in order to accurately determine the satisfaction functions.
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There are several techniques to increase the honesty of participants when answer-
ing the questionnaire, such as the use of self-administered questionnaires and/or
the incorporation of instructions at the beginning and during the surveys asking
the respondents to answer the questions truthfully.
Especially for LSPs, geographical coverage is essential but cannot be achieved
by one partner alone. However, a horizontal collaboration could provide compa-
nies with the opportunity to expand their geographical coverage. In this context,
finding the right coalition partner is essential. The research introduced in Chap-
ter 5 focuses on this SCC challenge. For the first time, several known regular,
semi-regular and demi-regular tessellations as well as one newly introduced ex-
panding hexagonal tessellation approach were investigated for their performance
in locating facilities in a cost-efficient way under the assumption of an irregular
demand distribution. The results show that there is no tessellation exhibiting a
superior performance for every demand distribution and cost structure. As a re-
sult, each specific case needs to be treated individually. However, the research
revealed that using tessellations is a good approach to locate facilities and to as-
sign demand to the facilities in a fair and cost efficient manner. In the context of
horizontal logistics collaborations, the tessellation approach supports companies
in their partner selection process by suggesting where a coalition partner’s facil-
ities should be preferably located in order to achieve a significant geographical
coverage. Simultaneously, the approach might reduce transport costs in a hori-
zontal collaboration by assigning the demand to the facilities/collaborative parties
in a cost efficient manner. In addition, since tessellations cover a plane without
overlaps, the competitive pressure that can arise through overlaps in the customer
base is avoided.
6.2 Further Research Directions
SCC constitutes a broad research domain. Although, in the course of the last years
a great amount of literature has been published in this field, several opportunities
for further research directions may be identified.
First, this thesis focuses on three challenges for the implementation and suc-
cess of SCCs. However, as indicated in Section 1.2 there are several more SCC
challenges that should be further investigated. Examples are the lack of trust and
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the power imbalance, which are both factors that have a negative impact on the
success and sustainability of SCCs.
Second, the majority of research findings are based on data from the Dutch
FMCG industry. Further research chould also include other industries and/or geo-
graphical areas. Testing the completeness of the framework proposed in Chapter 2
in other geographical areas and/or industries as well as with a greater sample size
may result in stronger support. The survey performed in Chapter 3 as well as
the gain sharing system proposed in Chapter 4 should also be applied to other
geographical areas and/or industries as well as to horizontal and lateral SCCs.
Third, the practical validation of the research work is relevant. The developed
framework of Chapter 2 should be applied to real-life cases in order to discover
whether the framework actually leads to an increased SCC success. For this pur-
pose, parties that have already participated in a failed collaboration could be
interviewed in order to investigate whether the SCC failure would have been pre-
vented if all collaborative parties had taken into account the proposed framework.
In addition, the survey outlined in Chapter 3 was conducted in an artificial situ-
ation and no incentives, e.g. monetary incentives in order to increase effort and
task performance, were provided. Conducting the survey in a real-life situation
could identify other important behavioral decision-making aspects. Further re-
search could also apply the gain sharing system proposed in Chapter 4 to real-life
SCCs in order to investigate whether it increases the parties’ acceptance of and
satisfaction with the assigned gain share. The expanding hexagonal tessellation
proposed in Chapter 5 could also be applied to a real-life horizontal SCC. In this
way, it can be identified whether the partner selection process with regard to the
geographical coverage is supported and whether the costs can be reduced.
Finally, the surveys, frameworks, methods and approaches introduced in this
thesis focus on certain choices and assumptions. Further research could also take
additional aspects into account in order to support the research findings. The
focus of the comprehensive framework of all drivers and resistors for launching an
SCC is on the relevance of the drivers and resistors for the collaborative parties.
However, the importance of the drivers and resistors has not been quantified for
a specific partner and collaboration. Quantifying the factors for each partner and
collaboration can be beneficial and could also be considered in further research. In
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Chapter 3, the parties’ acceptance was investigated for a selection of gain sharing
methods. The investigation of the parties’ acceptance levels might be extended
by observing other gain sharing methods, such as the EPM or WRSM. Moreover,
additional weights for the WCM could be investigated. In addition, in the survey
the influence of two behavioral aspects, availability of information and cognitive
biases, was investigated. Further research could also take into account other as-
pects. One example would be the availability of time, which is another component
of bounded rationality. The lack of available time forces people to use heuristics
and cognitive biases. Therefore, it might be interesting to also include the time
availability in future surveys. The gain sharing system proposed in Chapter 4 ex-
clusively considers the gain share as an aspect that has an influence on the parties’
satisfaction. The research could be extended by including additional influencing
aspects such as the amount and quality of information that has to be shared by
a party. Furthermore, the tessellation approach introduced in Chapter 5 could
consider practical characteristics such as the transport network, different trans-
port modes, heterogeneous facilities as well as geographical barriers for facility
locations.
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Valorization
Knowledge valorization refers to the process of translating scientific knowledge
into social benefits. In this addendum, I outline the knowledge valorization of the
results obtained during my PhD.
The research presented in this thesis deals with selected supply chain collabora-
tion (SCC) challenges: the identification and understanding of relevant drivers and
resistors for launching an SCC, gain sharing and the selection of a suitable coali-
tion partner. In addition, ways to overcome these SCC challenges are proposed.
In this thesis, the majority of the research findings are based on data from the
Dutch fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry. As a result, the knowledge
valorization for companies in a supply chain as a target group has already been
described in each chapter itself. In the following, for each chapter the knowledge
valorization is again briefly outlined. This is followed by a short overview about
other possible target groups of this research.
Chapter 2 discusses the challenge of identifying and understanding relevant
drivers and resistors for launching SCCs. To eliminate a barrier before it leads to
the breakdown of the SCC, it is essential for the collaborative party to be aware of
this barrier. In Chapter 2, a comprehensive, structured and consistent framework
including all potential drivers and resistors for launching an SCC for a broad range
of SCC types, perspectives and industries has been developed. This framework
supports parties in a supply chain to more holistically evaluate the considered SCC
and thus helps to identify collaborations with high failure potential. As a result,
the probability of sustainable SCCs, which are nowadays very important for every
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company in a supply chain to be competitive on the dynamic market, is increased.
The introduced framework provides to all collaborative parties an extensive check-
list of drivers and resistors, which should be evaluated on their importance for the
considered collaboration before launching the SCC. The framework further sup-
ports supply chain parties in their decision whether to launch a specific SCC or
not. Only if the factors, which have a positive influence on SCC outweigh those
with a negative influence, the considered SCC is advisable to launch.
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the challenge of fairly sharing the coalition gain
between the collaborative parties. If one party is not satisfied with its received
gain share or if the party has the feeling that it is treated unfairly, future SCC are
less likely to occur. As a result, in order to increase the probability of sustainable
SCCs, the fair allocation of the coalition gain, which is also perceived as fair by
all collaborative parties, is necessary.
Chapter 3 investigates the parties’ acceptance of selected gain sharing meth-
ods. In order to be able to explain the cause of the acceptance or rejection of a
gain sharing method, the influence of behavioral aspects, namely the availability
of information and cognitive biases, on the party’s acceptance of a gain sharing
method has been observed. The incorporation of behavioral decision-making as-
pects ensure the practical validity of the results, since it is taken into account that
human beings do not think rational. For a long time, the predominant assumption
in economics was that human beings are rational thinking agents, which implies
that decisions are made in a rational and consistent way. However, human beings
are bounded due to limitations in available time, information and cognitive ca-
pabilities. We tend to rely on heuristics or cognitive biases to deal with complex
problems. The main result of this chapter is that due to a different influence of
information availability and diverse cognitive biases, no gain sharing method is
accepted by all parties involved. As a result of the different influence of available
information, one practical implication is to not provide the same amount of in-
formation to all collaborative parties, since this would lead to no preferred gain
sharing method. Therefore, to each party separately an individual amount of in-
formation should be provided. Moreover, an influence of diverse cognitive biases
could be identified. Cognitive biases make decisions more unpredictable, since
decisions are not made in a rational and consistent way. In order to make the de-
cisions more predictable, debiasing-techniques should be applied in practice. One
example for a debiasing-technique is to provide all relevant information packaged
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in an intuitively comprehensible and compelling format. A suggestion in regard
to gain sharing would be to show a figure which provides information about the
allocation of the coalition gain.
Chapter 4 proposes a comprehensive, fair and simple gain sharing system,
which focuses on the maximization of the parties’ satisfaction. By focusing on
the maximization of the parties’ satisfaction, the satisfaction of all collaborative
parties with the coalition gain should be guaranteed and as a result the proba-
bility of having sustainable SCCs should be achieved. The proposed gain sharing
system can be easily applied into practice, since it provides all key characteris-
tics, which are appreciated in practice: mathematical simplicity, applicability and
transparency. Furthermore, the gain sharing system only requires limited input
data in order to provide robust output for the gain sharing decision. In addition,
the gain sharing system includes the evaluation of important key performance indi-
cators such as the optimal gain share allocation and the fairness properties, which
supports managers to evaluate the performance of the gain sharing system.
In Chapter 5 an approach which supports parties in the partner selection pro-
cess is proposed. Special attention is paid to the geographical coverage, which is an
important aspects for companies especially in the transport and logistics industry.
However, geographical coverage cannot be achieved alone, but collaborations be-
tween parties from the same supply chain level are needed. The proposed approach
supports parties in their partner selection process by suggesting where the coali-
tion partner’s facilities should be preferably located in order to achieve a significant
geographical coverage. Simultaneously, the approach might reduce the transport
costs in the horizontal collaboration, which represents another huge challenge in
the transport industry, by assigning the demand to the facilities/collaborative
parties in a cost efficient manner. In addition, the approach ensures, that the
geographical markets of the parties do not overlap, which avoids the competitive
pressure resulting out of overlaps in the customer base.
In this thesis, the focus has been on collaborations between parties in a supply
chain. However, collaborations do not just appear between parties in a supply
chain, but also all around us in e.g. our everyday relationships or at work. As
a result, the proposed approaches can also be applied, in an adjusted version, to
other collaborations. In the following, some examples are provided in which col-
laborations are essential.
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One example is the collaboration between researchers. The majority of re-
searchers collaborate at a certain point in time to do research and/or to publish
a paper together. Besides researchers, also students have to collaborate with each
other at a certain point in time during their education. If students have to sit down
together to exchange their ideas to solve a problem, the students are collaborating
with each other. Recently, so-called real-life escape rooms have become popular.
In these real-life escape rooms a group of people is locked in a room, where they
have to solve puzzles in order to escape the room in a specific time frame. In order
to successfully escape the room, the collaboration between the players is essential.
As a whole, I can summarize, that the research I performed during my PhD
has the focus on collaborations between parties in a supply chain. However, since
collaborations happen every day to multiple persons, the research findings are not
limited to one area.
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In de loop van de laatste decennia zijn bedrijven de voordelen beginnen inzien
van het opzetten van een Supply Chain-samenwerking. Verschillende uitdagin-
gen – zoals schaarse middelen, toegenomen concurrentie tussen de organisaties en
hogere verwachtingen van de consument – hebben de bedrijven gedwongen om
buiten hun organisatiegrenzen te zoeken naar partijen met wie ze kunnen samen-
werken. Verschillende onderzoekers hebben de duurzame concurrentievoordelen
geschetst die kunnen worden bereikt door samenwerking in de toeleveringsketen;
zoals kostenbesparingen, cyclustijdverkorting en een verbeterde dienstverlening.
Ondanks dat Supply Chain-samenwerkingsverbanden aanzienlijke voordelen
hebben, brengt deze samenwerking ook uitdagingen met zich mee. In dit proef-
schrift worden drie samenwerkings-uitdagingen, alsook benaderingen om deze uit-
gagingen aan te pakken, kritisch onderzocht. Ten eerste is onder de loep genomen
hoe moeilijk het is om de drijfveren en de belemmeringen van het opstarten van
een dergelijke samenwerking, te identificeren en te begrijpen. Ten tweede wordt de
uitdaging van het verdelen van de winst besproken. Ten derde wordt een aanpak
geschetst hoe de juiste coalitiepartner te vinden op basis van geografische karak-
teristieken.
Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe moeilijk het is om alle po-
tentie¨le drivers en hindernissen voor het opstarten van een Supply Chain-samen-
werking te identificeren en te begrijpen. Om een belemmering te elimineren voor-
dat deze leidt tot het uiteenvallen van de samenwerking, moet men zich immers be-
wust zijn van dit obstakel. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een uitgebreid kader voorgesteld
169
Nederlandse Samenvatting
dat alle drijfveren en drempels omvat voor het opstarten van een samenwerking
voor een breed scala van samenwerkingsstructuren, perspectieven en industriee¨n in
de Supply Chain. Het concept is versterkt door een duidelijk onderscheid tussen
de vier categoriee¨n drijfveren en hindernissen, en consistente definities en verk-
laringen van de invloed van deze categoriee¨n op een samenwerking in de Supply
Chain. Dit verbetert sterk de evaluatie door de samenwerkende partijen van een
mogelijke collaboratie in de toeleveringsketen.
Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 bespreken de uitdagingen van het verdelen van de winst
van de coalitie over de samenwerkende partijen. Voor een duurzame samenwerk-
ing in de toeleveringsketen is het noodzakelijk dat alle samenwerkende partijen
tevreden zijn met hun toegewezen aandeel en dat ze het gevoel hebben dat ze een
eerlijk deel van de coalitiewinst ontvangen.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt gekeken hoe, in een verticale samenwerking met drie
echelon-toeleveringsketens binnen de Nederlandse Fast Moving Consumer Goods
industrie, de geselecteerde winstdeel-methodes worden aanvaard. Er wordt ook een
verklaring gezocht waarom een winstdeel-methode al dan niet wordt aanvaard.
Hierbij wordt de invloed van twee gedragsaspecten van beslissingen beschouwd,
namelijk de beschikbaarheid van informatie enerzijds en cognitieve vooroordelen
anderzijds. Dit onderzoek heeft twee belangrijke bevindingen aan het licht ge-
bracht. Ten eerste blijken de beschikbare informatie en cognitieve vooroordelen, de
aanvaarding van de winstdeel-methode door de verschillende partijen te be¨ınvloe-
den. Ten tweede wordt elke partner individueel be¨ınvloed door de beschikbaarheid
aan informatie en door de verschillende cognitieve vooroordelen. Als gevolg van
de individuele invloed van de beschikbaarheid van informatie en de verschillende
cognitieve vooroordelen, wordt geen enkele toewijzingsmethode geaccepteerd door
alle samenwerkende partijen.
Hoofdstuk 4 bouwt verder op de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3. Er wordt een uit-
gebreid, robuust en eenvoudig winstdeelsysteem ge¨ıntroduceerd dat de aanvaarding
en de tevredenheid van alle samenwerkende partijen garandeert. Door te focussen
op het maximaliseren van de tevredenheid van de partijen wordt de kans op een
duurzame Supply Chain-samenwerking vergroot. Het voorgestelde winstdeelsys-
teem vertoont alle belangrijke kenmerken die in de praktijk worden gewaardeerd,
zoals wiskundige eenvoud, toepasbaarheid en transparantie. Bovendien is vast-
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gesteld dat het winstdelingssysteem een eerlijke verdeling van winsten oplevert,
wat kan leiden tot duurzame samenwerkingsverbanden in de Supply Chain.
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de uitdaging om een geschikte coalitiepartner te vin-
den voor een horizontale samenwerking in de Supply Chain en dit specifiek, in de
logistieke sector. Een grote uitdaging in deze sector is de geografische dekking.
De gewenste geografische dekking kan niet door e´e´n partij alleen bereikt wor-
den, maar enkel door samenwerking met Supply Chain partners van hetzelfde
niveau. Daarom ligt de focus van het partnerselectieproces op deze geografische
dekking. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een aanpak voorgesteld die de partijen ondersteunt
in hun partnerselectie-proces door te suggereren waar de faciliteit van de partner
bij voorkeur moet worden geplaatst om een significante geografische dekking te
bereiken. Tegelijkertijd vermindert deze aanpak eveneens de transportkosten –
een andere grote uitdaging in de logistieke sector. Tot slot wordt in deze strate-
gie – aangezien de tesselaties een vlak zonder overlappingen bedekken – de con-
currentiedruk die door zulke overlappingen in het klantenbestand kan ontstaan,
vermeden.
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